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ABSTRACT
Given the growing reliance of industry and government on online information
services such as cloud computing and data centers, eﬃcient fault-tolerance
algorithm design is of increasing importance in both industry and academia.
In this dissertation, we present some of our eﬃcient fault-tolerant algorithms
for distributed systems under both point-to-point and broadcast communi-
cation models.
For the point-to-point model, we mainly consider Byzantine agreement al-
gorithms. We develop algorithms that require only O(nL) total bits of com-
munication for achieving agreement of L bits among n nodes for suﬃciently
large L, without making any cryptographic assumption. Previous algorithms
either have higher communication cost or rely on cryptographic assumptions.
We also develop Byzantine agreement algorithms that perform well when the
communication links in the network are capacity-constrained. We develop
the ﬁrst Byzantine broadcast algorithm that achieves constant fraction of
the optimal throughput in general point-to-point networks. For some special
class of networks, we develop algorithms that achieve the optimal through-
put. We then study the communication complexity of the multiparty equality
function, which is the core of the Byzantine agreement problem.
For the broadcast model, we study the problem of detecting packet tam-
pering attacks in multi-hop wireless networks. We propose a lightweight
detection scheme that integrates the idea of wireless watchdogs and error de-
tection coding. We show in a single ﬂow example that even if the watchdog
can only observe a fraction of packets, by choosing the encoder properly, an
attacker will be detected with high probability while achieving throughput
arbitrarily close to optimal. The trade-oﬀ between throughput and security
in a more practical setting – there are multiple data ﬂows in the network and
a distributed random access MAC protocol is used – is also studied.
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In recent years, we have seen tremendous growth in the development in dis-
tributed computing systems, which consist of a multitude of autonomous
computing devices that communicate through a network, wired or wireless.
In such systems, applications often require cooperation between multiple de-
vices, which are usually failure-prone. In many systems, such failures can
lead to unanticipated, potentially disruptive failure behavior and to service
unavailability. Hence, fault-tolerance is of increasing importance in the design
of such distributed network systems.
To achieve fault-tolerance in a distributed system, one must incorporate
redundancy, in the forms of information and/or processing components. Intu-
itively, the more redundancy introduced, the more fault-tolerant the system
can be made. However, more redundancy usually also means a less eﬃcient
system. The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the trade-oﬀ between
the amount of redundancy required and the level of fault-tolerance in dis-
tributed systems under both point-to-point and broadcast communication
models. For the point-to-point model, we will mainly consider the Byzan-
tine fault-tolerance problem. For the broadcast model, we will focus on the
problem of detecting packet tampering attack by faulty intermediate nodes
in wireless multi-hop networks.
1.1 Research Summary
1.1.1 Communication Complexity of Byzantine
Fault-Tolerance
Recent years have seen a tremendous growth in the popularity of data-
oriented online services. Enterprises often run their critical business ap-
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plications using “clouds” that provide storage as well as computing services.
Many individual users also have become dependent on the Internet to store
their personal data including photos, music and videos. As industry and in-
dividuals rely increasingly on data centers and other similar online services,
the threat posed by malicious attacks and software errors has also become
increasingly prominent. For example, software errors have brought down the
Amazon S3 storage system for several hours [1], and have resulted in mass
email deletion at Gmail [2]. Being able to provide reliable and consistent
access to the data and services has become an important quality-of-service
requirement that the online services must fulﬁll.
Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT) provides a powerful state machine replica-
tion approach for building highly reliable services despite failures (or attacks).
In BFT state machine replication, n replicas collectively behave as one fault-
free server, even if up to f replicas, with f < n/3, are faulty and deviate from
the protocol, i.e., misbehave, in arbitrary (or “Byzantine”) fashion [3]. A key
requirement in implementing BFT is that all the fault-free replicas of a server
must execute identical client requests in an agreed upon order. A Byzantine
agreement algorithm is used to reach an agreement on the requests to be
handled. The agreement on requests guarantees that all fault-free replicas
always have consistent state and produce the same output. Then the clients
can obtain the correct output from the replicated server by taking a majority
vote of the individual replica outputs. The Byzantine fault model allows for
worst-case behavior by the faulty nodes. The fault model can be used to
characterize the behavior of a replica under attack (security compromise), or
to model the detrimental impact of undetected failures or software bugs.
Despite its potential for achieving a high level of reliability in the presence
of arbitrary nature of failure or attack, BFT was rarely adopted in practice
in the three decades after its introduction in 1980 [3]. The reluctance to use
BFT in practical systems stems from two causes: (a) the high overhead of
Byzantine agreement, and (b) the belief that the Byzantine fault model is
too pessimistic to model real failures that occur in practical systems.
From the high proﬁle failures in recent years (e.g., [1, 2]), it is apparent
that not all failures in practical systems are “crash” or “fail-stop” failures,
and at least for some critical services, higher level of reliability oﬀered by
BFT is desired. Thus, provided that the overheads are reduced, BFT can
become attractive for some applications.
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In 1985, Dolev and Reischuk [4] proved that, without authentication, Θ(n2)
bits are necessary to be communicated, in order to achieve agreement on 1
bit, which results in a lower bound on the per-bit communication complexity
of agreement as Ω(n2). This result is one of the main reasons why BFT is
perceived as being too expensive to be practical.
The objective of this part of the dissertation is to mitigate the communi-
cation overhead of BFT. We show that, if the size of the value/message to
be agreed on is suﬃciently large, the per-bit communication complexity for
agreement can be made much lower than Θ(n2). In particular, we design
and analyze algorithms that achieve Byzantine agreement of value/message
of L bits among n nodes with at most f < n/3 faulty nodes, while requiring
O(nL) bits of communication, even in the worst case. In addition to de-
veloping theoretical algorithms, we also demonstrate and evaluate them via
experimental implementations.
Work reported in this part has resulted in conference publications [5, 6]
and technical reports [7, 8].
1.1.2 Network-Aware Byzantine Fault-Tolerance
The past work on BFT has not considered processing or communication bot-
tlenecks when designing the Byzantine agreement algorithms. In particular,
previous algorithms do not consider the possibility that some of the commu-
nication links in the network may be constrained. These algorithms treat
all communication links in the network equally, and usually allocate roughly
the same amount of workload to each communication link in the network.
However, in practice, diﬀerent links in the network may have very diﬀerent
capacities. When applying the previous BFT algorithms in such systems, the
links with poor capacity can become a bottleneck: transmission of the work-
load over the bottleneck links takes a long time, so accordingly, completion
of agreement will take longer.
The objective of this part of the dissertation is to improve performance
of BFT algorithms by taking into account the communication constraints
of the underlying network. We say such algorithms are “network-aware”.
We consider the performance metric of throughput of network-aware BFT
algorithms. The notion of throughput here is similar to that used in the
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networking/communications literature on unicast or multicast traﬃc. Infor-
mally, the throughput of a BFT algorithm in a given network is the average
number of bits that can be agreed on per unit time, while the traﬃc imposed
by the algorithm stays within the communication constraints of the networks.
In particular, we study the throughput of BFT algorithms in point-to-
point networks, in which each communication link is subject to a capacity
constraint. We derive an upper bound on the optimal throughput over all
possible BFT algorithms in general point-to-point networks. We develop a
network-aware BFT algorithm that is guaranteed to achieve at least 1/3 of
the optimal throughput in general point-to-point networks. It is the ﬁrst
BFT algorithm that achieves constant fraction of the optimal throughput in
general networks. Moreover, for certain classes of point-to-point networks,
we also develop BFT algorithms that achieve the optimal throughput.
Work reported in this part has resulted in conference publications [9, 10, 11]
and technical reports [12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
1.1.3 Multiparty Equality Function Computation under
Point-to-Point Communication Model
In this part, we study the communication complexity of distributed compu-
tation of the multiparty equality function (MEQ), under the point-to-point
communication model. We generalize the two-party communication complex-
ity model [17] to the multiparty scenario: n ≥ 2 nodes are trying to compute
a function f(x1, · · · , xn) by communicating over point-to-point links, with
input xi ∈ Xi only known to node i.
We demonstrate that traditional techniques generalized from the two-party
communication complexity problem are not suﬃcient to obtain tight bounds
under the point-to-point communication model. We then introduce tech-
niques to signiﬁcantly reduce the space of protocols to study. We then study
the MEQ problem of n = 3, |Xi| = 6, and introduce a protocol that achieves
the optimal complexity. This protocol is then used as a building block for
construction of eﬃcient protocols for large |Xi|. The problem of ﬁnding the
communication complexity of the MEQ problem for general values of n and
|Xi| is still open.
Work reported in this part has resulted in a conference publication [18]
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and a technical report [19].
1.1.4 Watchdog in Wireless Networks
In wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, paths between a source and desti-
nation are usually multihop, and data packets are relayed in several wireless
hops from their source to their destination. This multihop nature makes the
wireless networks subject to tampering attack: a compromised/misbehaving
node can easily ruin data communications by dropping or corrupting pack-
ets it should forward. Watchdog mechanism [20] is a monitoring method
used for such networks. The basic idea is to have nodes (called watchdogs)
to monitor their neighborhoods using overheard messages in order to detect
misbehavior, utilizing the broadcast nature of the wireless medium.
The main challenge for the watchdog mechanism is to balance the system
throughput and ability to detect most tampering attacks, given the unrelia-
bility of the wireless environment. In this problem, we propose a computa-
tionally simple scheme that integrates source error detection coding and the
watchdog mechanism. We show that by choosing the encoder properly, a mis-
behaving node will be detected with high probability while the throughput
approaches optimal, even in the case when the watchdog can only overhear
a fraction of the packets and the attacker is omniscient, i.e., knows what
encoder is being used and no secret is shared only between the source and
destination.
Work reported in this part has resulted in a conference publication [21]
and a technical report [22].
1.2 Dissertation Outline
• In Chapter 2, we present our Byzantine fault-tolerance algorithms that
achieve linear per-bit complexity, for suﬃciently large input size. Proofs
for correctness and experimental comparison with existing algorithms
are also provided.
• In Chapter 3, we motivate the problem of designing network-aware
BFT algorithms under capacity constraints of the underlying commu-
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nication network. We ﬁrst present one BFT algorithm that is guar-
anteed to achieve a constant fraction of the optimal throughput in
general point-to-point networks. Then two algorithms that achieve op-
timal throughput in two special classes of point-to-point networks are
presented.
• In Chapter 4, we study the distributed computation of the multiparty
equality function.
• In Chapter 5, we introduce the idea of the integration of error-detection
coding and the watchdog mechanism. We then provide analytical re-
sults on some case studies.
• In Chapter 6, we summarize the list of future work.







In recent years, there has been a tremendous growth in the popularity of
data-oriented online services, such as cloud computing, data centers and
online storage. For example, industrial leaders such as Amazon, Google,
IBM and Microsoft have been investing heavily in developing their cloud
computing systems and data centers. As the reliance of industry, government,
and individuals on data centers and other similar online information services
increases, so does the threat posed by malicious attacks and software errors
[1, 2]. Consequently, being able to provide reliable and consistent access to
the data and services that they host has become an important requirement
that these online services must fulﬁll.
Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT), also known as Byzantine agreement (BA)
in the theoretical distributed computing literature, provides a powerful state
machine replication approach for providing highly reliable and consistent
services in spite of the presence of failures. In BFT state machine replication,
n ≥ 3f + 1 replicas collectively behave as one fault-free server, even if up
to f replicas are faulty and deviate from the algorithm, i.e., misbehave, in
arbitrary (Byzantine) fashions [3]. The key of BFT is to make sure that
all replicas agree upon the same sets as well as the order of requests, and
execute them in the agreed upon order. This guarantees that all fault-free
replicas always have consistent states and produce the same output. Then
the correct output can be obtained by taking the majority of the individual
outputs, since at least 2n/3 of the replicas are fault-free.
Unfortunately, BFT has been rarely adopted in practice for the three
decades following its introduction in 1980 [3], mainly because of the overhead
incurred due to the minimum 3f + 1 replicas required to tolerate f failures,
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and the high communication overhead of previously proposed error-free BFT
algorithms.
In the last decade, there have been numerous eﬀorts devoted to making
BFT systems practical [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. One common optimization
is that, to check the consistency of a request (or a piece of data) received
by diﬀerent replicas, the replicas exchange hash values (sometimes called
“digests”) computed from the request, using some collision-resistant hash
function, and check the hash values against the original request, instead of
exchanging the entire request. Since the digest is much smaller than the
original request in size, communication cost is signiﬁcantly reduced (roughly
by an order of n). Despite the impressive performance improvement achieved
by these systems, the use of a collision-resistant hash function may, in fact,
be problematic, for the following two reasons:
• First of all, the correctness of the aforementioned algorithms relies on
the collision-resistant property of the hash function used. With the
rapid improvement in modern cryptanalysis and computational power
of computers, defeating the hash functions may become computation-
ally feasible in the future, and a malicious adversary will be able to
ﬁnd collisions of the hash function and then break the system. For ex-
ample, Castro and Liskov’s seminal practical Byzantine fault tolerance
(PBFT) [23] algorithm uses MD5, which has since been broken [29].
• The second reason is related to the ﬁrst one. In a later implementa-
tion of PBFT in 2002 [25], MD5 was replaced by SHA-1 in order to
improve the reliability of the algorithm. However, SHA-1 was then
broken in 2008 [30]. It is likely that these algorithms need to use more
and more secure hash functions (e.g. SHA-256 and SHA-512), try-
ing to stay ahead of the development in technology and cryptanalysis.
However, the more secure a hash function, the more expensive it is
to compute. So the improvement we gain from reducing communica-
tion overhead with hashing can become overwhelmed by the increasing
computational/time cost we pay for using a stronger hash function.
The discussion above motivates our work in this chapter. In particular, we
ask the following question:
Is it possible to design a practical BFT system with the following two prop-
erties?
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1. Reliability: Always correct (in other words “error-free”) and does not
rely on hash functions; and
2. Eﬃciency: Performance is comparable to the aforementioned systems
that use hash functions.
We give an aﬃrmative answer to this question in this chapter:
• We present CBC – a Coding-based Byzantine consensus algorithm,
and CBB – a Coding-based Byzantine broadcast algorithm. These
two algorithms solve two variants of the BFT problem: Consensus and
Broadcast (formally deﬁned later), respectively, without using any hash
function or relying on any cryptographic assumption. Both algorithms
are proved to be error-free, i.e., reliable.
• We prove that the communication complexity of both CBC and CBB
are O(nL) for suﬃciently large input size L (formally deﬁned later).
Moreover, we show that
– The communication complexity of CBC is at least one order of n
lower than all previously known error-free Byzantine consensus al-
gorithms. The best previously known communication complexity
of error-free consensus algorithms is O(n2L).
– The communication complexity of CBB is at most 1/2 of the best
previously known communication complexity of error-free Byzan-
tine broadcast algorithm, developed by Beerliova-Trubiniova and
Hirt [31].
• Experimental results on our testbed show that the CBB algorithm is
at least as eﬃcient as the algorithms that use hash functions.
This chapter is structured as follows. We begin by giving formal problem
formulation and describing our system and failure models. Related work is
discussed in Section 2.3. Salient features of the two proposed algorithms are
then brieﬂy discussed in Section 2.4. Then details of CBC and CBB will be
discussed in Section 2.5 and Section 2.7. Last, we summarize this chapter in
Section 2.8
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2.2 Problem Deﬁnitions and Models
We ﬁrst introduce the formal deﬁnition of the two versions of the Byzantine
agreement problem that we are going to study, as well as the system model
that will be considered in the rest of this chapter.
Byzantine Consensus (BC)
The Byzantine consensus problem considers n nodes, namely nodes 1, ..., n,
of which at most f nodes may be faulty and deviate from the algorithm in
arbitrary fashion. Each node i is given an L-bit input value xi. The basic
version of the consensus problem considered here requires that the following
properties to be satisﬁed.
• Termination: every node i eventually decides on an output value yi.
• Consistency: the output values of all fault-free nodes are equal, i.e.,
for every fault-free node i, yi = y for some y.
• Validity: if every node i holds the same input xi = x for some x, then
y = x.
These properties have been used as the requirements for consensus in previous
literature as well [28]. Other characterizations of the validity condition above
are also of potential interest in practice. For instance, we may want the nodes
to agree on the majority of the input values (if there is any), i.e., the agreed
output value y = x if at least n+1
2
 nodes have input value equal to x. With
suitable parameterization, the CBC algorithm satisﬁes such more general
validity conditions as well (Section 2.5.5).
Byzantine Broadcast (BB)
Byzantine broadcast considers a similar problem. There are also n nodes
1, · · · , n in the system. One special node is designated as the source/sender.
Without loss of generality, assume that node n is the source. The other
nodes 1, · · · , n−1 are designated as the peers. The source node 1 is given an
L-bit input value x, which the source node tries to broadcast to the peers.
The goal is for all the fault-free nodes to “agree on” the value being sent by
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the source, despite the possibility that some of the nodes (possibly including
the source) may be faulty. In particular, the following conditions must be
satisﬁed:
• Termination: every fault-free peer i (i < n) eventually decides on an
output value yi.
• Consistency: the output values of all fault-free peers are equal, i.e.,
for every fault-free peer i (i < n), yi = y for some y.
• Validity: if the source is fault-free, then y = x.
A consensus (or broadcast) algorithm is said to be error-free if in all pos-
sible executions of the algorithm, the properties of BC (or BB) are always
satisﬁed. We are interested in the communication complexity of error-free
consensus and broadcast algorithms. Communication complexity of an algo-
rithm is deﬁned as the maximum (over all possible executions) of the total
number of bits transmitted by all the nodes according to the speciﬁcation of
the algorithm. This measure of complexity was ﬁrst introduced by Yao [17],
and has been used widely (e.g., [32, 28, 33]).
System Model
We assume a synchronous fully connected network of n nodes. Every pair
of nodes is connected by a pair of directed point-to-point communication
channels. Each node correctly knows the identity of the nodes at the other
end of its channels. Whenever a node receives a message on such a directed
channel, it can correctly assume that the message is sent by the node at the
other end of the channel. We assume a Byzantine adversary that has com-
plete knowledge of the state of the nodes, including the L-bit input value(s).
No secret is hidden from the adversary. The adversary can take over up to f
nodes (f < n/3) at any point during the algorithm. These nodes are said to
be faulty. The faulty nodes can engage in any “misbehavior”, i.e., deviations
from the algorithm, including collusion. The remaining nodes are fault-free
and follow the algorithm.
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2.3 Related Work
Binary agreement: Binary agreement corresponds to L = 1 in our no-
tation. For binary agreement, optimal error-free algorithms (consensus and
broadcast) with communication complexity O(n2) have been proposed [34,
35]. King and Saia [36] introduced a randomized consensus algorithm with
communication complexity O(n1.5), allowing a non-zero probability of error.
Multi-valued agreement: Fitzi and Hirt [28] proposed a multi-valued con-
sensus algorithm in which an L-bit value (or message) is ﬁrst reduced to a
much shorter message, using a universal hash function. Byzantine consensus
is then performed for the shorter hashed values. Given the result of consen-
sus on the hashed values, consensus on L bits is then achieved by requiring
nodes whose L-bit input value matches the agreed hashed value to deliver
their L-bit input value to the other nodes jointly. By performing initial con-
sensus only for the smaller hashed values, this algorithm is able to achieve
communication complexity linear in n, i.e., O(nL), for suﬃciently large L
and up to f < n/2 failures, with a non-zero probability of error.
Beerliova-Trubiniova and Hirt have presented an error-free linear commu-
nication complexity multi-party computation algorithm, which uses a linear
complexity Byzantine broadcast algorithm as a sub-algorithm [31]. Their
algorithm uses the idea of coding to reduce communication complexity, as
does the Byzantine broadcast algorithm CBB we present in this chapter. Our
broadcast algorithm CBB improves on their algorithm: while both algorithms
have a similar structure, the communication complexity of the broadcast al-
gorithm from [31] is 2 to 4 times as high as that of CBB, depending on the
actual values of n and f . The main diﬀerence between the two algorithms is
in the manner in which a code is used for error detection. In addition, the al-
gorithm from [31] uses a player elimination framework, which is motivated by
the dispute control framework proposed in [37]. In player elimination, when
two nodes disagree with each other, one of the two nodes must be fault-free.
Then both the nodes are removed from the system, and the underlying algo-
rithm is performed on the smaller system, which must now tolerate one fewer
faulty node, with two fewer nodes. This approach has also been adopted by
asynchronous Byzantine agreement algorithms (e.g. [38]). While it may be
possible to also use player elimination to achieve consensus, we believe that
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the approach we adopted for the design of our Byzantine consensus algorithm
CBC, in general, can more eﬃciently achieve stronger validity properties than
approaches that may be designed using player elimination.
Practical BFT: Eﬀorts have been devoted to make BFT practical. Castro
and Liskov’s practical Byzantine fault-tolerant (PBFT) state-machine repli-
cation algorithm [23] showed for the ﬁrst time that BFT can be made practi-
cal. PBFT adopts the client-server model: the clients submit their requests
to the servers, then the servers execute the requests and deliver the outcomes
to the clients. One designated server is called the “primary” (or source in
our terminology). The clients send their requests to the primary. Then the
primary authenticates and orders the requests. The ordered requests are
then broadcast to the other replicas (peers in our terminology) from the pri-
mary. In order to make sure that no two fault-free replicas accept diﬀerent
requests, hash values computed from the requests are exchanged among the
replicas. Due to the use of hashing, the communication complexity is sig-
niﬁcantly reduced (to roughly O(nL) for broadcasting L bits). Follow-ups
of PBFT, such as Zyzzyva [24] and Aardvark [39], all take the similar hash-
ing approach. However, due to the use of hashing, these algorithms are not
error-free. The probability of error depends on the probability of collision of
the hash function they use, and also on the adversary’s ability to break it.
In designing the proposed algorithms, we drew inspiration from well-known
ideas in prior work, as summarized next.
System-level diagnosis: Preparata, Metze and Chien [40] introduced the
system diagnosability problem in their 1967 paper. Since then there has been
a large body of work exploring diﬀerent variations of the problem (e.g., [41]).
The work on system-level diagnosis considers a (un)directed diagnosis graph
(or a test graph), wherein each (un)directed edge represents a test: in essence,
when node X tests node Y, it may declare Y as faulty or fault-free, with a
faulty tester providing potentially erroneous test outcomes. The goal then is
to use the results of the tests to either exactly identify the faulty nodes, or
identify a small set of nodes that contains the faulty nodes. The past works
diﬀer in the nature of tests being performed, and the nature of the faults being
diagnosed. In the system-level diagnosis jargon, our faults are intermittent
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[42], and the tests are comparison-based [43]. We interpret the test outcome
fault-free (faulty) as equivalent to the corresponding two nodes trusting (not
trusting) each other, as discussed in detail later. In our work, we strengthen
the comparison-based system-level diagnosis approach by incorporating an
error detection code, which provides additional structure to our “comparison
test” outcomes. This structure can be exploited for computational eﬃciency
as well (see Appendix A.1).
Linear coding and block coding: A standard mechanism for improving
eﬃciency of information transmission is to use block codes, meaning that a
“block” (or multiple bits) of data is encoded together in a single codeword.
Our speciﬁc approach for using linear error detection (block) codes for Byzan-
tine consensus and broadcast is motivated by the rich literature on network
coding, particularly, multicasting in the presence of a Byzantine attacker
(e.g., [44, 45, 46]). Application of such an approach to Byzantine consensus
or broadcast in an arbitrary point-to-point networks under per-link capac-
ity constraints is non-trivial [10, 11]. However, under the communication
complexity model, the problem is simpler, as the algorithms in this chapter
demonstrate. Essentially, the simpliﬁcation arises from the ability to treat
each point-to-point link identically, resulting in a solution that has a certain
symmetry. As we will see in the next chapter, such a symmetric solution is
generally not optimal when the diﬀerent links have diﬀerent capacities.
Make the common case fast: In fault-tolerant systems, a common trick
to improve average system performance (or reduce average overhead of fault-
tolerance) is to make the “common case”, namely, the failure-free execution,
eﬃcient, with the possibility of much higher overhead when a failure does
occur. This approach works well when failure rates are low. There are many
instances of the application of this idea, but some examples include error
detection followed by retransmission for link reliability, and checkpointing
and rollback or roll-forward recovery after failure detection [47].
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2.4 Overview of the Proposed Algorithms
The proposed Byzantine consensus and broadcast algorithms are designed
to perform eﬃciently for large-sized inputs, i.e., L  1. Consequently, our
discussion will assume that L is “suﬃciently large” (how large is “suﬃciently
large” will become clearer later in this chapter). We now brieﬂy describe
the salient features of the consensus algorithm, with the detailed algorithm
presented later in Sections 2.5 and 2.7.
Execution in Multiple Generations
To improve the communication complexity, consensus (or broadcast) for the
L-bit value is performed “in parts”. In particular, for a certain integer D,
the L-bit value is divided into L/D parts, each consisting of D bits. For
convenience of presentation, we will assume that L/D is an integer. A sub-
algorithm is used to perform consensus (or broadcast) on each of these D-
bit values, and we will refer to each execution of the sub-algorithm as a
“generation”.
Memory Across Generations
If during any one generation, misbehavior by some faulty node is detected,
then additional (and expensive) diagnostic steps are performed to gain infor-
mation on the potential identity of the misbehaving node(s). This informa-
tion is captured by means of a diagnosis graph, as elaborated later. As the
sub-algorithm is performed for each new generation, the diagnosis graph is
updated to incorporate any new information that may be learned regarding
the location of the faulty nodes. The execution of the sub-algorithm in each
generation is adapted to the state of the diagnosis graph at the start of the
generation.
Bounded Instances of Misbehavior
With Byzantine failures, it is not always possible to immediately determine
the identity of a misbehaving node. However, due to the manner in which the
diagnosis graph is maintained, and the manner in which the sub-algorithm
15
adapts to the diagnosis graph, the f (or fewer) faulty nodes can collectively
misbehave in at most f(f + 1) generations, before all the faulty nodes are
exactly identiﬁed. Once a faulty node is identiﬁed, it is eﬀectively isolated
from the network, and cannot tamper with future generations. Thus, f(f+1)
is also an upper bound on the number of generations in which the expensive
diagnostic steps referred to above may need to be performed.
Low-Cost Failure-Free Execution
Due to the bounded number of generations in which the faulty nodes can mis-
behave, it turns out that the faulty nodes do not tamper with the execution
in a majority of the generations. We use a low-cost mechanism to achieve
consensus and broadcast in failure-free generations, which helps to achieve
low communication complexity. In particular, we use an error detection code-
based strategy in both algorithms to reduce the amount of information the
nodes must exchange to be able to achieve consensus and broadcast in the
absence of any misbehavior (the strategy, in fact, also allows detection of
potential misbehavior).
Consistent Diagnosis Graph Maintenance
A copy of the diagnosis graph is maintained locally by each fault-free node.
To ensure consistent maintenance of this graph, the diagnostic information
(elaborated later) needs to be distributed consistently to all the nodes in
the network. This operation is performed using an error-free 1-bit Byzantine
broadcast algorithm that tolerates f < n/3 Byzantine failures with commu-
nication complexity of O(n2) bits [35, 34]. This 1-bit broadcast algorithm is
referred to as Broadcast Binary in our discussion. While Broadcast Binary
is expensive, its cumulative overhead is kept low by invoking it a relatively
small number of times.
The structure above is inspired by prior work on fault-tolerant computing
and communications theory, which is discussed in Section 2.3. It turns out
that the “dispute control” approach used in the work on multi-party com-
putation (MPC) has also used this structure [37], and its variation called
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player elimination has been used to design an error-free linear complexity
Byzantine broadcast algorithm [31].
We now elaborate on the error-detection code used in the proposed algo-
rithms, and also describe the diagnosis graph in some more detail.
Error Detection Code
We will use Reed-Solomon codes in our algorithms (potentially, other codes
may be used instead). Consider an (m, d) Reed-Solomon code in Galois
Field GF (2c), where c is chosen large enough (speciﬁcally, m ≤ 2c−1). This
code encodes d data symbols from GF (2c) into a codeword consisting of m
symbols from GF (2c). Each symbol from GF (2c) can be represented using c
bits. Thus, a data vector of d symbols contains dc bits, and the corresponding
codeword contains mc bits. Each symbol of the codeword is computed as a
linear combination of the d data symbols, such that every subset of d coded
symbols represents a set of linearly independent combinations of the d data
symbols. This property implies that any subset of d symbols from the m
symbols of a given codeword can be used to determine the corresponding
data vector. Similarly, knowledge of any subset of d symbols from a codeword
suﬃces to determine the remaining symbols of the codeword. So d is also
called the dimension of the code. The (m, d) code has the Hamming distance
of m−d+1, and can always detect up to m−d errors. We will denote a code
with dimension d as Cd, and the encoding/decoding operations as Z = Cd(x)
and x = C−1d (Z) for a data vector x and the corresponding codeword Z.
In our algorithms, we also assume the availability of a null (⊥) symbol
that is distinguished from all other symbols. For an m-element vector X,
we denote X[j] as the j-th element of the vector, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Given a
subset A ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, denote V |A as the ordered list of elements of X at
the locations corresponding to elements of A. For instance, if m = 5 and
A = {2, 4}, then X|A is equal to (X [2], X [4]). We will say that X|A ∈ Cd if
X|A contains at least d non-null ( =⊥) elements, and there exists a codeword
Z = Cd(x) for some x such that the non-null elements of X|A are equal to the
corresponding elements of Z|A. When such Z and x exist, by generalizing
the decoding operation, we deﬁne C−1d (X|A) = x. If no such Z and x exist,
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we will say that X|A /∈ Cd.
For our consensus algorithm CBC, we use an (n, v − f) distance-(n− v +
f + 1) code Cv−f , for a suitable v such that f + 1 ≤ v ≤ n − f , and ensure
that there are at least v−f non-null elements in the argument to C−1v−f (when
the decoding function is used at a fault-free node).
For an improved version of CBC, we use an (n, n − f) distance-(f + 1)
code Cn−f . For the broadcast algorithm CBB, a (2(n− 1), n− f) distance-
(n+ f − 1) code is used. As will become clear from our later discussion, the
key of our proofs rely only on the dimension, but not the length, of the code
used. So to simplify the discussion, with a little abuse of notation, we also
denote both code used in the improved version of the consensus algorithm
CBC and the code used in the broadcast algorithm CBB as Cn−f , and ensure
that there are at least n−f non-null elements in the argument to C−1n−f . The
code that we are referring to using Cn−f will be clear from the context.
Diagnosis Graph
The fault-free nodes’ (potentially partial) knowledge of the identity of the
faulty nodes is captured by a diagnosis graph. A diagnosis graph is an undi-
rected graph with n vertices, with vertex i corresponding to node i. A pair
of nodes are said to “trust” each other if the corresponding pair of vertices
in the diagnosis graph is connected with an edge; otherwise they are said
to “accuse” each other. In the dispute control jargon, two nodes that trust
each other are “not in dispute”, and two nodes that accuse each other are
“in dispute”.
Before the start of the very ﬁrst generation, the diagnosis graph is initial-
ized as a fully connected graph, which implies that all the n nodes initially
trust each other. During the execution of the algorithm, whenever misbe-
havior by some faulty node is detected, the diagnosis graph will be updated,
and one or more edges will be removed from the graph, using the diagnostic
information communicated using the Broadcast Binary algorithm. The use
of Broadcast Binary ensures that the fault-free nodes always have a con-
sistent view of the diagnosis graph. The evolution of the diagnosis graph
satisﬁes the following properties:
• If an edge is removed from the diagnosis graph, at least one of the
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nodes corresponding to the two endpoints of the removed edge must be
faulty.
• The fault-free nodes always trust each other.
• If more than f edges at a vertex in the diagnosis graph are removed,
then the node corresponding to that vertex must be faulty.
The last two properties above follow from the ﬁrst property, and the assump-
tion that at most f node are faulty.
2.5 CBC – A Coding-Based Byzantine Consensus
Algorithm
In this section, we describe CBC – a Byzantine consensus algorithm that has
the properties listed in Section 2.1 – and present a proof of correctness. Also
algorithm parameterization to satisfy more general validity requirements will
be discussed in Section 2.5.5.
The L-bit input value xi at each node is divided into L/D parts of size D
bits each, as noted earlier. These parts are denoted as xi(1), · · · , xi(L/D).
The algorithm for achieving L-bit consensus consists of L/D sequential ex-
ecutions of Algorithm 2.5.1 presented in this section. Algorithm 2.5.1 is
executed once for each generation. For the g-th generation (1 ≤ g ≤ L/D),
each node i uses xi(g) as its input in Algorithm 2.5.1. Each generation of the
algorithm results in node i deciding on g-th part (namely, yi(g)) of its ﬁnal
decision value yi.
The value xi(g) is represented by a vector of n− 2f symbols, each symbol
represented with D/(n − 2f) bits. For convenience of presentation, assume
that D/(n− 2f) is an integer. We will refer to these n− 2f symbols as the
data symbols.
An (n, n− 2f) distance-(2f +1) Reed-Solomon code, denoted as Cn−2f , is
used to encode the n − 2f data symbols into n coded symbols. We assume
that D/(n − 2f) is large enough to allow the above Reed-Solomon code to
exist, speciﬁcally, n ≤ 2D/(n−2f)−1, which implies that D = Ω(n logn). This
condition is met only if L is large enough (since L > D). As we will see later,
Cn−2f is used only for error detection.
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Let the set of all the fault-free nodes be denoted as Pgood. Algorithm 2.5.1
for each generation g consists of three stages. We summarize the function of
these three stages ﬁrst, followed by a more detailed discussion:
1. Matching stage: Each node i encodes its D-bit input xi(g) for genera-
tion g into n coded symbols, as noted above. Each node i sends one of
these n coded symbols to the other nodes that it trusts. Node i trusts
node j if and only if the corresponding vertices in the diagnosis graph
are connected by an edge. Using the symbols thus received from each
other, the nodes attempt to identify a “matching set” of nodes, denoted
as Pmatch, of size n−f such that the fault-free nodes in Pmatch are guar-
anteed to have an identical input value for the current generation. If
such a Pmatch is not found, it can be determined with certainty that all
the fault-free nodes do not have the same input value – in this case,
the fault-free nodes decide on a default output value and terminate the
algorithm.
2. Checking stage: If a set of nodes Pmatch is identiﬁed in the above match-
ing stage, each node j /∈ Pmatch checks whether the symbols received
from nodes in Pmatch correspond to a valid codeword. If such a code-
word exists, then the symbols received from Pmatch are said to be “con-
sistent”. If any node ﬁnds that these symbols are not consistent, then
misbehavior by some faulty node is detected. Else all the nodes are
able to correctly compute the value to be agreed upon in the current
generation.
3. Diagnosis stage: Whenever misbehavior is detected, the diagnosis stage
is performed, to learn (possibly partial) information regarding the iden-
tity of the faulty node(s). For fault diagnosis, the nodes in Pmatch are
required to broadcast the coded symbols they sent in the matching
stage, using the Broadcast Binary algorithm. Using the information
received during these broadcasts, the fault-free nodes are able to learn
new information regarding the potential identity of the faulty node(s).
The diagnosis graph (called Diag Graph in Algorithm 2.5.1) is updated
to incorporate this new information.
In the rest of this section, we discuss each of the three stages in more
detail. Note that whenever algorithm Broadcast Binary is used, all the
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fault-free nodes will receive the broadcast information identically. One in-
stance of Broadcast Binary is needed for each bit of information broadcast
using Broadcast Binary.
Algorithm 2.5.1 CBC Algorithm (generation g)
1.Matching Stage:
Each node i performs the matching stage as follows:





symbol that node i receives from node j,
if node i trusts node j;
⊥, otherwise.
If a trusted node j does not send anything, then Ri[j] ← 0.
(c)If Si[j] = Ri[j] then Mi[j] ← TRUE; else Mi[j] ← FALSE
(d)Node i broadcasts the vector Mi using Broadcast Binary
Using the received M vectors:
(e)Find a set of nodes Pmatch of size n− f such that
Mj [k] = Mk[j] = TRUE
for every pair of nodes j, k ∈ Pmatch. If multiple possibility exist
for Pmatch, then any one of the possible sets is chosen arbitrarily
as Pmatch (all fault-free nodes choose a deterministic algorithm to
select identical Pmatch).
(f)If Pmatch does not exist, then decide on a default value and termi-
nate;
else enter the Checking Stage
2.Checking Stage:
Each node j /∈ Pmatch performs steps 2(a) and 2(b):
(a)If Rj |Pmatch ∈ Cn−2f then Detectedj ← FALSE;
else Detectedj ← TRUE.
(b)Broadcast Detectedj using Broadcast Binary
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Each node i performs step 2(c):
(c)Receive Detectedj from each node j /∈ Pmatch (broadcast in step
2(b)).




else enter Diagnosis Stage
3.Diagnosis Stage:
Each node j ∈ Pmatch performs step 3(a):
(a)Broadcast Sj [j] using Broadcast Binary
Each node i performs the following steps:
(b)R#[j] ← symbol received from node j ∈ Pmatch as a result of
broadcast in step 3(a)
(c)For all nodes j ∈ Pmatch,
if node i trusts node j and Ri[j] = R
#[j] then
Trusti[j] ← TRUE;
else Trusti[j] ← FALSE
(d)Broadcast Trusti|Pmatch using Broadcast Binary
(e)For each edge (j, k) in Diag Graph, such that node j ∈ Pmatch,
remove edge (j, k)
if Trustj[k] = FALSE or Trustk[j] = FALSE
(f)If R#|Pmatch ∈ Cn−2f then
if for any node j /∈ Pmatch, Detectedj = TRUE, but no edge at
vertex j was removed in step 3(e), then
remove all edges at vertex j in Diag Graph
(g)If at least f + 1 edges at any vertex j have been removed so far,
then node j must be faulty, and all edges at j are removed.
(h)Find a set of nodes Pdecide ⊂ Pmatch of size n− 2f in the updated
Diag Graph,
such that every pair of nodes j, k ∈ Pdecide still trust each other
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NOTE: Instead of performing steps 3(h) and 3(i), Algorithm 2.5.1
may be repeated for generation g again after the diagnosis graph
has been updated in step 3(g). This alternative does not aﬀect
algorithm correctness.
2.5.1 Matching Stage
The line numbers referred to below correspond to the line numbers for the
pseudo-code in Algorithm 2.5.1.
Line 1(a): In generation g, each node i ﬁrst encodes xi(g), represented by
n−2f symbols, into a codeword Si from the code Cn−2f . The j-th symbol in
the codeword is denoted as Si[j]. Then node i sends Si[i], the i-th symbol of
its codeword, to all the other nodes that it trusts. Recall that node i trusts
node j if and only if there is an edge between the corresponding vertices in
the diagnosis graph (referred as Diag Graph in the pseudo-code).
Line 1(b): Let us denote by Ri[j] the symbol that node i receives from a
trusted node j. If a node i does not trust some node j, then node i sets Ri[j]
equal to null (⊥). Messages received from untrusted nodes are ignored.
Line 1(c): FlagMi[j] is used to record whether node i ﬁnds node j’s symbol
consistent with its own local value. Speciﬁcally, the pseudo-code in Line 1(c)
is equivalent to the following:
• When node i trusts node j:
If Ri[j] = Si[j], then Mi[j] = TRUE;
else Mi[j] = FALSE.
• When node i does not trust node j: Mi[j] = FALSE.
Line 1(d): As we will see later, if a fault-free node i does not trust another
node j, then node j must be faulty. Thus entryMi[j] in vector Mi is FALSE
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if (i) node i believes that node j is faulty, or (ii) the input value at node j
appears to diﬀer from the input value at node i. Thus, entry Mi[j] being
TRUE implies that, as of this time, node i believes that node j is fault-free,
and that the value at node j is possibly identical to the value at node i. Node
i uses Broadcast Binary to broadcast Mi to all the nodes. One instance of
Broadcast Binary is needed for each bit of Mi.
Lines 1(e) and 1(f): Due to the use of Broadcast Binary, all fault-free
nodes receive identical vector Mj from each node j. Using these M vectors,
each node i attempts to ﬁnd a set Pmatch containing n− f nodes such that,
for every pair of nodes j, k ∈ Pmatch, Mj [k] = Mk[j] = TRUE. If multiple
such sets Pmatch exist, the tie is broken by some predetermined function.
One example of the predetermined function is: map the set Pmatch into an
n-bit binary value such that the i-th bit is 1 if node i ∈ Pmatch, and 0
otherwise; then the one set with smallest binary value is picked as Pmatch
in the algorithm. Since the M vectors are received identically by all the
fault-free nodes (using Broadcast Binary), they can compute an identical
Pmatch. However, if such a set Pmatch does not exist, then the fault-free nodes
conclude that all the fault-free nodes do not have identical input – in this
case, they decide on a default value, and terminate the algorithm.
It is worth noting that ﬁnding Pmatch is, in fact, equivalent to identifying a
clique of size n− f in an undirected graph of size n, whose edges are deﬁned
by theM vectors. Speciﬁcally, an edge exists between j and k in this graph, if
Mj [k] = Mk[j] = TRUE. Finding a clique of a certain size in general graphs
is NP-complete. It turns out that, with a slight modiﬁcation, the algorithm
can perform correctly even if Pmatch is not a clique in the graph induced byM
vectors. Instead it suﬃces if Pmatch includes at least n− 2f fault-free nodes
with identical input for the current generation. In other words, the subgraph
induced by M and Pmatch will contain a clique of size n−2f corresponding to
fault-free nodes. Such a Pmatch can be found with polynomial computational
complexity (see Appendix A.1). However, for simplicity, in our proofs, we
will assume that Pmatch indeed corresponds to a clique of size n− f .
In the following discussion, we will show the correctness of the Matching
Stage. In the proofs of Lemmas 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, we assume that the fault-
free nodes (that is, the nodes in set Pgood) always trust each other – this
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assumption will be shown to be correct later in Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.1 If for each fault-free node i ∈ Pgood, xi(g) = x(g), for some
value x(g), then a set Pmatch necessarily exists (assuming that the fault-free
nodes trust each other).
Proof: Since all the fault-free nodes have identical input x(g) in generation
g, Si = Cn−2f(x(g)) for all nodes i ∈ Pgood. Since these nodes are fault-
free, and trust each other, they send to each other correct messages in the
matching stage. Thus, Ri[j] = Sj [j] = Si[j] for all nodes i, j ∈ Pgood. This
fact implies that Mi[j] = TRUE for all nodes i, j ∈ Pgood. Since there are
at least n− f fault-free nodes, it follows that a set Pmatch of size n− f must
exist.

Observe that, although the above proof shows that there exists a set Pmatch
containing only fault-free nodes, there may also be other such sets that con-
tain some faulty nodes as well. That is, all the nodes in Pmatch cannot be
assumed to be fault-free. The converse of Lemma 2.1 implies that, if a set
Pmatch does not exist, it is certain that all the fault-free nodes do not have
the same input values. In this case, they can correctly agree on a default
value and terminate the algorithm. Thus Line 1(f) is correct.
In the case when a set Pmatch is found, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 2.2 All nodes in Pmatch ∩ Pgood have identical input in generation
g.
Proof: |Pmatch ∩ Pgood| ≥ n − 2f because |Pmatch| = n − f and there are
at most f faulty nodes. Consider any two nodes i, j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood. Since
Mi[j] = Mj [i] = TRUE, it follows that Si[i] = Sj [i] and Sj[j] = Si[j].
Since there are n−2f fault-free nodes in Pmatch ∩Pgood, this implies that the
codewords computed by these fault-free nodes (in Line 1(a)) contain at least
n− 2f identical symbols. Since the code Cn−2f has dimension (n− 2f), this





When Pmatch is found during the matching stage, the checking stage is en-
tered.
Lines 2(a), 2(b): Each fault-free node j /∈ Pmatch checks whether the
symbols received from the trusted nodes in Pmatch are consistent with a valid
codeword: that is, check whether Rj |Pmatch ∈ Cn−2f . The result of this test
is broadcast as a 1-bit notiﬁcation Detectedj , using Broadcast Binary. If
Rj |Pmatch /∈ Cn−2f , then node j is said to have detected an inconsistency.
Line 2(c): If no node announces in Line 2(b) that it has detected an in-
consistency, each fault-free node i chooses C−1n−2f(Ri|Pmatch) as its output for
generation g.
The following lemma argues correctness of Line 2(c).
Lemma 2.3 If no node claims it has detected an inconsistency in Lines 2(a)-
2(b), all fault-free nodes i ∈ Pgood decide on the identical output value y(g)
such that y(g) = xj(g) for all nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood.
Proof: We assume that the fault-free nodes trust each other. Observe that
size of set Pmatch∩Pgood is at least n−2f , and hence the decoding operations
C−1n−2f(Ri|Pmatch) and C−1n−2f(Ri|Pmatch ∩ Pgood) are both deﬁned at fault-free
nodes.
Since fault-free nodes send correct messages, and trust each other, for all
nodes i ∈ Pgood, Ri|Pmatch ∩ Pgood are identical. Since no inconsistency has
been detected by any node, every node i ∈ Pgood decides on C−1n−2f(Ri|Pmatch)
as its output. Also, C−1n−2f (Ri|Pmatch) = C−1n−2f (Ri|Pmatch∩Pgood), since Cn−2f
has dimension (n − 2f). It then follows that all the fault-free nodes decide
on the identical value y(g) = C−1n−2f(Ri|Pmatch ∩ Pgood) in Line 2(c). Since
Rj |Pmatch ∩ Pgood = Sj |Pmatch ∩ Pgood for all nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood, y(g) =
xj(g) for all nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood.

2.5.3 Diagnosis Stage
When any node that is not in Pmatch announces that it has detected an
inconsistency, the diagnosis stage is entered. The algorithm allows for the
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possibility that a faulty node may erroneously announce that it has detected
an inconsistency. The purpose of the diagnosis stage is to learn new informa-
tion regarding the potential identity of a faulty node. The new information is
used to remove one or more edges from the diagnosis graph Diag Graph – as
we will soon show, when an edge (j, k) is removed from the diagnosis graph,
at least one of nodes j and k must be faulty. We now describe the steps in
the Diagnosis Stage.
Lines 3(a), 3(b): Every fault-free node j ∈ Pmatch uses Broadcast Binary
to broadcast Sj[j] to all nodes. Let us denote by R
#[j] the result of the broad-
cast from node j. Due to the use of Broadcast Binary, all fault-free nodes
receive identical R#[j] for each node j ∈ Pmatch. This information will be
used for diagnostic purposes.
Lines 3(c), 3(d): Every fault-free node i uses ﬂag Trusti[j] to record
whether it “believes”, as of this time, that each node j ∈ Pmatch is fault-free or
not. Then node i broadcasts Trusti|Pmatch to all nodes using Broadcast Binary.
Speciﬁcally,
• If node i trusts node j and Ri[j] = R#[j],
then set Trusti[j] =TRUE;
• If node i does not trust node j or Ri[j] = R#[j],
then set Trusti[j] =FALSE.
Line 3(e): Using the Trust vectors received above, each fault-free node i
then removes any edge (j, k) from the diagnosis graph such that Trustj[k] =
FALSE or Trustk[j] = FALSE. Due to the use of Broadcast Binary for
distributing Trust vectors, all fault-free nodes will maintain an identical
view of the updated Diag Graph. Note that edges may only be removed
from Diag Graph.1
Line 3(f): As we will soon show, in the case R#|Pmatch ∈ Cn−2f , a node j /∈
Pmatch that announces that it has detected an inconsistency, i.e., Detectedj =
1If the system allows “repair” of faulty nodes, then edges will need to be added back
to Diag Graph.
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TRUE, must be faulty if no edge attached to vertex j was removed in Line
3(e). Such a node j is “isolated”, by having all edges attached to vertex j
removed from Diag Graph, and the fault-free nodes will not communicate
with it anymore in subsequent generations.
Line 3(g): As we will soon show, a node j must be faulty if at least f + 1
edges at vertex j have been removed. The identiﬁed faulty node j is then
isolated.
Lines 3(h) and 3(i): Since Diag Graph is updated only with information
broadcast with Broadcast Binary (Detected, R# and Trust), all fault-free
nodes maintain an identical view of the updated Diag Graph. Then they can
compute an identical set Pdecide ⊂ Pmatch containing exactly n − 2f nodes
such that every pair of nodes j, k ∈ Pdecide trust each other. Finally, every
fault-free node chooses C−1n−2f(R
#|Pdecide) as its decision value for generation
g.
Lemma 2.4 Every time the diagnosis stage is performed, at least one edge
attached to a vertex corresponding to a faulty node will be removed from
Diag Graph, and only such edges will be removed.
Proof: We prove this lemma by induction. For the convenience of discus-
sion, let us say that an edge (j, k) is “bad” if at least one of nodes j and k is
faulty.
Consider a generation g starting with any instance of the Diag Graph in
which only bad edges have been removed. Suppose that a node i /∈ Pmatch
“claims” that it detects a failure by broadcasting Detecti =TRUE in Line
2(b). This implies that, if node i is fault-free, Ri|Pmatch cannot be a valid
codeword, i.e., Ri|Pmatch /∈ Cn−2f .
The symbols broadcast by nodes of Pmatch in Line 3(a), i.e., R
#|Pmatch, can
either be a valid codeword of Cn−2f or not. We consider the two possibilities
separately:
• R#|Pmatch ∈ Cn−2f : In the case, if node i is actually fault-free, R#[k] =
Ri[k] must be true for some faulty node k ∈ Pmatch, which is trusted
by node i. Thus, Trusti[k] = FALSE and the bad edge (i, k) will
be removed in Line 3(e). The converse of this argument implies that
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if Detectedi =TRUE but no edge attached to vertex i is removed in
Line 3(e), then node i must be faulty. As a result, all bad edges at
vertex i are removed in Line 3(f).
• R#|Pmatch /∈ Cn−2f : There are always at least n − 2f fault-free nodes
in Pmatch ∩ Pgood, and Rj|Pmatch ∈ Cn−2f is TRUE for every node j ∈
Pmatch∩Pgood. Thus, if R#|Pmatch /∈ Cn−2f , then R#|Pmatch = Rj|Pmatch
must be true for every node j ∈ Pmatch ∩Pgood. Similar to the previous
case, R#[k] = Rj[k] must be true for some faulty node k ∈ Pmatch which
is trusted by every node j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood. As a result, Trustj[k] =
FALSE and the bad edge (j, k) will be removed in Line 3(e), for all
nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood.
At this point, we can conclude that by the end of Line 3(f), at least one new
bad edge has been removed. Moreover, since Ri[k] = R
#[k] for every pair of
fault-free nodes i, k ∈ Pgood, Trusti[k] remains TRUE, which implies that
the vertices corresponding to the fault-free nodes will remain fully connected,
and each will always have at least n− f − 1 edges. It follows that a node j
must be faulty if at least f + 1 edges at vertex j have been removed. So all
edges at j are bad and will be removed in Line 3(g).
Now we have proved that for every generation that begins with aDiag Graph
in which only bad edges have been removed, at least one new bad edge, and
only bad edges, will be removed in the updated Diag Graph by the end of
the diagnosis stage. Together with the fact that Diag Graph is initialized as
a complete graph, we ﬁnish the proof.

The above proof of Lemma 2.4 shows that all fault-free nodes will trust
each other throughout the execution of the algorithm, which justiﬁes the
assumption made in the proofs of the previous lemmas. The following lemma
shows the correctness of Lines 3(h) and 3(i).
Lemma 2.5 By the end of diagnosis stage, all fault-free nodes i ∈ Pgood
decide on the same output value y(g), such that y(g) = xj(g) for all nodes
j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood.
Proof: First of all, the set Pdecide necessarily exists since there are at least
n−2f ≥ f +1 fault-free nodes in Pmatch∩Pgood that always trust each other.
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Secondly, since the size of Pdecide is n− 2f ≥ f + 1, it must contain at least
one fault-free node k ∈ Pdecide ∩ Pgood. Since node k still trusts all nodes
of Pdecide in the updated Diag Graph, R
#|Pdecide = Rk|Pdecide = Sk|Pdecide.
The second equality is due to the fact that node k ∈ Pmatch. Finally, since
the size of set Pdecide is n− 2f , the decoding operation of C−1n−2f(R#|Pdecide)
is deﬁned, and it equals to xk(g) = xj(g) for all nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood, as
per Lemma 2.2.

We can now conclude the correctness of the Algorithm 2.5.1.
Theorem 2.1 Given n nodes with at most f < n/3 are faulty, each given an
input value of L bits, Algorithm 2.5.1 achieves consensus correctly in L/D
generations, with the diagnosis stage performed for at most f(f + 1) times.
Proof: Lemmas 2.1 to 2.5 imply that consensus is achieved correctly for
each generation g of D bits. So the termination and consistency properties
are satisﬁed for the L-bit outputs after L/D generations. Moreover, in the
case all fault-free nodes are given an identical L-bit input x, theD bits output
y(g) in each generation g equals to x(g) as per Lemmas 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5. So
the L-bit output y = x and the validity property is also satisﬁed.
According to Lemma 2.4 and the fact that a faulty node Pj will be removed
once more than f edges at vertex j have been removed, it takes at most
f(f +1) instance of the diagnosis stage before all faulty nodes are identiﬁed.
After that, the fault-free nodes will not communicate with the faulty nodes.
Thus, the diagnosis stage will not be performed any more. So it will be
performed for at most f(f + 1) times in all cases.

2.5.4 Communication Complexity of CBC
Let us denote by B the complexity of broadcasting 1 bit with one instance
of Broadcast Binary. In every generation, the complexity of each stage is
as follows:
• Matching stage: every node i sends at most n − 1 symbols, each of
D/(n− 2f) bits, to the nodes that it trusts, and broadcasts n− 1 bits
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for Mi. So at most
n(n−1)
n−2f D + n(n − 1)B bits in total are transmitted
by all n nodes.
• Checking stage: every node j /∈ Pmatch broadcasts one bit Detectedj
with Broadcast Binary, and there are f such nodes. So tB bits are
transmitted.
• Diagnosis stage: every node j ∈ Pmatch broadcasts one symbol Sj [j] of
D/(n− 2f) bits with Broadcast Binary, and every node i broadcasts
n−f bits of Trusti|Pmatch with Broadcast Binary. So the complexity
is n−f
n−2fDB + n(n− f)B bits.
According to Theorem 2.1, there are L/D generations in total. In the
worst case, Pmatch can be found in every generation, so the matching and
checking stages will be performed for L/D times. In addition, the diagnosis
stage will be performed for at most f(f +1) time. Hence the communication
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Error-free algorithms that broadcast 1 bit with communication complex-
ity Θ(n2) bits are known [34, 35]. So we assume B = Θ(n2). Then the





= O(nL+ n4L0.5 + n6). (2.3)
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For L = Ω(n6), the communication complexity becomes O(nL). (This re-
quirement can be improved to L = Ω(n5) if we use a technique from [37] in
the Diagnosis stage.2)
2.5.5 Other Validity Conditions
Algorithm 2.5.1 satisﬁes the validity conditions stated in Section 2.1. As
noted earlier, other validity conditions may also be desirable in practice.
Algorithm 2.5.1 is ﬂexible in the sense that, with proper parameterization,
it can achieve other (reasonable) validity properties. In particular, v-validity
property deﬁned below can be achieved for f + 1 ≤ v ≤ n− f :
• v-Validity: If at least v fault-free nodes hold an identical input x, then
the output y agreed by the fault-free nodes equals input xj for some
fault-free node j. Furthermore, if v ≥ n+1
2
, then y = x.
In order to achieve v-validity, we need to change the error detection code
and the size of Pmatch in Algorithm 2.5.1 as follows (v is said to be the
parameter of the algorithm):
• Throughout the algorithm, we replace the (n, n−2f) distance-(2f +1)
code Cn−2f with a (n, v− f) distance-(n− v + f + 1) code, denoted as
Cv−f . Since v ≥ f + 1, v − f ≥ 1. Thus Cv−f always exists for large
enough L.
• Line 1(e): Choose a set of v nodes Pmatch such that Mj[k] = Mk[j] =
TRUE for every pair of node j, k ∈ Pmatch. 3
• Lines 3(h) and 3(i): For the more general validity conditions, in-
stead of performing steps 3(h) and 3(i), as stated in the NOTE at the
end of Algorithm 2.5.1, the algorithm can be repeated for generation
g with the updated diagnosis graph. For v > 2f , we also have the
alternative of retaining steps 3(h) and 3(i), but the size of the chosen
Pdecide must be v − f .
Similar to Lemmas 2.1 through 2.5, we can prove that
2We would like to thank Martin Hirt for suggesting this improvement.
3The validity condition achieved can be made stronger, particularly for v ≤ n/2, by
choosing the largest possible set Pmatch with size at least v.
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1. If at least v fault-free nodes i ∈ Pgood hold the same input xi(g) = x(g)
for some x(g), then a set Pmatch of size v necessarily exists.
2. There are at least v − f ≥ 1 fault-free nodes in Pmatch and all the
fault-free nodes in Pmatch have the same input for generation g.
3. If no node detects inconsistency in Line 2(a), all fault-free nodes i ∈
Pgood decide on the identical output value y(g) such that y(g) = xj(g)
for all nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood. Furthermore, when v ≥ n+12 , and
at least v fault-free nodes have identical input x, at least one of these
fault-free nodes is bound to be in Pmatch, and therefore, y(g) = x.
4. In case (for v > 2f) steps 3(h) and 3(i) are used, by the end of diagno-
sis stage, all fault-free nodes i ∈ Pgood decide on the same output value
y(g), such that y(g) = xj(g) for all nodes j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood. Other-
wise, if steps 3(h) and 3(i) are not used, the algorithm is repeated for
generation g with the updated diagnosis graph.
Then Algorithm 2.5.1 achieves v-validity for f+1 ≤ v ≤ n−f with the afore-




v − f L+O(n
4L0.5 + n6)
= O(nL+ n4L0.5 + n6), if v − f = Ω(n).
When v < n+1
2
, there may be more than one choice for Pmatch in Line
1(e). For example, there can be two disjoint cliques, one containing v fault-
free nodes with the same input x, and the other containing v − f fault-free
nodes with input z (x = z) and f faulty nodes that pretend to have input z.
It is possible that the second clique is picked to be Pmatch and the consensus
value ends up being z. So in this case, even though at least v fault-free nodes
hold the same input, we can only guarantee agreement on the input of some
fault-free nodes, but not necessarily equal to the v identical inputs. However,
when v ≥ n+1
2
, it is guaranteed that, if at least v inputs at the fault-free
nodes equals to x, then the agreed output equals x.
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2.5.6 Multiple Consensus
In the above discussion, we considered consensus on a single long L-bit value.
An alternate view of the problem is likely to be more relevant in practice. In
particular, let us consider the problem of performing g instances of consensus,
with each node receiving a D-bit input for each instance (in particular, the
input for node i is xi(g) for instance g). Then the consensus properties need
to be satisﬁed for each instance separately. We assume that the identity
of faulty nodes remains ﬁxed across the diﬀerent instances. Then it should
not be diﬃcult to see that Algorithm 2.5.1 solves the multiple instances of
the consensus problem, with the algorithm for g-th generation essentially
performing the g-th instance of the consensus problem for D-bit values.
Let us denote the average per-instance complexity for performing g in-
stances of consensus on D-bit values as CCBC(g,D). Similar to the analysis
in Section 2.5.4, for g ≥ f(f + 1), we have
CCBC(g,D) =
n(n− 1)




















From Equation 2.5, we can conclude that we only need D = Ω(n3) and
g = Ω(n3) instances of D-bit consensus for the per consensus complexity to
reduce to O(nD). In other words, when the goal is to sequentially perform
a large number (Ω(n3)) of instances of consensus, the input size for each
instance only needs to be Ω(n3) in order to achieve complexity linear in n,
rather than Ω(n6) as discussed in Section 2.5.4.
2.6 Improving the CBC Algorithm
2.6.1 Improving Communication Complexity of CBC
The CBC algorithm has complexity n(n−1)
n−2f L (ignoring the terms sub-linear
in L). In this section, we present Improved-CBC, an improved version of
CBC that achieves communication complexity n(n−1)
n−f L, which can be twice
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as eﬃcient as CBC when f gets close to n/3. Pseudo-code of the Improved-
CBC algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.6.2.
The main diﬀerence between CBC and Improved-CBC is the way in which
Pmatch is found. In CBC, a set Pmatch is found in each generation indepen-
dently, and Pmatch from diﬀerent generations can contain diﬀerent nodes. On
the other hand, Pmatch is maintained across generations in Improved-CBC
such that Pmatch in generation g + 1 is always a subset of Pmatch in gener-
ation g. In generation 1, Pmatch is initialized to the set of all n nodes in
Improved-CBC.
Algorithm 2.6.2 Improved-CBC Algorithm (generation g)
In the following steps, for every node i: Ri[k] ← Sj [k] whenever node i
receives Sj[k] from its trusted node j. If a trusted node j does not send
anything when it should send Rj[k], then Ri[k] ← 0.
1.Matching Stage:
Each node Pi ∈ Pmatch performs steps 1(a) and 1(b) as follows:
(a)Compute (Si[1], . . . , Si[n]) = Cn−f(xi(g)), and send Si[i] to every
trusted node j (including those not in Pmatch, and node i itself).
(b)For every node j /∈ Pmatch that is trusted by node i:
If i = min{l|l ∈ Pmatch and node j trusts node l}, then node i
sends Si[k] to node j for each k ∈ Pmatch such that node j does
not trust node k.
Each node j /∈ Pmatch performs step 1(c) as follows:
(c)Using the ﬁrst n − f symbols it has received in steps 1(a) and
1(b), node j computes Sj [j] according to Cn−f , then sends Sj[j]
to all trusted nodes (including node j itself).
2.Checking Stage:
Each node i (in Pmatch or not) performs Checking Stage as follows:
(a)IfRi ∈ Cn−f thenDetectedi ← FALSE; elseDetectedi ←TRUE.
(b)If node i ∈ Pmatch and Ri = Si then Detectedi ← TRUE.
(c)Broadcast Detectedi using Broadcast Binary.
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(d)Receive Detectedj from each node j (broadcast in step 2(c)).
If Detectedj = FALSE for all node j, decide on yi(g) = C
−1
n−f(Ri);
else enter Diagnosis Stage.
3.Diagnosis Stage:
Each node i (in Pmatch or not) performs Diagnosis Stage as follows:
(a)Broadcast Si and Ri using Broadcast Binary.
(b)S#j ← Sj and R#j ← Rj received from node j as a result of
broadcast in step 3(a).
Using the broadcast information, all nodes perform the following steps
identically:
(c)For each edge (i, j) in Diag Graph: Remove edge (i, j) if ∃k, such
that node j receives Si[k] from node i in Matching stage and
R#j [k] = S#i [k]
(d)For each node i ∈ Pmatch: If S#i /∈ Cn−f , then node i must be
faulty. So remove vertex i and the adjacent edges from Diag Graph.
(e)For each node j /∈ Pmatch: If S#j [j] is not consistent with (accord-
ing to Cn−f) the subset of n− f symbols of R#j , from which S#j [j]
is computed, node j must be faulty. So remove vertex j and the
adjacent edges from Diag Graph.
(f)If at least f + 1 edges at any vertex i have been removed, then
node i must be faulty. So remove vertex i and the adjacent edges.
(g)Find the maximum set of nodes Pnew ⊆ Pmatch such that S#i = S#j
for every pair of nodes i, j ∈ Pnew. In case of a tie, pick any one.
(h)If |Pnew| < n − f , terminate the algorithm and decide on the
default output.




j ) for any node j ∈ Pnew, and
update Pmatch = Pnew.
The proof of correctness of Improved-CBC is similar to that for CBC, and is
included in Appendix A.2 for completeness. We compute the communication
complexity of Improved-CBC in a similar way as in CBC:
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In Lines 1(a) to 1(c), every node receives at most n − 1 symbols, so at
most n(n − 1) symbols are communicated in the Matching stage. With an





So for suﬃciently large L = Ω(n6), the complexity approaches n(n−1)
n−f .
While the Improved-CBC algorithm may not be better in terms the order
of the communication complexity, in practice, a factor of 2 reduction in com-
munication overhead is quite signiﬁcant. Whether this algorithm is optimal
for arbitrary f and n (f < n/3) remains an open question. What we do
know, however, is that the degenerate version of the algorithm for f = 0
with complexity (n− 1)L is not optimal for all n. When f = 0, the consen-
sus problem reduces to the multiparty equality (MEQ) problem in which all
nodes are necessarily fault-free. The MEQ problem is discussed in Chapter
4.
2.6.2 Improving the Communication Complexity for
v-Validity
In Section 2.5.5, we have discussed how to achieve v-validity with CBC and
analyzed its communication complexity. One weakness of the CBC algo-
rithm is that it achieves v-validity with O(nL) communication complexity
only when v = f + Ω(n). In particular, for v = f + 1, the communication
complexity of CBC becomes O(n2L). In this section, we present VCBC,
an improved algorithm that achieves v-validity with O(nL) communication
complexity for all all f + 1 ≤ v ≤ n− f as long as v = Ω(n).
In VCBC, an (n, v) distance-(n − v + 1) Reed-Solomon code, denoted as
Cv, is used to encode v data symbols into n coded symbols. The operations
in each generation g are presented in Algorithm 2.6.3
Algorithm 2.6.3 VCBC Algorithm (generation g)
In the following steps, for every node i: Ri[k] ← Sj [k] whenever node i
receives Sj[k] from its trusted node j. If a trusted node j does not send
anything when it should send Rj[k], then Ri[k] ← 0.
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1.Matching Stage:
Every node i performs steps 1(a) to 1(e) as follows:
(a)Compute (Si[1], . . . , Si[n]) = Cv(xi(g)), and send Si[i] to every
trusted node j.
(b)If Si[j] = Ri[j] then Mi[j] ← TRUE; else Mi[j] ← FALSE
(c)Node i broadcasts the vector Mi using Broadcast Binary
Using the received M vectors:
(d)Find a set of nodes Pmatch of size v such that
Mj [k] = Mk[j] = TRUE
for every pair of nodes j, k ∈ Pmatch. If multiple possibilities exist
for Pmatch, then any one of the possible sets is chosen arbitrarily
as Pmatch (all fault-free nodes choose a deterministic algorithm to
select identical Pmatch).
(e)If Pmatch does not exist, then decide on a default value and con-
tinue to the next generation;
else continue to the following steps.
Note: At this point, if Pmatch does not exist, it is, in fact, safe
to terminate the algorithm with a default output since it can be
asserted that no v fault-free nodes have identical inputs. However,
by continuing to the next generation instead of terminating, v-
validity is satisﬁed for the inputs of each individual generation.
When Pmatch of size v is found, each node i ∈ Pmatch performs steps
1(f) as follows:
(f)For every node j /∈ Pmatch that is trusted node i:
If i = min{l|l ∈ Pmatch and node j trusts node l}, then node i
sends Si[k] to node j for each k ∈ Pmatch such that node j does
not trust node k.
Each node j /∈ Pmatch performs step 1(g) as follows:
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(g)Using the ﬁrst v symbols it has received from the nodes in Pmatch
in steps 1(a) and 1(f), node j computes Sj[j] according to Cv,
then sends Sj[j] to all trusted nodes.
Note: For every node i trusted by node j, it has set Ri[j] to the
Sj [j] received from node j in step 1(a). It will be replaced with
the new Sj[j] received in step 1(g).
2.Checking Stage:
Each node i (in Pmatch or not) performs Checking Stage as follows:
(a)If Ri ∈ Cv then Detectedi ← FALSE; else Detectedi ← TRUE.
(b)If node i ∈ Pmatch and Ri = Si then Detectedi ← TRUE.
(c)Broadcast Detectedi using Broadcast Binary.
(d)Receive Detectedj from each node j (broadcast in step 2(c)).
If Detectedj = FALSE for all j, then decide on yi(g) = C
−1
v (Ri);
else enter Diagnosis Stage.
3.Diagnosis Stage:
Each node i (in Pmatch or not) performs Diagnosis Stage as follows:
(a)Broadcast Si and Ri using Broadcast Binary.
(b)S#j ← Sj and R#j ← Rj received from node j as a result of
broadcast in step 3(a).
Using the broadcast information, all nodes perform the following steps
identically:
(c)For each edge (i, j) in Diag Graph: Remove edge (i, j) if ∃k, such
that node j receives Si[k] from node i in Matching stage and
R#j [k] = S#i [k].
(d)For each node i ∈ Pmatch: If S#i /∈ Cv, then node i must be faulty.
So remove vertex i and the adjacent edges from Diag Graph.
(e)For each node j /∈ Pmatch: If S#j [j] is not consistent with the subset
of v symbols of R#j |Pmatch, from which S#j [j] is computed, node j
must be faulty. So remove vertex j and the adjacent edges from
Diag Graph.
39
(f)If at least f + 1 edges at any vertex i have been removed, then
node i must be faulty. So remove vertex i and the adjacent edges.
(g)Find a set Pdecide of maximum size such that all nodes in Pdecide
trust each other and S#i = S
#
j for every pair of nodes i, j ∈ Pdecide.
In case of a tie, pick any one.
(h)If |Pdecide| < v, decide on the default output.




j ) for any node j ∈ Pdecide.
The proof of correctness of VCBC is similar to those for CBC and Improved-
CBC, and is included in Appendix A.3 for completeness. We compute
the communication complexity of VCBC in a similar way as in CBC and
Improved-CBC:
In Lines 1(a) and 1(f), every node receives at most n − 1 symbols, so
at most n(n − 1) symbols are communicated in these two steps. In Line
1(g), every node Pj /∈ Pmatch sends at most n − 1 symbols, and there are
at most n − v nodes not in Pmatch, so at most (n − v)(n − 1) symbols are
communicated in this step. So in total, no more than (2n−v)(n−1) symbols
are communicated in the Matching stage. Then with an appropriate choice




So for any v = Ω(n) and f+1 ≤ v ≤ n−f , with a suﬃciently large L (Ω(n7)),
the communication complexity for achieving v-validity with algorithm VCBC
is O(nL).
2.7 CBB – A Coding-Based Byzantine Broadcast
Algorithm
In this section, we present CBB, a coding-based error-free Byzantine broad-
cast algorithm. For comparison, we ﬁrst introduce Digest, a PBFT-like algo-
rithm for Byzantine broadcast. Both Digest and CBB have similar structure
as CBC. They both divide the L-bit input value x into generations of D bits,
and a diagnose graph Diag Graph is maintained across generations.
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Figure 2.1: Normal case operation of Digest. Dashed arrows represent
broadcasting using Broadcast Binary.
2.7.1 Digest: A PBFT-Like Algorithm
In this section we brieﬂy describe a simple PBFT-like algorithm: Digest.
Digest provides the readers a general idea how algorithms such as those in
[23, 25, 39, 28] utilize collision-resistant hash functions to achieve Byzantine
broadcast. It will also serve as a baseline for the performance evaluation of
the CBB algorithm.
In Digest, the Byzantine broadcast of the g-th generation starts with the
source node n multicasting a pre-prepare message 〈PRE− PREPARE, x(g)〉 to
all of the peers, where x(g) is the input for the g-th generation.
After a peer i (i < n) receives pre-prepare message 〈PRE− PREPARE, xi(g)〉
from the source node n, it sends one prepare message 〈PREPARE, ki,j, di,j〉
to each peer j (j < n), where ki,j is a randomly generated key, and di,j =
H(xi(g), ki,j) is xi(g)’s “digest” computed using key ki,j and a pre-determined
collision-resistant hash function H .
A peer i waits until it receives all n − 2 prepare messages from the other
peers. Then it checks if dj,i = H(xi(g), kj,i) for all j. If yes, then node i sets
Detectedi to FALSE. Otherwise, it sets Detectedi to TRUE. Then node i
broadcasts an one-bit message 〈Detectedi〉 to the rest of the network (includ-
ing the source node n), using Broadcast Binary. Since Broadcast Binary
is error-free, all fault-free nodes receive identical Detectedi from each peer i.
When all n− 1 instances of Broadcast Binary terminate, every node (in-
cluding the source node n) checks if all Detectedj ’s are FALSE. If yes, it
agrees on its local copy of x(g) (xi(g) if the node is a peer i). Otherwise,
failure is detected and diagnosis will be performed. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
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failure-free operations of Digest.
Failure-Case Operation
It should not be hard to see that whenever at least one of the Detectedi is
TRUE, the faulty node(s) must have misbehaved in one or some combination
of the following ways: (1) a faulty source node sends diﬀerent x(g) to diﬀerent
peers; (2) a faulty peer i sends incorrect prepare message to one or more
peers; or (3) a faulty peer i broadcasts Detectedi =TRUE even though it
should be FALSE. Diﬀerent algorithms handle failures diﬀerently. Here we
present one technique known as “dispute control” [37], which is similar to
the diagnosis stage of the CBC algorithm from Section 2.5.
In dispute control, when failure is detected, every node broadcasts all mes-
sages it has sent and received in the current generation, using Broadcast Binary.
The peers ﬁrst agree on the value x(g) broadcast by the source using
Broadcast Binary. Then, by comparing the information broadcast by each
pair of nodes, the fault-free nodes will be able to jointly update the diagnosis
graph Diag Graph identically. By the end of dispute control, at least one of
the following claims is true.
1. One new node is correctly identiﬁed as faulty and this node has not been
identiﬁed as faulty before. This node is then isolated from the rest of
the system, by having all edges attached to its corresponding vertex in
Diag Graph removed. This is similar to Line 3(f) in Algorithm CBC.
2. One new pair of nodes, say nodes a, b, are “in dispute” with each other,
i.e., their broadcasts, using Broadcast Binary, contradict each other.
When a node pair a, b is found in dispute, it is guaranteed that (i) at
least one of these two nodes is faulty, and (ii) these two nodes trust
each other at the beginning of the current generation. Then the edge
connecting the corresponding vertices in Diag Graph is removed. This
is similar to Line 3(e) in Algorithm CBC.
The correctness of the above claims follows from a similar argument as
those for Lines 3(e)-3(f) in Algorithm CBC. Our network-aware Byzan-
tine broadcast algorithm NAB (presented in Chapter 3) also uses a similar
dispute control structure with a few additional steps, which is discussed in
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detail in Appendix B.2. The discussion of steps DC1-DC3 in Appendix B.2
can serve as a proof of correctness for two claims above, by substituting Vk
as Diag Graph.
Following the same argument for Line 3(g) in Algorithm CBC, any node
that is accused by at least f + 1 other nodes must be faulty, and it will be
isolated, in the same way as Line 3(g) in Algorithm CBC. It then follows
that dispute control will be performed for at most f(f + 1) times. If at any
time the source node n is identiﬁed as faulty, all fault-free nodes terminate
the algorithm and decide on a default output.
Correctness and Traﬃc Load Analysis
The correctness of Digest follows from the correctness of PBFT [23]. Now
we consider the communication complexity of Digest in the failure-free case,
because this is the scenario that determines the performance of the system
[23]. Also similar to our earlier discussion of the communication complexity
of CBC, the failure-free case dominates the complexity of the algorithm for
suﬃciently large value of L. Recall that D is the size of each generation. Let
κ be the size of the key-digest pair (ki,j, di,j) and B = Θ(n
2) be the com-
munication cost of each execution of Broadcast Binary. The per-generation
complexity imposed by Digest is
(n− 1)D + (n− 1)(n− 2)κ+ (n− 1)B (2.8)
= (n− 1)D + κO(n2) +O(n3). (2.9)
So for suﬃciently large D (D = Ω(κn2) and D = Ω(n3)), the per-generation
of Digest is roughly (n− 1)D.
2.7.2 The CBB Algorithm
CBB has a similar structure as Digest. But instead of using hashing, it uses
the technique of error-detection coding, similar to CBC. The pseudo-code of
CBB is presented in Algorithm 2.7.4.
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Algorithm 2.7.4 CBB Algorithm (generation g)
In the following steps, Ri is a 2(n−1)-dimension vector, which is initialized
as all ⊥. For every peer i: Ri[k] ← Rj [k] whenever node i receives Rj [k] from
a trusted node j. If a trusted node j does not send anything when it should
send Rj[k] or Sk, then Ri[k] ← 0.
Source node n:
1.Encode x(g) into (S1, · · · , S2(n−1)) = Cn−f(x(g)).
2.For each trusted peer i (i < n): Send (Si, Si+(n−1)) to node i.
Each peer i (i < n) trusted by source node n:
3.(Ri[i], Ri[i+ (n− 1)]) ← (Si, Si+(n−1)) received from node n in step 2.
4.Send Ri[i] to all trusted peers.
Each peer i (i < n) not trusted by source node n:
5.If k < n− f peers are trusted by both node i and source node n, node
i receives < n− f symbols in step 4:
Receive Rj [j + (n − 1)] from each peer j trusted by both node i and
source node n, until Ri has n− f non-null symbols.
6.Now Ri has n− f non-null symbols:
Decode Z = C−1n−f(Ri) and set Ri[i] to be the i-th symbol of Z. If the
decoding fails, set Ri[i] to 0.
7.Send Ri[i] to all trusted peers.
Every peer i:
8.If Ri /∈ Cn−f , then Detectedi ← TRUE;
Otherwise Detectedi ← FALSE.
9.Broadcast Detectedi using Broadcast Binary.
10.Receive Detectedj from each node j (broadcast in step 9):
If Detectedj = FALSE for all j, agree on C
−1
n−f(Ri).
Otherwise perform dispute control (Similar to Digest).
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11.Proceed to the next generation.
Lines 1 to 3: These steps correspond to the source node n multicasting
the pre-prepare message to the peers in Digest. The diﬀerence lies in that,
in CBB, the source node n encodes the input of the current generation x(g)
into 2(n − 1) coded symbols with code Cn−f and only sends a small set
of the coded symbols to each of the trusted peers, rather than sending the
whole D bits of x(g) to every peer as in Digest. In particular, two symbols
(Si, Si+(n−1)) are sent to every peer i that the source node n trusts.
Lines 4 to 7: These steps correspond to the peers exchanging prepare
messages in Digest. Each peer i trusted by the source node n simply relays
Si to all of its trusted peers after it is received from source node n (Figure
2.2(a)).
For a peer i not trusted by source node n, if there is any, it ﬁrst gathers
enough (≥ n−f) coded symbols from the peers trusted by both itself and the
source node n (Figure 2.2(b)). Notice that both of nodes n and i must each
trust at least n−f−1 other peers; otherwise, at least one of them is accused by
at least f + 1 other nodes, and should have already been identiﬁed as faulty
and isolated from the rest of the system. Through simple counting, there
must be at least n− 2f peers that are trusted by both nodes n and i. Given
that n ≥ 3f + 1, these peers together receive at least 2(n− 2f) ≥ n− f + 1
coded symbols from the source node n. So it is guaranteed that peer i will
receive enough coded symbols in line 5, which are then used to generate
the i-th symbol of the codeword that peer i should have received from source
node n if they had trusted each other. Then node i sends the i-th symbol to
all its trusted peers (Figure 2.2(c)).
Lines 8 and 9: Every fault-free peer i checks whether the set of symbols
received from its trusted node belong to part of a valid codeword of Cn−f by
trying to apply the decoding function C−1n−f(Ri). If the decoding fails, i.e.,
Ri /∈ Cn−f , node i detects a failure/misbehavior. Then node i broadcasts
Detectedi using Broadcast Binary. This is the counterpart of checking mi
against the received hash value and key pairs in Digest.
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(a) Source node 4 does not trust node 3.
Transmissions by nodes 4, 1 and 2 are
shown. Node 3 receives 2 < n − f = 3
coded symbols by the end of step 4.
(b) Peer 3 receives S4 from node 1 so that
it has 3 = n− f coded symbols. Then node
3 uses them to reconstruct S3 in step 6.
(c) Peer 3 sends S3 to all its trusted peers.
By the end of step 7, all peers share packets
S1, S2, S3.
Figure 2.2: Example: One peer does not trust the source with n = 4 and
f = 1. Two nodes connected by an edge in the ﬁgure trust each other. The
direction of an arrow indicates the direction of a transmission along that
edge. Next to each arrow, the coded symbol(s) transmitted on that edge is
listed. The boxes near to the peers indicate the coded symbols that are
available to the peers by the end of steps 4, 6 and 7, respectively.
Line 10: If no peer claims that it detects a failure, then each peer i agrees
on C−1n−f(Ri) as the output of the current generation. Otherwise, dispute
control is performed in the same way as in Digest.
2.7.3 Correctness and Communication Complexity of CBB
The correctness of CBB is guaranteed by Theorem 2.2. The proof is similar to
that for Lemma 2.3. The proof is included in Appendix A.4 for completeness.
Theorem 2.2 If none of the peers claims failure detected, the peers agree
on an identical output y. In the case the source node n is fault-free, y = x.
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The communication complexity of CBB, denoted as CCBB, is computed
similarly to that of CBC. In each generation
• Lines 1-7: every node i receives at most n symbols, each of D/(n−f)
bits, from the nodes that it trusts. So at most n(n−1)
n−f D bits in total are
transmitted by all n nodes.
• Lines 8-9: every peer i that is not identiﬁed as faulty broadcasts one
bit Detectedi with Broadcast Binary. So at most (n − 1)B bits are
transmitted.
• Dispute control: every symbol transmitted in Lines 1-7 is broadcast by
two nodes with Broadcast Binary. So the complexity is 2n(n−1)
n−f DB
bits.
Recall that there are L/D generations in total, and dispute control is
performed by at most f(f+1) times. So the total communication complexity
of CBB can be formulated as
CCBB(L) =
n(n− 1)
n− f L+ (n− 1)B
L
D






4L0.5), if D = Θ(L0.5/n). (2.10)
Similar to CCBC(g,D), we deﬁne the average per-generation complex-
ity for performing g instances of Byzantine broadcast on D-bit values as
CCBB(g,D), which is formulated as
CCBB(g,D) =
n(n− 1)














So for D = Ω(n2) and g = Ω(n5), the per-generation communication com-
plexity imposed by CBB is roughly n(n−1)
n−f D < 1.5(n − 1)D, since f < n/3.
Recall that the cost of Digest is approximately (n − 1)D. So in terms of
traﬃc load, CBB is at most 50% more expensive than Digest. But the de-
coding function C−1n−f() is much less expensive in computational complexity
for small f , compared to the hash function used in Digest. The performance
of the algorithms is determined by the combination of communication and
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computational costs. As we will see later, according to experimental results,
CBB performs comparably with Digest, without the need for a secure hash
function.
2.7.4 Implementation
For performance evaluation, we implemented both Digest and CBB in Linux.
In this section, we discuss some of our implementation choices and some
optimization we adopted for CBB.
MultiThreading
We implement both Digest and CBB in a multithreading fashion. On every
node, there is one listener thread for each of the other nodes, which simply
accepts incoming connection requests from the node that it listens to. TCP
is used for communication between every pair of nodes. Also since Digest
and CBB share the same structure, it also makes it easier to share the same
code between the two algorithms.
A worker thread is launched whenever a listener thread receives a TCP
connection request. The worker thread establishes a TCP session with the
requesting node. When the TCP session completes, the worker thread checks
whether the received information follows the speciﬁcation of the algorithm,
and if enough messages have been received from diﬀerent nodes. If yes, it
proceeds to the consistency checking part (checking the digests against the
local generation in Digest, and decoding C−1(Ri) in CBB) and the rest of
the algorithm.
Of course, the algorithms can be implemented in the sequential manner as
well. However, this will require careful coordination among the nodes about
when and who should transmit to whom. Otherwise the system will end up
deadlocked when two nodes try to send messages to each other. This can be
very complicated in large systems. With multithreading, this complication
is avoided.
Multithreading also makes it very easy to incorporate diﬀerent optimiza-
tions. For example, with “speculative execution” technique in Zyzzyva [24], a
node executes the request speculatively when it receives a minimum number
of matching prepare messages, even if it cannot conﬁrm that all other nodes
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have accepted the same request. So by the time it conﬁrms an agreement of
the request, the output has already been computed and is waiting to be sent
to the client. This technique can be incorporated into our implementation
by having the worker thread launch a “speculate” thread for performing the
request speculatively.
Synchrony
Although we assume a synchronous system model in the previous discus-
sion, bad things can happen in real life. Synchrony might be violated tem-
porarily in practice. For example, packets might be lost in the network
and never reach the destination. Since we use TCP as the underlying com-
munication algorithm, packet losses in the middle of a TCP session have
been taken care of by the retransmission mechanism of TCP. So the only
problem packet losses can cause is when one node attempts to create a con-
nection with another node. Our implementation incorporates this concern
by allowing each node to try to connect to another node for no more than
MAX ATTEMPTS times. If a node fails to create a connection with another node
after MAX ATTEMPTS attempts, it considers that node as being faulty. In our
experiments, MAX ATTEMPTS is set to 2.
Optimization for single failure
In replication systems where each individual replica is reasonably reliable,
the probability that more than one node fails at the same time is very small.
In this case, designing for f = 1 suﬃces, and CBB can be optimized to
further reduce the computational cost as follows.
Instead of using a (2(n−1), n−1) Reed-Solomon code, we use an (n, n−1)
Reed-Solomon code, which is in fact a parity code: S1, · · · , Sn−1 are just raw
data symbols, and the parity symbol Sn = ⊕n−1i=1 Si, where ⊕ denotes bitwise
exclusive or (XOR). Then we simply substitute all Si+(n−1) in Algorithm
2.7.4 with Sn. For failure detection, a peer just needs to check if the received
symbols pass the parity check. If all peers claim with Broadcast Binary that
their symbols passed the parity check, then the output is simply S1, · · · , Sn−1.
The computation for this modiﬁed CBB algorithm is very eﬃcient: each node
just needs to perform bitwise XOR’s.
49
2.7.5 Experimental Evaluation
We dedicate this section to investigations of how Byzantine broadcast algo-
rithms perform in real systems. We implemented four algorithms in Linux:
Digest, CBB and the following two:
• BASIC: This is the classic algorithm developed by Pease, Shostak and
Lamport [3]. It is also used to realize Broadcast Binary in the other
algorithms. When there is at most one faulty node (f = 1), BASIC
is very simple: the source sends the value x to every peer and the
peer forwards that to every other peer. The output at each peer is
computed as the majority of the received values. If there is no clear
majority, then all peers know that source must be faulty and will agree
on some default message.
• BTH: The error-free Byzantine broadcast algorithm proposed by Beerliova-
Trubiniova and Hirt in [31]. This algorithm uses similar ideas of cod-
ing and fault diagnosis as CBB to reduce communication complexity
to O(nL). But it has a higher communication and computational cost
than CBB.
We conduct our experiments in systems of both four and ﬁve nodes: four
(or ﬁve) Dell Inspiron 1545 laptops connected by a Netgear GS108 gigabit
switch. Each Inspiron 1545 was running Ubuntu 9.04 and a 2.0 GHz Intel
Core 2 Duo Processor T6400. One Inspiron machine was designated to be
the source node and the remaining three (or four) machines made up the
group of peers. In order to ensure consistency between test runs, the role
performed by each machine remained constant throughout the experiment.
In Digest, we use SHA-256 as the collision-resistant hash function. We use
the realization of SHA-256 from the OpenSSL toolkit [48]. The results with
ﬁve nodes are very similar to the ones with four nodes. So we only present
results for four nodes in this section.
To minimize any external error introduced by thread scheduling and back-
ground services, each data point in the following discussion/ﬁgures represents
an average of 100 identical trials. To further reduce any skew, the trials
between the three diﬀerent algorithms were interleaved so that any unfore-
seeable incident would aﬀect the algorithms as evenly as possible. In each
trial, the actual content of each generation was randomly generated. This
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random generation occurred at run time and diﬀered for each algorithm. We
see no reason for the content of each generation to have any bearing on the
results of our experiment. For each set of 100 trials, the generation size D
and the number of generations g is ﬁxed. All algorithms were timed from
the moment the source begins executing at the ﬁrst generation until the
moment that broadcast of all g generations terminates at the source node.
Timing only the source is an accurate measure since for every algorithm the
source cannot terminate until it has reliably received all n− 1 Decidedi bits
as FALSE from Broadcast Binary. So when the source terminates, it is
guaranteed that all peers have agreed upon the correct information.
Eﬀects of Generation Sizes
We ﬁrst test the failure-free performance of CBB, Digest, BASIC and BTH
for diﬀerent values of generation size D. In particular, we measure each
algorithm’s throughput: total size of data in bytes divided by the time it
takes to ﬁnish broadcasting. For the experiments of four nodes (n = 4 and
f = 1), the per-generation communication costs of the four implemented
algorithms for large D are approximately,
• CBB: n(n− 1)D/(n− f) = 4D;
• Digest: (n− 1)D = 3D;
• BASIC: 9D;
• BTH: 2n(n− 1)D/(n− 2f) = 12D.
It follows that, if only communication cost is considered, the throughput of
Digest should be 4/3 times that of CBB, while the throughput of BASIC and
BTH should be 4/9 and 1/3 times the throughput of CBB, respectively.
Figure 2.3(a) shows how the throughputs of the four tested algorithms
change as the generation size D varies from 1.5KB to 1500KB, while the total
size L is ﬁxed to 1500KB, and Figure 2.3(b) zooms-in for generation size D ≤
30KB. We ﬁrst observe that CBB and Digest achieve similar throughput for
all values of D. For all values of D, the throughput of CBB is at least as
high as that of Digest, and for D ≥ 150KB, the throughput of CBB is even
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(b) Generation size ≤ 30 KB
Figure 2.3: Throughput under diﬀerent generation sizes.
argument that although CBB introduces more traﬃc than Digest does, it
can still outperform Digest in practice, since CBB does not need to compute
any collision-resistant hash function, resulting in a lower computational cost
than Digest.
We next observe that the throughput of BASIC is roughly 60% that of
CBB for D ≥ 150KB. This is slightly higher than we expect according
to the comparison of these two algorithms’ per-generation communication
cost. We believe this is the joint eﬀect of the extra communication overhead
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Figure 2.4: One “crazy” faulty peer keeps sending arbitrary corrupted
messages to all other nodes, starting from the ﬁrst generation.
ing the Detected bits and the computational overhead introduced by en-
coding/decoding for the Reed-Solomon code Cn−f . Finally, BTH achieves
roughly 15% of CBB’s throughput. This is about 1/2 lower than we expect
according to the previous analysis. We believe this is mainly because that
BTH uses a more complicated code than CBB, which results in higher com-
putational cost and hence reduces its throughput, and includes an additional
round of messages exchange than CBB.
Performance with Failure
We also conduct tests for the failure cases. To quantify the eﬀect of the
presence of one faulty node on the performance of the algorithms, we deﬁne




It reﬂects how much slower/faster an algorithm becomes when one of the
nodes goes “bad” (or fails). At this time, we have only implemented the
normal case of BTH. So we will only compare CBB, Digest and BASIC
below.
We ﬁrst test the scenario when a faulty peer goes “crazy”: the faulty peer
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Figure 2.5: One “milder” faulty peer keeps sending arbitrary corrupted
messages to only one other node, starting from the ﬁrst generation.
the fault eﬀect ratios of CBB, Digest and BASIC change after the faulty
peer becomes “crazy”. It is easy to see that BASIC’s performance does
not depend on the presence of failures, so its fault eﬀect ratio is always 1.
On the other hand, immediately after the faulty peer becomes “crazy”, the
fault eﬀect ratio is as small as 0.2 for CBB and about 0.3 for Digest. This
means when a faulty node starts to misbehave, throughputs of CBB and
Digest are reduced to approximately 20% and 30% of their throughput before
failure, respectively. The reduction is due to the fault diagnosis process,
in which every node is required to broadcast everything it has received or
sent using Broadcast Binary. As the number of generations after failure
increases, the fault eﬀect ratio increases. After 250 generations, the fault
eﬀect ratio becomes larger than 1 (roughly 1.15 - 1.25), which implies that
when a faulty node misbehaves, the system, in fact, becomes faster in the
long run. It may seem counter-intuitive that a faulty node could improve the
performance. The explanation for this phenomenon is that since the faulty
peer sends corrupted messages to all other nodes, conﬂicts are found between
the faulty peer and all other nodes during the fault diagnosis process. Then
the faulty peer is immediately identiﬁed by the others. Hence all fault-free
nodes will not communicate with the faulty peer, and do not need to check
the consistency of the faulty peer’s messages in the subsequent generations.
As a result, both communication and computation costs are reduced after the
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ﬁrst generation, and hence the algorithms become more eﬃcient. The cost
of diagnosis in the ﬁrst generation becomes negligible once it is amortized
over a large number of generations. Since the computational cost of the hash
function in Digest is much higher than the decoding function of CBB, Digest
saves more than CBB from identifying the faulty node. As a result, the fault
eﬀect ratio of Digest is always slightly larger than that of CBB.
We also test a “milder” faulty peer, which only sends corrupted messages
to one fault-free peer. In this scenario, only one conﬂict is found and the
faulty node is not exactly identiﬁed. In Figure 2.5, a similar trend as in
Figure 2.4 is observed. R converges to 1 when the number of generations
is large, which means that the performance is the same as in normal-case,
because the faulty node is not isolated.
Both tests show that with the fault diagnosis process in Digest and CBB,
the misbehavior of faulty nodes will only degrade the performance of the
system temporarily, and the long term performance will not be degraded (or
may even be improved), even if the faulty nodes persistently misbehave.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented two eﬃcient error-free Byzantine fault-
tolerant algorithms: CBC for the consensus problem, and CBB for the broad-
cast problem. Both algorithms require O(nL) total bits of communication
for achieving Byzantine consensus and Byzantine broadcast, respectively, of







In Chapter 2, we present a Byzantine consensus algorithm CBC and a Byzan-
tine broadcast algorithm CBB that solve the consensus and broadcast prob-
lems with communication complexity O(nL) for suﬃciently large L. Both
CBC and CBB, as well as most existing Byzantine consensus/broadcast al-
gorithms, are network-oblivious, by which we mean that these algorithms are
designed without taking into account constraints of the underlying commu-
nication networks.
In this chapter, we study the design of Network-Aware Byzantine broad-
cast algorithms. The proposed Byzantine broadcast algorithms are “network-
aware” in the sense that their design takes the link capacities into account. In
particular, we consider the problem of maximizing the throughput of Byzan-
tine broadcast in synchronous networks of point-to-point links, wherein each
directed communication link is subject to a “capacity” constraint. Informally
speaking, throughput of Byzantine broadcast is the number of bits that can
be broadcast from the source to the peers per unit time (on average), under
the worst-case behavior by the faulty nodes. Despite the large body of work
on Byzantine consensus and broadcast [49, 35, 34, 36, 31, 38], performance
of consensus and broadcast in arbitrary point-to-point network has not been
investigated previously. When capacities of the diﬀerent links are not iden-
tical, previously proposed algorithms can perform poorly. In fact, one can
easily construct example networks in which previously proposed algorithms
achieve throughput that is arbitrarily worse than the optimal throughput.
Main contributions: This chapter studies throughput and capacity of
Byzantine broadcast in point-to-point networks.
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1. We develop a Network-Aware Byzantine broadcast algorithm NAB for
arbitrary point-to-point networks wherein each directed communication
link is subject to a capacity constraint.
2. We derive an upper bound on the capacity of BB in arbitrary point-to-
point networks.
3. We show that NAB can achieve throughput at least 1/3 of the capacity
in arbitrary point-to-point networks. When the network satisﬁes an
additional condition, NAB can achieve throughput at least 1/2 of the
capacity.
4. We develop Capacity-Achieving network-aware Byzantine broadcast
(CAB) algorithms for two special families of networks, namely 4-node
networks and symmetric fully connected networks.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we ﬁrst recapitulate
the deﬁnition of the Byzantine broadcast problem, and introduce the formal
deﬁnition of the point-to-point network. We then deﬁne throughput and
capacity of Byzantine broadcast in a given network. Overview of the NAB
algorithm is then presented in Section 3.3. Detailed discussion of the NAB
algorithm is given in Sections 3.4 and 3.6. A general upper bound on the
capacity of Byzantine broadcast in arbitrary point-to-point networks is then
proved in Section 3.6.2. Then in Section 3.7 we introduce the CAB algorithm,
which can achieve a throughput arbitrarily close to the upper bound in 4-
nodes networks and symmetric fully-connected networks.
3.2 Problem Deﬁnition and Models
We have introduced the deﬁnition of the Byzantine broadcast problem in
Chapter 2.1. For convenience in the following discussion, we restate the
deﬁnition below. We consider a synchronous system consisting of n nodes,
named 1, 2, · · · , n, with one node designated as the sender or source node. In
particular, we assume here that node 1 is the source node. Source node 1 is
given an input value x containing L bits, and the goal here is for the source
to broadcast its input to all the other nodes. The following conditions must
be satisﬁed when the input value at the source node is x:
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• Termination: Every fault-free node i must eventually decide on an
output value of L bits; let us denote the output value of fault-free node
i as yi.
• Agreement: All fault-free nodes must agree on an identical output
value, i.e., there exists y such that yi = y for each fault-free node i.
• Validity: If the source node is fault-free, then the agreed value must
be identical to the input value of the source, i.e., y = x.
Failure Model: The faulty nodes are controlled by an adversary that has
a complete knowledge of the network topology, the algorithm, and the infor-
mation the source is trying to send. No secret is hidden from the adversary.
The adversary can take over at most f nodes at any point during execution of
the algorithm, where f < n/3. These nodes are said to be faulty. The faulty
nodes can engage in any kind of deviations from the algorithm, including
sending incorrect or inconsistent messages to the neighbors.
We assume that the set of faulty nodes remains ﬁxed across diﬀerent in-
stances of execution of the BB algorithm. This assumption captures the
conditions in practical replicated server systems. In such a system, the repli-
cas may use Byzantine broadcast to agree on requests to be processed. The
set of faulty (or compromised) replicas that may adversely aﬀect the agree-
ment on each request does not change arbitrarily. We model this by assuming
that the set of faulty nodes remains ﬁxed over time.
When a faulty node fails to send a message to a neighbor as required by the
algorithm, we assume that the recipient node interprets the missing message
as being some default value.
Network Model: We assume a synchronous point-to-point network mod-
eled as a directed simple graph G(V, E), where the set of vertices V =
{1, 2, · · · , n} represents the nodes in the point-to-point network, and the
set of edges E represents the links in the network. The capacity of an edge
e ∈ E is denoted as ze. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will use the
terms edge and link interchangeably, and use the terms vertex and node inter-
changeably. We assume that n ≥ 3f + 1 and that the network connectivity
is at least 2f + 1 (these two conditions are necessary for the existence of a
correct BB algorithm [49]).
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In the given network, links may not exist between all node pairs. Each
directed link is associated with a ﬁxed link capacity, which speciﬁes the max-
imum amount of information that can be transmitted on that link per unit
time. Speciﬁcally, over a directed edge e = (i, j) with capacity ze bits/unit
time, we assume that up to zeτ bits can be reliably sent from node i to node j
over time duration τ (for any non-negative τ). This is a deterministic model
of capacity that has been commonly used in other work [50, 45, 51, 46]. All
link capacities are assumed to be positive integers. Rational link capacities
can be turned into integers by choosing a suitable time unit. Irrational link
capacities can be approximated by integers with arbitrary accuracy by choos-
ing a suitably long time unit. Propagation delays on the links are assumed to
be zero (relaxing this assumption does not impact the correctness of results
shown for large input sizes). We also assume that each node correctly knows
the identity of the nodes at the other end of its links.
This point-to-point communication model has been widely used for wired
networks. It can also be used for wireless networks, if capacity constraint is
imposed for each point-to-point wireless link.
Throughput and Capacity of Byzantine Broadcast
When deﬁning the throughput of a given BB algorithm in a given network,
we consider Q ≥ 1 independent instances of BB. The source node is given
an L-bit input for each of these Q instances, and the validity and agreement
properties need to be satisﬁed for each instance separately (i.e., independent
of the outcome for the other instances).
For any BB algorithm A, denote t(G, L,Q,A) as the duration of time re-
quired, in the worst case, to complete Q instances of L-bit Byzantine broad-
cast, without violating the capacity constraints of the links in G. Throughput
of algorithm A in network G for L-bit inputs is then deﬁned as




We then deﬁne capacity CBB as follows.
Capacity CBB of Byzantine broadcast in network G is deﬁned as the supre-
mum over the throughput of all algorithms A that solve the BB problem and
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all values of L. That is,
CBB(G) = sup
A,L
T (G, L,A). (3.1)
Generalization of the Problem
Recall that the goal of Byzantine broadcast is for all nodes in the system,
except for the source node, to learn about the input value (if source is fault-
free). In practice, similar to the multicast problem in networking, we may
only need to reliably deliver the input value to a subset of the nodes in the
system, namely the receivers; there are some other nodes in the system,
namely the helpers, that are just to “help” the delivery of the input value
and themselves do not necessary need to learn the input value. For example,
an Ethernet switch or a router can be considered as a helper node. If this is
the case, then the Byzantine Broadcast problem can be generalized in many
ways. We list some possibly interesting generalizations below:
• We do not diﬀerentiate the faulty nodes: the only constraint on the
capability of the adversary is that it can control up to f nodes (can
include the source, the receivers, and the helpers).
• We diﬀerentiate the faulty nodes: the adversary can control up to f1
non-helper nodes (source and receivers), and up to f2 helpers.
• In addition to the link capacity constraints in G, each helper node has
a total traﬃc constraint. In other words, the total number of bits a
helper node can send and receive together per unit time cannot exceed
its total traﬃc constraint.
There are many more ways to generalize the problem. However, for this
dissertation, we only consider the original problem in which all non-source




Each instance of our NAB algorithm performs Byzantine broadcast of an L-
bit value. We assume that the NAB algorithm is used repeatedly, and during
all these repeated executions, the cumulative number of faulty nodes is upper
bounded by f . Due to this assumption, the algorithm can perform well by
amortizing the cost of fault tolerance over a large number of executions.
Larger values of L also result in better performance for the algorithm. The
algorithm is intended to be used for suﬃciently large L, to be elaborated
later.
The k-th instance of NAB executes on a network corresponding to graph
Gk(Vk, Ek), deﬁned as follows:
• For the ﬁrst instance, k = 1, and G1 = G. Thus, V1 = V and E1 = E .
• The k-th instance of NAB occurs on graph Gk in the following sense:
(i) all the fault-free nodes know the node and edge sets Vk and Ek, (ii)
only the nodes corresponding to the vertices in Vk need to participate
in the k-th instance of BB, and (iii) only the links corresponding to the
edges in Ek are used for communication in the k-th instance of NAB
(communication received on other links can be ignored).
During the k-th instance of NAB using graph Gk, if misbehavior by
some faulty node(s) is detected, then, as described later, additional
information is gleaned about the potential identity of the faulty node(s).
In this case, Gk+1 is obtained by removing from Gk appropriately chosen
edges and possibly some vertices (as described later).
On the other hand, if during the k-th instance, no misbehavior is de-
tected, then Gk+1 = Gk.
The k-th instance of NAB algorithm consists of three phases, as described
next. The main contributions of this chapter are (i) the algorithm used in
Phase 2 below, and (ii) a performance analysis of NAB.
If graph Gk does not contain the source node 1, then (as will be clearer
later) by the start of the k-th instance of NAB, all the fault-free nodes already
know that the source node is surely faulty; in this case, the fault-free nodes
can agree on a default value for the output, and terminate the algorithm.
Hereafter, we will assume that the source node 1 is in Gk.
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Phase 1: Unreliable Broadcast
In Phase 1, source node 1 broadcasts L bits to all the other nodes in Gk. This
phase makes no eﬀort to detect or tolerate misbehavior by faulty nodes. As
elaborated in Appendix B.1, unreliable broadcast can be performed using a
set of spanning trees embedded in graph Gk. Now let us analyze the time
required to perform unreliable broadcast in Phase 1.
MINCUT (Gk , 1, j) denotes the minimum cut in the directed graph Gk
from source node 1 to node j. Let us deﬁne
γk = min
j∈Vk
MINCUT (Gk, 1, j).
MINCUT (Gk, 1, j) is equal to the maximum ﬂow rate possible from node 1
to node j ∈ Vk. It is well-known [52] that γk is the maximum rate achievable
for unreliable broadcast from node 1 to all the other nodes in Vk, under the
capacity constraints on the links in Ek. Thus, the least amount of time in
which L bits can be broadcast by node 1 in graph Gk is given by1
L / γk. (3.2)
Clearly, γk depends on the capacities of the links in Gk. For example, if
Gk were the directed graph in Figure 3.1(a), then MINCUT (Gk, 1, 2) =
MINCUT (Gk, 1, 4) = 2, MINCUT (Gk, 1, 3) = 3, and hence γk = 2.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Example graphs.
1To simplify the analysis, we ignore propagation delays. Analogous results on through-
put and capacity can be obtained in the presence of propagation delays as well.
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At the end of the broadcast operation in Phase 1, each node should have
received L bits. At the end of Phase 1 of the k-th instance of NAB, one of
the following four outcomes will occur:
(i) the source node 1 is fault-free, and all the fault-free nodes correctly
receive the source node’s L-bit input for the k-th instance of NAB, or
(ii) the source node 1 is fault-free, but some of the fault-free nodes receive
incorrect L-bit values due to misbehavior by some faulty node(s), or
(iii) the source node 1 is faulty, but all the fault-free nodes still receive an
identical L-bit value in Phase 1, or
(iv) The source node is faulty, and all the fault-free nodes do not receive an
identical L-bit value in Phase 1.
The values received by the fault-free nodes in cases (i) and (iii) satisfy the
agreement and validity conditions, whereas in cases (ii) and (iv) at least one
of the two conditions is violated.
Phase 2: Failure Detection
Phase 2 performs the following two operations. As stipulated in the fault
model, a faulty node may not follow the algorithm speciﬁcation correctly.
• (Step 2.1) Equality check: Using an Equality Check algorithm, the nodes
in Vk perform a comparison of the L-bit value they received in Phase
1, to determine if all the nodes received an identical value. The source
node 1 also participates in this comparison operation (treating its input
as the value “received from” itself).
Section 3.4 presents the Equality Check algorithm, which is designed to
guarantee that if the values received by the fault-free nodes in Phase
1 are not identical, then at least one fault-free node will detect the
mismatch.
• (Step 2.2) Agreeing on the outcome of equality check: Using a previ-
ously proposed Byzantine broadcast algorithm, such as [3], each node
performs Byzantine broadcast of a 1-bit ﬂag to other nodes in Gk indi-
cating whether it detected a mismatch during Equality Check.
63
If any node broadcasts in step 2.2 that it has detected a mismatch, then
subsequently Phase 3 is performed. On the other hand, if no node an-
nounces a mismatch in step 2.2 above, then Phase 3 is not performed; in
this case, each fault-free node agrees on the value it received in Phase 1, and
the k-th instance of NAB is completed.
We will later prove that, when Phase 3 is not performed, the values agreed
above by the fault-free nodes satisfy the validity and agreement conditions
for the k-th instance of NAB. On the other hand, when Phase 3 is performed
during the k-th instance of NAB, as noted below, Phase 3 results in correct
outcome for the k-th instance.
When Phase 3 is performed, Phase 3 determines Gk+1. Otherwise, Gk+1 =
Gk.
Phase 3: Dispute Control
Phase 3 employs a dispute control mechanism that has also been used in
prior work [37, 5] and our design of linear-complexity Byzantine consensus
and broadcast algorithms (CBC and CBB) in the previous chapter. Dispute
control is used to update the communication graph Gk used for the each
instance of NAB. The way Gk is updated is similar to the way in which
Diag Graph is updated in CBC and CBB. The main diﬀerence is that, in
order to better utilize the link capacities in the network, some operations
performed in dispute control of NAB are more complicated than in CBC and
CBB. Appendix B.2 provides the details of the dispute control algorithm used
in Phase 3. Here we summarize the outcomes of this phase – this summary
should suﬃce for understanding the main contributions of this chapter.
The dispute control in Phase 3 has very high overhead, due to the large
amount of data that needs to be transmitted. From the above discussion of
Phase 2, it follows that Phase 3 is performed only if at least one faulty node
misbehaves during Phases 1 or 2. The outcomes from Phase 3 performed
during the k-th instance of NAB are as follows.
• Phase 3 results in correct Byzantine broadcast for the k-th instance of
NAB. This is obtained as a byproduct of the Dispute Control mecha-
nism.
• By the end of Phase 3, either one of the nodes in Vk is correctly iden-
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tiﬁed as faulty, or/and at least one pair of nodes in Vk, say nodes a, b,
is identiﬁed as being “in dispute” with each other. When a node pair
a, b is found in dispute, it is guaranteed that (i) at least one of these
two nodes is faulty, and (ii) at least one of the directed edges (a, b) and
(b, a) is in Ek. Note that the dispute control phase never ﬁnds two
fault-free nodes in dispute with each other.
• Phase 3 in the k-th instance of NAB computes graph Gk+1. In par-
ticular, any nodes that can be inferred as being faulty based on their
behavior so far are excluded from Vk+1; links attached to such nodes are
excluded from Ek+1. In Appendix B.2 we elaborate on how the faulty
nodes are identiﬁed. Then, for each node pair in Vk+1, if that node pair
has been found in dispute at least in one instance of NAB so far, the
links between the node pair are exluded from Ek+1. Phase 3 ensures that
all the fault-free nodes compute an identical graph Gk+1 = (Vk+1, Ek+1)
to be used during the next instance of NAB.
Consider two special cases for the k-th instance of NAB:
• If graph Gk does not contain the source node 1, it implies that all the
fault-free nodes are aware that node 1 is faulty. In this case, they can
safely agree on a default value as the outcome for the k-th instance of
NAB.
• Similarly, if the source node is in Gk but f other nodes are excluded
from Gk, that implies that the remaining nodes in Gk are all fault-free;
in this case, algorithm NAB can be reduced to just Phase 1.
Observe that during each execution of Phase 3, either a new pair of nodes
in dispute is identiﬁed, or a new node is identiﬁed as faulty. Once a node
is found to be in dispute with f + 1 distinct nodes, it can be identiﬁed
as faulty, and excluded from the algorithm’s execution. Therefore, Dispute
Control needs to be performed at most f(f + 1) times over repeated execu-
tions of NAB. Thus, even though each dispute control phase is expensive,
the bounded number ensures that the amortized cost over a large number of
instances of NAB is small, as reﬂected in the performance analysis of NAB
(in Section 3.6 and Appendix B.4).
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3.4 Equality Check Algorithm with Parameter ρk
We now present the Equality Check algorithm used in Phase 2, which has an
integer parameter ρk for the k-th instance of NAB. Later in this section, we
will elaborate on the choice of ρk, which is dependent on capacities of the
links in Gk.
Let us denote by xi the L-bit value received by fault-free node i ∈ Vk in
Phase 1 of the k-th instance. For simplicity, we do not include index k in
the notation xi. To simplify the presentation, let us assume that L/ρk is
an integer. Thus we can represent the L-bit value xi as ρk symbols from
Galois Field GF (2L/ρk). In particular, we represent xi as a 1× ρk vector Xi
in GF (2L/ρk),
Xi = [Xi(1), Xi(2), · · · , Xi(ρk)]
where each symbol Xi(j) ∈ GF (2L/ρk) can be represented using L/ρk bits.
As discussed earlier, for convenience, we assume that all the link capacities
are integers when using a suitable time unit.
Algorithm 3.4.5 Equality Check in Gk with parameter ρk
Each node i ∈ Vk should performs these steps:
1.On each outgoing link e = (i, j) ∈ Ek whose capacity is ze, node i
transmits ze linear combinations of the ρk symbols in vector Xi, with
the weights for the linear combinations being chosen from GF (2L/ρk).
More formally, for each outgoing edge e = (i, j) ∈ Ek of capacity ze, a
ρk× ze matrix Ce is speciﬁed as a part of the algorithm. Entries in Ce
are chosen from GF (2L/ρk). Node i sends to node j a vector Ye of ze
symbols obtained as the matrix product Ye = XiCe. Each element of
Ye is said to be a “coded symbol”. The choice of the matrix Ce aﬀects
the correctness of the algorithm, as elaborated later.
2.On each incoming edge d = (j, i) ∈ Ek, node i receives a vector Yd
containing zd symbols from GF (2
L/ρk). Node i then checks, for each
incoming edge d, whether Yd = XiCd. The check is said to fail iﬀ
Yd = XiCd.
3.If checks of symbols received on any incoming edge fails in the previous
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step, then node i sets a 1-bit ﬂag equal to MISMATCH; else the ﬂag is
set to NULL. This ﬂag is broadcast in Step 2.2 above.
In the Equality Check algorithm, ze symbols of size L/ρk bits are transmit-
ted on each link e of capacity ze. Therefore, the Equality Check algorithm
requires time duration
L / ρk. (3.3)
Salient Feature of Equality Check Algorithm
In the Equality Check algorithm, a single round of communication occurs
between adjacent nodes. No node is required to forward packets received from
other nodes during the Equality Check algorithm. This implies that, while
a faulty node may send incorrect packets to its neighbors, it cannot tamper
with information sent between fault-free nodes. This feature of Equality
Check is important in being able to prove its correctness despite the presence
of faulty nodes in Gk.
Choice of Parameter ρk
We deﬁne a set Ωk as follows using the disputes identiﬁed through the ﬁrst
(k − 1) instances of NAB.
Ωk = { H | H is a subgraph of Gk containing (n− f) nodes such that
no two nodes in H have been found in dispute through
the ﬁrst (k − 1) instances of NAB }
As noted in the discussion of Phase 3 (Dispute Control), fault-free nodes
are never found in dispute with each other (fault-free nodes may be found in
dispute with faulty nodes, however). This implies that Gk includes all the
fault-free nodes, since a fault-free node will never be found in dispute with
f + 1 other nodes. There are at least n− f fault-free nodes in the network.
This implies that set Ωk is non-empty.
Corresponding to a directed graph H(V,E), let us deﬁne an undirected
graph H(V,E) as follows: (i) both H and H contain the same set of vertices,
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(ii) undirected edge (i, j) ∈ E if either (i, j) ∈ E or (j, i) ∈ E, and (iii)
capacity of undirected edge (i, j) ∈ E is deﬁned to be equal to the sum of
the capacities of directed links (i, j) and (j, i) in E (if a directed link does
not exist in E, here we treat its capacity as 0). For example, Figure 3.2(b)
shows the undirected graph corresponding to the directed graph in Figure
3.2(a).
(a) Directed graph G (b) Undirected graph G
(c) Two unit-capacity spanning trees in
the directed graph. Every directed edge
has capacity 1
(d) A spanning tree in the undirected
graph shown in dotted edges
Figure 3.2: Diﬀerent graph representations of a network. Numbers next to
the edges indicate link capacities.
Deﬁne a set of undirected graphs Ωk as follows. Ωk contains undirected
version of each directed graph in Ω.







MINCUT (H, i, j)
as the minimum value of the MINCUTs between all pairs of nodes in all
the undirected graphs in the set Ωk. For instance, suppose that n = 4,
f = 1 and the graph shown in Figure 3.1(a) on page 62 is G, whereas Gk
is the graph shown in Figure 3.1(b). Thus, nodes 2 and 3 have been found
in dispute previously. Then, Ωk and Ωk each contain two subgraphs, one
subgraph corresponding to the node set {1, 3, 4}, and the other subgraph
corresponding to the node set {2, 3, 4}. In this example, Uk = 2.




Under the above constraint on ρk, as per (3.3), execution time of Equality
Check is minimized when ρk =
Uk
2
. Under the above constraint on ρk, we
will prove the correctness of the Equality Check algorithm, with its execution
time being L/ρk.
3.4.1 Correctness of the Equality Check Algorithm
The correctness of Algorithm 3.4.5 depends on the choices of the parameter
ρk and the set of coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek}. Let us say that a set of coding
matrices is correct if the resulting Equality Check Algorithm 3.4.5 satisﬁes the
following requirement:
• (EC) if there exists a pair of fault-free nodes i, j ∈ Gk such that
Xi = Xj (i.e., xi = xj),
then the 1-bit ﬂag at at least one fault-free node is set to MIS-
MATCH.
Recall thatXi is a vector representation of the L-bit value xi received by node
i in Phase 1 of NAB. Two consequences of the above correctness condition
are:
• If some node (possibly source node) misbehaves during Phase 1 leading
to outcomes (ii) or (iv) for Phase 1, then at least one fault-free node will
set its ﬂag to MISMATCH. In this case, the fault-free nodes (possibly
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including the sender) have not received identical L-bit values in Phase
1.
• If no misbehavior occurs in Phase 1 (thus the values received by fault-
free nodes in Phase 1 are correct), but MISMATCH ﬂag at some fault-
free node is set in Equality Check, then misbehavior must have occurred
in Phase 2.
The following theorem shows that when ρk ≤ Uk/2, and when L is suﬃ-
ciently large, there exist of coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} that are correct.
Theorem 3.1 For ρk ≤ Uk/2, when the entries of the coding matrices {Ce|e ∈
Ek} in step 1 of Algorithm 3.4.5 are chosen independently and uniformly
at random from GF (2L/ρk), then {Ce|e ∈ Ek} is correct with probability





(n− f − 1)ρk
]






(n− f − 1)ρk
]
> 0.
Proof Sketch: The detailed proof is presented in Appendix B.3. Here we
provide a sketch of the proof. The goal is to prove that property (EC) above
holds with a non-zero probability. That is, regardless of which (up to f)
nodes in G are faulty, when Xi = Xj for some pair of fault-free nodes i and
j in Gk during the k-th instance, at least one fault-free node (which may be
diﬀerent from nodes i and j) will set its 1-bit ﬂag to MISMATCH. To prove
this, we consider every subgraph of H ∈ Ωk (see deﬁnition of Ωk above).
By deﬁnition of Ωk, no two nodes in H have been found in dispute through
the ﬁrst (k − 1) instances of NAB. Therefore, H represents one potential set
of n − f fault-free nodes in Gk. Denote 01×z as a 1 × z vector of which all
symbols equal to 0. For each edge e = (i, j) in H , steps 1-2 of Algorithm 3.4.5
together have the eﬀect of checking whether or not (Xi − Xj)Ce = 01×ze .
Without loss of generality, for the purpose of this proof, rename the nodes
in H as 1, · · · , n− f . Denote a 1× ρk vector in GF (2L/ρk)
Di = Xi −Xn−f
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for i = 1, · · · , (n− f − 1), then
(Xi −Xj)Ce = 01×ze ⇔
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(Di −Dj)Ce = 01×ze , if i, j < n− f ;
DiCe = 01×ze , if j = n− f ;
−DjCe = 01×ze , if i = n− f.
(3.4)
Deﬁne
DH = [D1,D2, · · · ,Dn−f−1].
DH is a 1 × ρk(n − f − 1) vector in GF (2L/ρk). Let m be the sum of the
capacities of all the directed edges in H . As elaborated in Appendix B.3, we
deﬁne CH to be a (n− f − 1)ρk ×m matrix in GF (2L/ρk) whose entries are
obtained using the elements of Ce for each edge e in H in an appropriate
manner. For the suitably deﬁned CH matrix, we can show that the compar-
isons in steps 1-2 of Algorithm 3.4.5 at all the nodes in H ∈ Ωk are equivalent
to checking whether or not
DHCH = 01×m. (3.5)
We can show that for a particular subgraph H ∈ Ωk, when ρk ≤ Uk/2,
m ≥ (n − f − 1)ρk; and when the set of coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek} are
generated as described in Theorem 3.1, for large enough L, with non-zero
probability CH contains a (n − f − 1)ρk × (n − f − 1)ρk square submatrix
that is invertible. In this case DHCH = 01×m if and only if DH = 01×m,
i.e., X1 = X2 = · · · = Xn−f . In other words, if all nodes in subgraph H are
fault-free, and Xi = Xj for two fault-free nodes i, j, then DHCH = 01×m
and hence the check in step 2 of Algorithm 3.4.5 fails at some fault-free node
in H .
We can then show that, for large enough L, with a non-zero probability,
this is also simultaneously true for all subgraphs H ∈ Ωk. This implies
that, for large enough L, correct coding matrices (Ce for each e ∈ Ek) can
be found. These coding matrices are speciﬁed as a part of the algorithm
speciﬁcation. Further details of the proof are in Appendix B.3. 
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3.5 Correctness of NAB
For Phase 1 (Unreliable Broadcast) and Phase 3 (Dispute Control), the proof
that the outcomes claimed in Section 3.3 indeed occur follows directly from
the prior literature cited in Section 3.3 (and elaborated in Appendices B.1
and B.2). Now consider two cases:
• The values received by the fault-free nodes in Phase 1 are not identical:
Then the correctness of Equality Check ensures that a fault-free node
will detect the mismatch, and consequently Phase 3 will be performed.
As a byproduct of Dispute Control in Phase 3, the fault-free nodes
will correctly agree on a value that satisﬁes the validity and agreement
conditions.
• The values received by the fault-free nodes in Phase 1 are identical: If
no node announces a mismatch in step 2.2, then the fault-free nodes
will agree on the value received in Phase 1. It is easy to see that this is
a correct outcome. On the other hand, if some (faulty) node announces
a mismatch in step 2.2, then Dispute Control will be performed, which
will result in correct outcome for the broadcast of the k-th instance.
Thus, in all cases, NAB will lead to correct outcome in each instance.
3.6 Throughput of NAB and Capacity of BB
3.6.1 A Lower Bound on Throughput of NAB for Large Q
and L
In this section, we provide the intuition behind the derivation of the lower
bound. More detail is presented in Appendix B.4. We prove the lower bound
when the number of instances Q and input size L for each instance are both
“large” (in an order sense) compared to n. Two consequences of L and Q
being large:
• As a consequence of Q being large, the average overhead of Dispute
control per instance of NAB becomes negligible. Recall that Dispute
Control needs to be performed at most f(f+1) times over Q executions
of NAB.
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• As a consequence of L being large, the overhead of 1-bit broadcasts
performed in step 2.2 of Phase 2 becomes negligible when amortized
over the L bits being broadcast by the source in each instance of NAB.
It then suﬃces to consider only the time it takes to complete the Unreliable
broadcast in Phase 1 and Equality Check in Phase 2. For the k-th instance
of NAB, as discussed previously, the unreliable broadcast in Phase 1 can be
done in L/γk time units (see deﬁnition of γk in section 3.3.). We now deﬁne
Γ = { J | J is a subgraph of G containing source node 1,
and Gk may equal J in some execution of NAB for some k }
Appendix B.5 provides a systematic construction of the set Γ. Deﬁne the






MINCUT (Gk, 1, j).
Then an upper bound of the execution time of Phase 1 in all instances of
NAB is L/γ∗.
With parameter ρk = Uk/2, the execution time of the Equality Check in
Phase 2 is L/ρk. Recall that Uk is deﬁned as the minimum value of the
MINCUTs between all pairs of nodes in all undirected graphs in the set
Ωk. As discussed in Appendix B.3.2, according to the way Gk is constructed
and the deﬁnition of Ωk, Gk is a subgraph of G1 = G, and Ωk ⊆ Ω1. Then










MINCUT (H, i, j)
= U1





Then ρk ≥ ρ∗ for all possible Gk and the execution time of the Equality Check











3.6.2 An Upper Bound on Capacity of BB
Theorem 3.2 In any point-to-point network G(V, E), the capacity of Byzan-
tine broadcast (CBB) with node 1 as the source satisﬁes the following upper
bound:
CBB(G) ≤ min(γ∗, 2ρ∗).
Appendix B.6 presents a proof of this upper bound. Given the throughput
lower bound in (3.6) and the upper bound on CBB(G) from Theorem 3.2, we
show that the NAB algorithm always achieves throughput at least as high as
1/3 of the capacity, as stated as the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3 For graph G(V, E):
lim
L→∞






Moreover, when γ∗ ≤ ρ∗:
lim
L→∞











From Equality 3.6, we know that limL→∞ T (G, L,NAB) ≥ TNAB(G). We
will compare TNAB(G) with min(γ∗, 2ρ∗) – the upper bound on CBB(G) from
Theorem 3.2. There are 3 possible cases in terms of the relative values of γ∗
and ρ∗:
1. γ∗ ≤ ρ∗: Observe that TNAB(G) is an increasing function of both γ∗










2To simplify the analysis above, we ignored propagation delays. Appendix B.4 describes
how to achieve this bound even when propagation delays are considered.
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The last inequality is due to γ∗ ≥ CBB(G).










The last inequality is due to γ∗ ≥ CBB(G).
3. γ∗ > 2ρ∗: Since TNAB(G) is an increasing function of γ∗, for a given ρ∗,










The second inequality is due to 2ρ∗ ≥ CBB(G).

3.7 The CAB Algorithms
In the previous sections of this chapter, we have shown that the NAB algo-
rithm can achieve Byzantine broadcast throughput arbitrarily close to 1/3
of the upper bound on the capacity of Byzantine broadcast from Theorem
3.2, in a general point-to-point network G. In this section, we will show that
the upper bound from Theorem 3.1 is tight in the two particular families of
networks below by providing algorithms that achieve throughput arbitrarily
close to the upper bound of capacity.
• Four-node networks: fully connected network of four nodes and at most
one faulty node, with arbitrary distribution of link capacities.
• Symmetric networks: fully connected network in which all link capac-
ities are identical, with arbitrary number of nodes n ≥ 4 and number
of faulty nodes f < n/3.
3.7.1 CAB Algorithm for Four-Node Networks
In this section, we use the same notations (such as Gk,Vk, Ek) as in previous
sections. For four-node networks, Theorem 3.2 reduces to the following:
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Figure 3.3: Four-node network. Labels denote some link capacities.
Corollary 3.1 In any four-node network with arbitrary distribution of link
capacities, the capacity of Byzantine broadcast (CBB4) is upper-bounded by
• the sum capacity of any two incoming links to a peer node i, for i =
2, 3, 4.
• the sum capacity of any two outgoing links of the source node 1.
Figure 3.3 shows a complete four-node network. The labels near the vari-
ous links denote the link capacities. With this notation, the ﬁrst condition
in Corollary 3.1 implies, for instance, that t + u ≥ CBB4; and the second
condition implies, for instance, that l +m ≥ CBB4.
The CAB algorithm for four-node networks is in fact similar to the NAB
algorithm for general point-to-point networks. The main diﬀerence is that,
by exploring the structure of the four-node networks, the CAB algorithm
performs the unreliable broadcast in Phase 1 of NAB and failure detection
in Phase 2 of NAB simultaneously. In other words, the transmissions for
delivering x from source node 1 to the three peers are also used for equality
checking. By doing this, the link capacities are fully utilized and throughput
matching the upper bound can be achieved.
As in NAB, we represent the L-bit input value x of the k-th instance of
Byzantine broadcast as a vector X of R symbols from Galois Field GF (2L/R).
The operation of the CAB algorithm is described in pseudo-code in Algorithm
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3.7.6. For the following discussion, denote zi,j as the capacity of edge e =
(i, j).
Algorithm 3.7.6 CAB Algorithm for four-node networks, with Gk and pa-
rameter R (instance k)
1.Source node 1:
On each outgoing link e = (1, i) ∈ Ek whose capacity is ze, node 1
transmits a vector of ze coded symbols Ye = XCe, with the weights
for the linear combinations being chosen from GF (2L/R).
2.Each peer node i that is not in dispute with the source, i.e., (1, i) and
(i, 1) are both in Ek:
On each outgoing link d = (i, j) ∈ Ek (j = 1) whose capacity is zd, node
i forwards to node j the ﬁrst min{zd, ze} coded symbols of Ye received
from node 1 in the previous step on link e = (1, i) ∈ Ek, following an
increasing order of the indices.
3.Peer node j that is in dispute with the source (if there is any), i.e.,
neither (1, j) nor (j, 1) is in Ek:
Denote the other two peers as l and p. Note that links (j, l), (j, p), (l, j)
and (p, j) are all in Ek; otherwise, node j must have been identiﬁed as
faulty and removed. Node l computes max{zl,j−z1,l, 0} coded symbols
as linear combinations of the coded symbols it has received from node
1 and node p in steps 1-2, and sends them to node j. Similarly, node p
computes and sends max{zp,j − z1,p, 0} symbols to node j. Now node j
has received zl,j+zp,j coded symbols from node l and node p in steps 2-3.
Then it computes min{zj,l, zj,p} coded symbols as linear combinations
of the coded symbols it has received. Then node j sends these set of
min{zj,l, zj,p} coded symbols on both links (j, l) and (j, p).
4.Each peer node i checks if there exists a unique 1 × R vector Yi from
GF (2L/R) that satisﬁes all the linear combinations represented by all
the coded symbols it has received through steps 1-3. The check is said
to fail iﬀ such an unique vector cannot be found.
5.The rest is the same as in the NAB algorithm.
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Steps 1-3 here correspond to the unreliable broadcast in Phase 1 and steps
1 of the equality checking algorithm in Phase 2 of the NAB algorithm, and
step 4 here corresponds to step 2 of the equality checking algorithm. Similar
to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we show that when parameter R is no greater
than the upper bound stated in Corollary 3.1 and the value L is suﬃciently
large, there exist sets of weights for computing the linear combinations such
that the resulting Algorithm 3.7.6 is correct, where the correctness of the
algorithm is deﬁned as in Section 3.4.1. The proof is included in Appendix
B.7 for completeness.
Algorithm 3.7.6 can achieve throughput arbitrarily close to the upper
bound stated in Corollary 3.1, as per a similar throughput analysis as in
Section 3.6 for NAB. Hence,
Theorem 3.4 In any four-node network, the capacity of Byzantine broadcast
is equal to the minimum value of
• the sum capacity of any two incoming links to a peer node i, for i =
2, 3, 4.
• the sum capacity of any two outgoing links of the source node 1.
Additionally, Algorithm 3.7.6 can achieve throughput arbitrarily close to
the capacity.
3.7.2 CAB Algorithm for Symmetric Networks
In a symmetric network of n nodes, every pair of nodes i and j in V is
connected with a pair of directed links (i, j), (j, i) ∈ E . Also, every edge
e ∈ E has the same capacity, i.e., ze = z for some positive constant z. In
such a symmetric network with up to f < n/3 faulty nodes, Theorem 3.2
reduces to the following:
Corollary 3.2 In any symmetric network with up to f < n/3 faulty nodes,
the capacity of Byzantine broadcast (CSYM) is upper-bounded by
CSYM ≤ (n− f − 1)z,
where z is the capacity of each link in the network.
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The CAB algorithm for symmetric networks is in fact almost identical to
the CBB Algorithm from Section 2.7.2, with the following modiﬁcations:
• Replace the (2(n− 1), n− f) distance-(n+ f − 1) Reed-Solomon code
Cn−f used in CBB with a (n − 1, n − f − 1) distance-(f + 1) Reed-
Solomon code, denoted as Cn−f−1. Also accordingly replace (n− f) in
CBB with (n− f − 1).
• In Line 5 of CBB, instead of receiving Rj [j+(n−1)] from each peer j
trusted by both node i and source node n, we require every node j that
is trusted by both node i and the source node n to compute a linear
combination of the coded symbols it has received through Lines 1-4
and send it to node i.
• Dispute control is done in the same way as the NAB algorithm does.
With these modiﬁcations, the algorithm achieves throughput arbitrarily
close to (n−f−1)z, as per similar proof of correctness for CBB and through-
put analysis as in Section 3.6 for NAB. Hence,
Theorem 3.5 In any symmetric network with up to f < n/3 faulty nodes
and link capacity z, the capacity of Byzantine broadcast is equal to (n−f−1)z.
Additionally, the CBB algorithm with the above modiﬁcations can achieve
throughput arbitrarily close to the capacity.
3.8 Network-Aware Byzantine Consensus
In previous sections of this chapter, we have discussed the design of network-
aware Byzantine broadcast algorithms in point-to-point networks. For the
Byzantine consensus problem, we can deﬁne throughput and capacity in
point-to-point networks in a similar way as for the Byzantine broadcast prob-
lem. Also, the same 3-phase structure used in NAB can be used to develop
network-aware Byzantine consensus algorithms in general point-to-point net-
works.
The main diﬀerence between Byzantine broadcast and Byzantine consensus
is that in the consensus problem there is no designated node acting as the
source of information as in the broadcast problem, and every node’s input
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value will possibly contribute to the ﬁnal output value. So in Phase 1 for
the consensus problem, instead of performing unreliable broadcast from the
source node, we need to ﬁrst identify a subset of nodes that appear to have
identical input values, and then try to agree with that value. For this, we
need to perform steps similar to the Matching stage of the CBC algorithm,
with appropriate modiﬁcations so that link capacities are better utilized.
After that, we can perform failure detection in Phase 2 and dispute control
in Phase 3 (if failure is detected) in the same way as in NAB.
We have developed an upper bound on the capacity of Byzantine consensus
in general point-to-point networks. For four-node networks, we have devel-
oped a capacity-achieving consensus algorithm. Details of the upper bound
and algorithm can be found in our paper [11]
3.9 Summary
In this chapter, we study the design of network-aware Byzantine agreement
algorithms. We derive an upper bound on the capacity of Byzantine broad-
cast for general point-to-point networks. A network-aware Byzantine broad-
cast algorithm NAB is proposed and proved to achieve throughput at least
1/3 of the capacity in general point-to-point networks. In two particular







In this chapter, we study the problem of computing the following multiparty
equality function (MEQ):
MEQ(x1, · · · , xn) =
{
0 if x1 = · · · = xn
1 otherwise.
(4.1)
The input vector x = (x1, · · · , xn) is distributed among n ≥ 2 nodes, with
only xi known to node i, and each xi chosen from the set {1, · · · , K}, for
some integer K ≥ 1.
Communication Complexity: The notion of communication complexity
(CC) was introduced by Yao in 1979 [17]. They investigated the problem
of quantifying the number of bits that two separated parties need to com-
municate between themselves in order to compute a function whose inputs,
namely X and Y , are distributed between them.
The communication cost of a protocol P , denoted as C(P ), is the number of
bits exchanged for the worst case input pair. The communication complexity
of a Boolean function f : X × Y → {0, 1} is the minimum of the cost of the
protocols for f .
Multiparty Function Computation: The notion of communication
complexity can be easily generalized to a multiparty setting, i.e., when the
number of parties > 2.
The communication complexity of a Boolean function f : X1×· · ·×Xn →
{0, 1}, is the minimum of the cost of the protocols for f .
There is more than one communication model for the multiparty problems.
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Two commonly used models are the “number on the forehead” model [53] and
the “number in hand” model. Consider function f : X1 × · · · ×Xn → {0, 1}
and input (x1, x2, · · · , xn) where each xi ∈ Xi. In the number on the forehead
model, the i-th party can see all the xj such that j = i; while in the number
in hand model, the i-th party can only see xi. As in the two-party case,
the n parties have an agreed-upon protocol for communication, and all this
communication is posted on a “public blackboard”. In these two models,
the communication may be considered as being broadcast using the public
blackboard, i.e., when any party sends a message, all other parties receive the
same message. Tight bounds often follow from considering two-way partitions
of the set of parties.
In this chapter, we consider a diﬀerent point-to-point communication model,
in which nodes communicate over private point-to-point links. This means
that when a party transmits a message on a point-to-point link, only the
party on the other end of the link receives the message. This model makes
the problem signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that with the broadcast communica-
tion model. We are interested in the communication complexity of the MEQ
problem under the point-to-point communication model.
4.2 Related Work
The 2-party version of the MEQ problem (i.e., n = 2), which is usually
referred to as the EQ problem, was ﬁrst introduced by Yao in [17]. It is shown
that the communication complexity of the EQ problem with deterministic
algorithms is logK [54]. The complexity of the EQ problem can be reduced to
O(log logK) if randomized algorithms are allowed [54]. MEQ problem with
n ≥ 3 has been studied under the number on the forehead model and the
number in hand model, both assuming a “public blackboard” for broadcast
communications. The MEQ problem with n ≥ 3 can be solved with cost of
2 bits [54] under the number on the forehead head model, while it requires
Θ(logK) bits under the number in hand model. On the other hand, the
result changes signiﬁcantly if we consider the point-to-point communication
model used in this chapter (it is easy to show at least Ω(n logK) bits are
needed).
The MEQ problem is related to the Set Disjointness problem and the con-
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sensus problem [55]. In the n-party Set Disjointness problem, we have n
parties, and given subsets S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ {1, . . . , K}, and the parties wish
to determine if S1 ∩ · · · ∩ Sn = φ without communicating many bits. The
disjointness problem is closely related to our MEQ problem. Consider the
two-party set disjointness problem with subsets S1 and S2. Let x1 and x2 be
the binary representations of S1 and S2, respectively. Then it is not hard to
show that x1 = x2 is equivalent to S1 ∩ S2 = φ and S1 ∩ S2 = φ. The multi-
party set disjointness problem has been widely studied under the “number
on the forehead” and broadcast communication model, e.g. [56, 57]. The
set disjointness problem has also been studied under the “number in hand”
model and point-to-point communication model (i.e., the same models we
are using in this chapter), with randomized algorithms. In [58], a lower
bound of Ω(K/n4) on its communication complexity is proved for random-
ized algorithms. The lower bound was then improved to Ω(K/n2) in [59]. In
[60], the authors established a further improved near-optimal lower bound of
Ω(K/(n logn)). Nevertheless, these papers focus on the order of the commu-
nication complexity of randomized algorithms. On the other hand, in this
chapter, our goal is to characterize the exact communication complexity of
deterministic algorithms.
In the Byzantine consensus problem, n parties, each of which is given an
input xi of logK bits, want to agree on a common output value x of logK
bits under the point-to-point communication model, despite the fact that up
to t of the parties may be faulty and deviate from the algorithm in arbitrary
fashion [55]. The core of the consensus problem is to make sure that all
fault-free parties’ outputs are identical, which is essentially what the MEQ
problem tries to solve. In our recent report [7], we established a lower bound
on the communication complexity of the Byzantine consensus problem of n
parties as a function of the communication complexity of the MEQ problem
of n− f parties. This motivates the MEQ problem under the point-to-point
communication model. The consensus problem has also been studied under a
slightly diﬀerent fault-free model [61]. Authors of [61] investigated the fault-
free consensus problem, which is essentially solving the MEQ problem with
1-bit inputs, i.e., K = 2, in tree topologies. We consider the problem under
a more general setting with arbitrary K and do not assume any structure of
the communication topology.
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4.3 Models and Problem Deﬁnition
4.3.1 Communication Model
In this chapter, we consider a point-to-point communication model. We
assume a synchronous fully connected network of n nodes. We assume that
all point-to-point communication channels/links are private such that when
a node transmits, only the designated recipient can receive the message. The
identity of the sender is known to the recipient.
4.3.2 Protocol
A protocol P is a schedule that consists of a sequence of steps. In each step
l, as speciﬁed by the protocol, a pair of nodes are selected as the transmitter
and receiver, denoted respectively as Tl and Rl. The transmitter Tl will
send a message the receiver Rl. The message being sent is computed as a
function ml(xTl , T
+
l (l)), where xTl denotes Tl’s input, and T
+
l (l) denotes all
the messages Tl has received so far. When it is clear from the context, we
will use T+l to denote T
+
l (l) to simplify the presentation.
In this chapter, we design protocols that are static : the triple 〈Tl, Rl, ml(·)〉
are pre-determined by the protocol and are independent of the inputs. In
other words, in step l, no matter what the inputs are, the transmitter, re-
ceiver, and the function according to which the transmitter compute the
message are the same. Since the schedule is ﬁxed, a static protocol can be
represented as a sequence of L(P ) steps: {α1, α2, · · · , αL(P )}, where αl =
〈Tl, Rl, ml(xTl, T+l )〉 in the l-th step. L(P ) is called the length of the pro-
tocol P , and P always terminates after the L(P )-th step. Denote Sl(P ) as
the cardinality of ml(), i.e., the number of possible channel symbols needed
in step l of a static protocol P , considering all possible inputs. Then the




log2 Sl(P ). (4.2)




We deﬁne two versions of the MEQ problem.
MEQ-AD (Anyone Detects): We consider protocols in which every node
i decides on a one-bit output EQi ∈ {0, 1}. A node i is said to have detected
a mismatch (or inequality of inputs) if it sets EQi = 1. A protocol P is said
to solve the MEQ-AD problem if and only if at least one node detects a
mismatch when the inputs to the n nodes are not identical. More formally,
the following property must be satisﬁed when P terminates:
EQ1 = · · · = EQn = 0 ⇔ MEQ(x1, · · · , xn) = 0. (4.3)
MEQ-CD (Centralized Detect): The second class of protocols we con-
sider are the ones in which one particular node is assigned to decide on an
output. Without loss of generality, we can assume that node n has to com-
pute the output. Then a protocol P is said to solve the MEQ-CD problem
if and only if, when P terminates, node n computes output EQn such that
EQn = MEQ(x1, · · · , xn). (4.4)
Communication Complexity: Denote ΓAD(n,K) and ΓCD(n,K) as the
sets of all protocols that solve the MEQ-AD and MEQ-CD problems with n
nodes, respectively. We are interested in ﬁnding the communication complex-
ity of the two versions of the MEQ problem, which is deﬁned as the inﬁmum
of the communication cost of protocols in ΓAD(n,K) and ΓAD(n,K), i.e.,
CAD(n,K) = inf
P∈ΓAD(n,K)
C(P ), and CCD(n,K) = inf
P∈ΓCD(n,K)
C(P ).
Communication Complexity with General Protocols: In general, a
protocol that solves the MEQ problem may not necessarily be static. The
schedule of transmissions might be determined dynamically on-the-ﬂy, de-
pending on the inputs. So the transmitter and receiver in a particular step
l can be diﬀerent with diﬀerent inputs. Since the set of all static protocols
is a subset of all general protocols, the communication complexities of the
two versions of the MEQ problem are bounded from above by the cost of
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static protocols. The purpose of this chapter is to show that there exist in-
stances of the MEQ problem whose communication complexity is lower than
the intuitive upper bound we are going to present in the next section. For
this purpose, it suﬃces to show that, even if we constrain ourselves to static
protocols, some MEQ problems can still be solved with cost lower than the
upper bound. In sections 4.6 to 4.7, such examples of static protocols are
presented.
4.4 Upper Bound of the Complexity
An upper bound of the communication complexity of both versions of the
MEQ problem is (n − 1) log2K, for all positive integer n ≥ 2 and K ≥ 1.
This can be proved by a trivial construction: in step i, node i sends xi to
node n, for all i < n. The decisions are computed according to
EQi =
{
MEQ(x1, · · · , xn) , i = n;
0 , i < n.
(4.5)
It is obvious that this protocol solves both the MEQ-AD and MEQ-CD prob-
lems with communication cost (n−1) log2K, which implies CAD(CD)(n,K) ≤
(n − 1) log2K. In particular, when K = 2k, we have CAD(CD)(n, 2k) ≤
(n− 1)k.
For the two-party equality problem (n = 2), this bound is tight [54], for
arbitrary K. The bound is also tight when K = 2 (binary inputs). (n −
1) log2 2 = n − 1 bits are necessary when K = 2, since any protocol with
communication cost < n− 1 will have at least one node not communicating
with any other node at all, making it impossible to solve the MEQ problem.
However, in the following sections, we are going to show that the (n−1) logK
bound is not always tight, by presenting a static protocol that solves instances
of the MEQ problem with communication cost lower than (n− 1) log2K.
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4.4.1 Loose Lower Bound of Complexity using Traditional
Techniques
In most of the existing literature on multiparty communication complexity,
the “number on the forehand” model or a broadcast communication model is
assumed. Under these models, when a node transmits, all other nodes receive
the same message. This broadcasting property makes it possible to consider
two-way partitions of the set of nodes since the nodes in each partition share
the same information being broadcast and can be viewed as one virtual node.
Thus, results from two-party communication complexity can be extended to
the multiparty case, and tight bounds (rather than just capturing the order)
can then be obtained.
However, the above technique no longer works well in obtaining tight
bounds under our point-to-point communication model. For example, the
complexity of the two-party equality problem of k-bit inputs (n = 2, K = 2k)
can be proved to be k with the “fooling set” argument [54]: Suppose in con-
tradiction that there exists a protocol of complexity at most C(P ) < k that
solves the two-party equality problem. Then there are at most 2C(P ) ≤ 2k−1
communication patterns possible between the two nodes. Consider all sets
of 2k pairs of input values (x, x). Using the pigeonhole principle we conclude
there exist two pairs (x, x) and (x′, x′) on which the communication patterns
are the same. It is easy to see that the communication pattern of (x, x′) is
also the same as (x, x). Hence, the nodes’ ﬁnal decisions on (x, x) must agree
with their decisions on (x, x′). But then the protocol must be incorrect, since
EQ(x, x′) = 1 = EQ(x, x).
The “fooling set” argument above can be extended to the case with n > 2
nodes and arbitrary M ≥ 1: partitioning the n nodes into two sets (say L
and R), there must be at least M patterns of communication between the
two sets L and R. By applying this argument to all possible two-partitions





This lower bound is within a factor of 1/2 of the upper bound we obtain
previously, which implies that CAD(CD)(n,K) = Θ(n log2K). However, we
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can show that the lower bound of n
2
log2K is generally not achievable. An
example for this is the MEQ(3,4) problem. It can be shown that CAD(3, 4) =
CCD(3, 4) = 4, while
n
2
log2K = 3. Details can be found in Appendix C.1.
The example above has demonstrated that, under our point-to-point com-
munication model, we can no longer extend results from two-party commu-
nication complexity to multiparty version for tight bounds in the way it has
been done under the broadcast communication models. The main reason for
this is the lack of modeling of the “networking” aspect of the problem in
both the two-party model and the broadcast communication models. In the
two-party model, since there are only two nodes, no networking is necessary.
In the broadcast communication models, all the nodes share a lot information
from the broadcast and have roughly the same view of system, which makes
it a not-so-distributed network. On the other hand, under our point-to-point
communication modes, each node may only receive information from a sub-
set of nodes; it is even possible that two nodes may receive information from
two disjoint sets of nodes. As a result, diﬀerent nodes can have very diﬀerent
views of the system. This makes the problem of ﬁnding the tight bound of
communication complexity diﬃcult, and new techniques may be required.
4.5 Equivalent MEQ-AD Protocols
In the rest of this chapter, except for Section 4.8, we will focus on static
protocols that solve the MEQ-AD problem.
It is not hard to see that a static protocol P can be interpreted as a directed
multi-graph G(V,E(P )), where the set of vertices V = {1, · · · , n} represents
the n nodes, and the set of directed edges E(P ) = {(T1, R1), · · · , (TL(P ), RL(P ))}
represents the transmission schedule in each step. From now on, we will use
the terms protocol and graph interchangeably, as well as the terms transmis-
sion and link. Figure 4.1(a) gives an example of the graph representation of
a protocol for n = 4. In Figure 4.1(a), the numbers next to the directed links
indicate the corresponding step numbers.
Two protocols P and P ′ in are said to be equivalent if their costs are
equal, i.e., C(P ) = C(P ′). The following lemma says that we can ﬂip the
direction of any edge in E(P ) and obtain a protocol P ′ that is equivalent to
P .
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Lemma 4.1 Given any static protocol P for MEQ-AD of length L(P ), and
any positive integer l ≤ L(P ), there exists an equivalent static protocol P ′ of
the same length, such that E(P ) and E(P ′) are identical, except that in the
l-th step, the transmitter and receiver are swapped, i.e.,
E(P ′) = E(P )\{(Tl, Rl)} ∪ {(Rl, Tl)}
= {(T1, R1), · · · , (Tl−1, Rl−1), (Rl, Tl), (Tl+1, Rl+1), · · · , (TL(P ), RL(P ))}.
Proof: Given the integer l and a protocol
P = {α1, · · · , αl−1, αl, αl+1, · · · , αL(P )}
with αl = (Tl, Rl, ml(xTl , T
+
l )), we construct
P ′ = {α′1, · · · , α′l−1, α′l, α′l+1, · · · , α′L(P )}
by modifying P as follows:
• α′j = αj for 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1.
• α′l = (Rl, Tl, m′l(xRl , R+l )). Herem′l(xRl , R+l ) = ml(xTl , T+l )|x1=···=xn=xRl
is the symbol that party Rl expects to receive in step l of protocol P ,
assuming all parties have the same input as xRl .
• α′j = (Tj , Rj , m′j(xTj , T+j )) for j > l.




j ) = mj(xTj , T
+
j )|ml(xTl ,T+l )=m′l(xRl ,R+l ) is the
symbol that party Rl sends in step j, pretending that it has
received m′l(xRl, R
+
l ) in step l of P .
– If Tj = Rl, m′j(xTj , T+j ) = mj(xTj , T+j ).
• To compute the output, Tl ﬁrst computes EQTl in the same way as in




l ) = ml(xTl , T+l ), else no change.
That is, Tl sets EQl to 1 if the symbol it receives from Rl in step l of
P ′ diﬀers from the symbol Tl would have sent to Rl in step l of P . The
other nodes compute their outputs in the same way as in P .




(b) Equivalent protocol of
P with Step 5 ﬂipped
(c) iid equivalent protocol
of P
Figure 4.1: Example of graph representation of a protocol P and its
equivalent protocols. The numbers next to the links indicate the
corresponding step number.
• m′l(xRl , R+l ) = ml(xTl, T+l ): It is not hard to see that in this case, the
execution of every step is identical in both P and P ′, except for step l.
So for all i = Tl, EQi is identical in both protocols. Sincem′l(xRl, R+l ) =
ml(xTl , T
+
l ), EQTl remains unchanged, so it is also identical in both
protocols.
• m′l(xRl , R+l ) = ml(xTl, T+l ): Observe that these two functions can be
diﬀerent only if the n inputs are not all identical. So it is correct to set
EQTl = 1.

In Figure 4.1(b), the graph for an equivalent protocol obtained by ﬂipping
the link corresponding to the 5-th step of the 4-node example in Figure 4.1(a)
is presented.
Let us denote all the symbols a node i receives from and sends to the other
nodes throughout the execution of protocol P as i+ and i−, respectively.
It is obvious that i− can be written as a function Mi(xi, i+), which is the
union of ml(xi, i
+(l)) over all steps l in which node i is the transmitter. If
a protocol P satisﬁes Mi(xi, i
+) = Mi(xi) for all i, we say P is individual-
input-determined (iid). The following theorem shows that there is always
an iid equivalent for every protocol.
Theorem 4.1 For every static protocol P for MEQ-AD, there always exists
an iid equivalent static protocol P ∗, which corresponds to an acyclic graph.
Proof: According to Lemma 4.1, we can ﬂip the direction of any edge in
E(P ) and obtain a new protocol which is equivalent to P . It is to be noted
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that we can keep ﬂipping diﬀerent edges in the graph, which implies that we
can ﬂip any subset of E(P ) and obtain a new protocol equivalent to P .
In particular, we consider a protocol equivalent to P , whose corresponding
graph is acyclic, and for all (i, j) ∈ E(P ), the property i < j is satisﬁed. In
this protocol, every node i has no incoming links from any node with index
greater than i. This implies that the messages transmitted by node i are
independent of the inputs to nodes with larger indices. Thus we can re-order
the transmissions of this protocol such that node 1 transmits on all of its
out-going links ﬁrst, then node 2 transmits on all of its out-going links, ...,
node n− 1 transmits to n at the end. Name the new protocol Q. Obviously
Q is equivalent to P .
Since we can always ﬁnd a protocol Q equivalent to P as described above,
all we need to do now is to ﬁnd P ∗. If Q itself is iid, then P ∗ = Q and we are
done. If not, we obtain P ∗ in the following way (using function M ′), which
is similar to how we obtain the equivalent protocol P ′ in Lemma 4.1:
• For node 1, since it receives nothing from the other nodes,M1(x1, 1+) =
M1(x1) is trivially true.
• For node 1 < i < n, we modify Q as follows: node i computes its
out-going message as a function M ′i(xi) = Mi(xi, i
+|x1=···=xn=xi), where
i+|x1=···=xn=xi are incoming messages node i expects to receive, assum-
ing that all parties have the same input xi. At the end of the protocol,
node i checks if i+|x1=···=xn=xi equals to the actual incoming symbols
i+. If they match, nothing is changed. If they do not match, the inputs
cannot be identical, and node i can set EQi = 1. (The correctness of
this step may be easier to see by induction: apply this modiﬁcation one
node at a time, starting from node 1 to node n− 1.)

Theorem 4.1 shows that, to ﬁnd the least cost of static protocols, it is
suﬃcient to investigate only the static protocols that are iid and the cor-
responding communication graph is acyclic. From now on, such protocols
are called iid static protocols for MEQ-AD. Figure 4.1(c) shows an iid static
protocol that is equivalent to the one shown in Figure 4.1(a).
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4.6 MEQ-AD(3,6)
Let us ﬁrst consider MEQ-AD(3,6), i.e., the case where 3 nodes (say A, B and
C) are trying to solve the MEQ-AD problem when each node is given input
from one out of six values, namely {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. According to Theorem
4.1, for any protocol that solves this MEQ-AD problem, there exists an
equivalent iid partially ordered protocol in which node A has no incoming
link, node B only transmits to node C, and node C has no out-going link.
We construct one such protocol that solves MEQ-AD(3,6) and requires only
3 channel symbols, namely {1, 2, 3}, per link. Denoting the channel symbol
being sent over link ij as sij , the schedule of the proposed protocol is: (1)
Node A sends sAB(xA) to node B; (2) Node A sends sAC(xA) to node C; and
(3) Node B sends sBC(xB) to node C. Table 4.1 shows how sij is computed
as a function of xi.
Table 4.1: A protocol for MEQ-AD(3,6)
x 1 2 3 4 5 6
sAB 1 1 2 2 3 3
sAC 1 2 2 3 3 1
sBC 1 2 3 1 2 3
Now consider the outputs. Node A simply sets EQA = 0. For nodes B
and C, they just compare the channel symbol received from each incoming
link with the expected symbol computed with its own input value, and detect
a mismatch if the received and expected symbols are not identical. For
example, node B receives sAB(xA) from node A. Then it detects a mismatch
if the sAB(xA) = sAB(xB).
It can be easily veriﬁed that if the three input values are not all identical,
at least one of nodes B and C will detect a mismatch. Hence the MEQ-
AD(3,6) problem is solved with the proposed protocol. The communication
cost of this protocol is
3 log2 3 = log2 27 ≈ 0.92× 2 log2 6. (4.7)
Notice that in this case, the upper bound from Section 4.4 equals to
(3− 1) log2 6 = 2 log2 6. So we have found a static MEQ-AD protocol whose
communication cost is lower than the upper bound. In fact, this protocol
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Figure 4.2: Bipartite graph for the MEQ-AD(3,6) protocol in Table 4.1.
is optimal in the sense that it can be shown to achieve the minimum com-
munication cost among all static protocols We prove the optimality of this
protocol using an edge coloring argument.
4.6.1 Edge Coloring Representation of MEQ-AD(3,K)
From Sections 4.5, we have shown that it is suﬃcient to study 3-node systems
where messages are transmitted only on links AB, AC and BC. Let us denote
|sAB|, |sAC| and |sBC | as the number of diﬀerent symbols being transmitted
on links AB, AC and BC, respectively.
Theorem 4.2 The existence of a MEQ-AD(3,K) static protocol P with cost
C(P ) is equivalent to the existence of a simple bipartite graph G(U, V, E)
and a distance-2 edge coloring scheme W , such that |U |× |V |× |W | = 2C(P ),
given |E| = K, |U | × |V | ≥ K, |U | × |W | ≥ K and |V | × |W | ≥ K. Here
U and V are disjoint sets of vertices, E is the set of edges, |U | = |sAB| and
|V | = |sAC | are the sizes of sets U and V , and |W | = |sBC | is the number of
colors used in W .
The detailed proof can be found in Appendix C.1. According to Theorem
4.2, we can conclude that the problem of ﬁnding a least cost static protocol
for MEQ − AD(3, K) is equivalent to the problem of ﬁnding the minimum
of |U | × |V | × |W | for the bipartite graphs and distance-2 coloring schemes
that satisfy the above constraints.
Using Theorem 4.2, to show that CAD(3, 6) = log2 27, we only need to
show that for every combination of |U | × |V | × |W | < 27, there exists no
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bipartite graph G(U, V, E) and distance-2 coloring scheme W that satisfy
the conditions as described in Theorem 4.2. It is not hard to see that there
are only two combinations (up to permutation) that satisfy all conditions and
have product less than 27: (2, 3, 3) and (2, 3, 4). Notice that in both cases,
|E| = |U | × |V |, where every pair of edges is within distance 2 of each other,
which means that the corresponding graph G(U, V, E) can only be distance-2
edge colored with at least |E| = 6 > 4 > 3 colors. So neither (2, 3, 3) nor
(2, 3, 4) satisﬁes the aforementioned conditions. Hence, together with the
protocol presented before, we can conclude that CAD(3, 6) = log2 27. The
bipartite graph corresponding to Table 4.1 is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Near
the nodes Ui (or Vi) we show the set of value x’s such that sAB(x) = i (or
sAC(x) = i). The number near each edges is the input value corresponding
to that edge.
4.7 MEQ-AD(3,2k)
Now we construct a protocol when the number of possible input values K =
2k, k ≥ 1 and only binary symbols can be transmitted in each step, using
the MEQ-AD(3,6) protocol we just introduced in the previous sections as a
building block.
First, we map the 2k input values into 2k diﬀerent vectors in the vector
space {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}h, where h = log6 2k = k log6 2. Then h instances
of the MEQ-AD(3,6) protocol are performed in parallel to compare the h
dimensions of the vector. Since 3 channels symbols are required for each
instance of the MEQ-AD(3,6) protocol, we need to transmit a vector from
{1, 2, 3}h on each of the links AB, AC and BC. One way to do so is to
encode the 3h possible vectors from {1, 2, 3}h into b = log2 3h = h log2 3
bits, and transmit the b bits through the links. Since the h instances of
MEQ-AD(3,6) protocols solve the MEQ-AD(3,6) problem for each dimension,
altogether they solve the MEQ-AD(3,2k) problem. The communication cost
this protocol can be computed as [19]
C(P ) = 3h log2 3 < (0.92× 2k) + 7.755. (4.8)
From Equation 4.8, we can see that when k is large enough, the commu-
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nication cost of this protocol is upper-bounded by 0.92 times of the upper
bound 2 log2 2
k = 2k from Section 4.4. The way in which the above protocol
is constructed can be generalized to obtain a MEQ-AD(3,K) protocol P with
similar cost
C(P ) < (0.92× 2 log2K) + Δ (4.9)
for arbitrary value of K, where Δ is some positive constant.
4.8 About MEQ-CD
In this section, we will show that CCD(n,K) roughly equals to CAD(n,K):
CAD(n,K) ≤ CCD(n,K) ≤ CAD(n,K) + n− 1. (4.10)
We have shown the ﬁrst inequality in Section 4.3.3. The second inequality
can be proved by the following simple construction: Consider any protocol
P for MEQ-AD, and construct a protocol P ′ by having node i send EQi to
node n by the end of P , for all i < n. Node n collects the n − 1 decisions
from all other nodes and computes the ﬁnal decision
EQ′n = max{EQ1, · · · , EQn}. (4.11)
It is easy to see that EQ′n = MEQ(x1, · · · , xn). So P ′ ∈ ΓCD(n,K). Since
C(P ′) = C(P )+n−1, the second inequality is proved. From Equation 4.9 it
then follows that for large enoughK, the MEQ-CD(3,K) problem can also be
solved with communication strictly less than 2 log2K bits. The performance
can be improved somewhat by exploiting communication that may be already
taking place between node n and the other nodes. For example, to solve
MEQ-CD(3,6), instead of having nodes A and B sending 1 extra bit to node
C at the end of the MEQ-AD(3,6) protocol in Section 4.6, we only need to
add one possible value to sBC , namely sBC ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, where sBC = 4
means that node B has detected a mismatch. The cost of this protocol
is 2 log2 3 + log2 4 = 2 log2 3 + 2 < 3 log2 3 + 2. The same approach can
also be applied to the MEQ-AD(3,2k) protocol from Section 4.7 by making
|sBC | = log2(3h + 1), and obtain an MEQ-CD(3,2k) protocol with cost of
2h log2 3 + log2(3h + 1) bits, which is almost the same as 3h log2 3 for
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large h.
4.9 MEQ Problem with Larger n
Our construction in Sections 4.6 and 4.7 can be generalized to larger net-
works. For brevity, just consider the case when n = 3m. The nodes are orga-
nized in m− 1 layers of “triangles”. At the bottom ((m− 1)-th) layer, there
are 3m−1 triangles, each of which is formed with 3 nodes running the MEQ-
AD(3,K) protocol presented in section 4.7. Then the i-th layer (i < m − 1)
consists 3i triangles, each of which is formed with 3 “smaller” triangles from
the (i + 1)-th layer running the MEQ-AD(3,K) protocol. So the top layer




(0.92× 2k + 7.755) ≈ 0.92(n− 1)k (4.12)
for large k. Notice that (n − 1)k is the upper bound from Section 4.4. So
the improvement of a constant factor of 0.92 can also be achieved for larger
networks.
4.10 Summary
In this chapter, we study the communication complexity problem of the mul-
tiparty equality function, under the point-to-point communication model.
The point-to-point communication model changes the problem signiﬁcantly
compared with previously used broadcast communication models. We focus
on static protocols in which the schedule of transmissions is independent of
the inputs. We then introduce techniques to signiﬁcantly reduce the space
of protocols to be studied. We then study the MEQ-AD(3,6) problem and
introduce an optimal static protocol that achieves the minimum communi-
cation cost among all static protocols that solve the problem. This protocol
is then used as a building block for construction of eﬃcient protocols for
more general MEQ-AD problems. The problem of ﬁnding the communica-




WATCHDOG IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
In wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, paths between a source and destina-
tion pair are usually multihop, and data packets are relayed in several wireless
hops from their source to their destination. This multihop nature makes the
wireless networks subject to tampering attack: a compromised/misbehaving
node can easily ruin data communications by dropping or corrupting packets
it should forward.
The watchdog mechanism proposed in [20] is a monitoring method used for
ad hoc and sensor networks, and is the basis of many misbehavior detection
algorithms and trust or reputation systems. The basic idea of the watchdog
mechanism is that nodes (called watchdogs) police their downstream neigh-
bors locally using overheard messages in order to detect misbehavior. If a
watchdog detects that a packet is not forwarded within a certain period or
is forwarded but altered by its neighbor, it deems the neighbor as misbehav-
ing. When the misbehavior rate for a node surpasses a certain threshold, the
source is notiﬁed and subsequent packets are forwarded along routes that
exclude that node [20].
The main challenge for most watchdog mechanisms is the unreliable wire-
less environment. Due to possible reasons such as channel fading, collision
with other transmissions, or interference, even when the source node and
the attacker are both within the communication range, the watchdog may
not be able to overhear every transmission and therefore may be unable to
determine whether there is an attack.
To mitigate the misbehavior of the malicious nodes, a watchdog mechanism
must achieve the following two goals: (1) Malicious behavior in the network
should be detected; and (2) The throughput under the detection mechanism
should be comparable to the throughput without detection if there is no
attack. These two goals seem to conﬂict. On one hand, more redundancy is
required to improve the probability of detection. On the other hand, higher
97
throughput requires redundancy to be reduced.
In this work, we show that both goals can be achieved simultaneously by
introducing error detection block coding to the watchdog mechanism. The
main contributions of this work are as follows:
• We propose a computationally simple scheme that integrates source
error detection coding and the watchdog mechanism. We show that
by choosing the encoder properly, a misbehaving node will be detected
with high probability while the throughput approaches optimal, even
in the case when the watchdog can only overhear a fraction of the
packets and an omniscient attacker, i.e., the attacker knows what en-
coder is being used and no secret is shared only between the source and
destination.
• We also propose a simple protocol that identiﬁes the misbehaving node
using exactly two watchdog nodes per unreliable relay node. We show
that our protocol can be interpreted as a maximum likelihood decision
making scheme. Finally, we show that with multiple rounds of detec-
tion, the probability of correctly locating the malicious node can be
made arbitrarily close to one.
• We illustrated the eﬀectiveness of our schemes with some small example
topologies, and we also show that these results generalize to multihop
networks.
5.1 Related Work
To ensure the reliability of packet delivery, trust for ad hoc and sensor net-
works has been investigated in past literature. The foundation of such dy-
namic trust systems is the node behavior monitoring mechanism, most fre-
quent discussion being on the watchdog mechanism [20]. The main idea of
watchdog was promiscuous monitoring, as discussed before. Once a node
is deemed to be misbehaving, the source would choose a new route free of
misbehaving node with the aid of a “path-rater”.
A variant of the watchdog mechanism is proposed in [62] where next-hop’s
behavior is measured with the local evaluation record, deﬁned as a 2-tuple:
packet ratio and byte ratio, forwarded by the next-hop neighbor. Local
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evaluation records are broadcast to all neighbors. The trust level of a node is
the combination of its local observation and the broadcast information. Trust
level is inserted to the RREQ (Route REQuest). Route is selected in the
similar way to AODV (Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector) [63]. Although
many ad hoc trust or reputation systems such as [64], [65] and [66] adopt
diﬀerent trust level calculation mechanisms, the basic processes are similar
to [62], including monitoring, broadcasting local observation, combing the
direct and indirect information into the ﬁnal trust level.
Recently, the security issue in network coding systems has drawn much
attention. Due to the mixing nature of network coding, such systems are
subject to a severe security threat, known as a pollution attack, where at-
tackers inject corrupted packets into the network.
Several solutions to address pollution attacks in intra-ﬂow coding systems
use carefully designed digital signatures [67], [68], [69], [70] or hash functions
[71], [72], which allow intermediate nodes to verify the integrity of combined
packets. Packets that fail the test will be dropped to save some bandwidth.
Such cryptographic solutions largely rely on either the private key being
kept secret from the adversary or the diﬃculty of reversing the hash function.
Non-cryptographic solutions have also been proposed [51], [46]. [73] proposes
two practical schemes to address pollution attacks against network coding in
wireless mesh networks without requiring complex cryptographic functions
and incur little overhead. Reference [74] studies the transmission overhead
associated with the schemes in [69], [51], and [46].
Reference [75] and our earlier work [22] propose two similar monitoring
schemes, independently. The two-hop wireless network investigated in [75] is
similar to the single ﬂow example in section IV of [22] and section 5.2.1 of
this chapter. Both schemes introduce redundancy at the source of data to
improve the detection at the monitoring node, in the form of a polynomial
hash function and MDS (maximum distance separable) code, respectively.
While [75] considers general network codes, we focus on a particular network
code – forward and compare. Both works show that as the amount of redun-




In this work, we focus on multihop wireless networks in which data packets
are transmitted from source to destination through multiple relay nodes.
We assume no coding is performed on relaying nodes so that packets are
forwarded as they are received at the relay nodes. In such a network, a node
W can be assigned as a watchdog for a relay node R if W can overhear
both incoming and outgoing transmissions to and from R. W ’s duty is to
compare the two copies of a packet it overhears from both R and its upstream
neighbor, and to report an attack to the source or destination if there is a
mismatch.
We are interested in detecting tampering attacks: we want the source
or destination to be able to detect if there are misbehaving nodes in the
network sending corrupted data. Moreover, we will focus tampering attack
detection under a single node failure adversary model, i.e., the adversary can
compromise at most one node in the network except for the source(s) and
destination(s). If a watchdog is misbehaving, the only way to attack is to
report an attack even though all other nodes are well-behaving. This is a
trivial case since the source/destination always knows some node is misbe-
having upon receiving the report of attack from the misbehaving watchdog.
So it is more interesting to look at the case when a relay node misbehaves.
Since the wireless broadcast channel is usually unreliable, a watchdog node
may only be able to overhear a fraction of the transmissions to/from the
node it is monitoring for reasons such as channel fading and interference. As
a result, an adversary may be able to avoid being detected by the watchdog
with high probability by keeping the fraction of packets it tampers lower
than a certain threshold Thwatchdog. To overcome this drawback of watchdog
mechanisms, we propose to integrate source coding with watchdogs: the
source node encodes the data packets with some error detecting code and
sends the coded packets through the multihop network with watchdogs. By
applying error detecting codes, the destination can detect an attack during
the decoding process with high probability if the fraction of packets tampered
with by the adversary is lower than a certain threshold Thcode. Intuitively,
if Thwatchdog < Thcode, even an omniscient adversary will be detected with
high probability no matter how many packets it corrupts. Throughout this




Figure 5.1: A single ﬂow network. The thick (directed) lines denote a
reliable connection from the tail node to the head node, a dashed line
denotes the overhearing and a blue line denotes a secure asymptotically
negligible rate channel between the two nodes.
complete knowledge of the misbehaving detection mechanism being used,
and there is no secret between the source and destination hidden from the
adversary.
5.2.1 Single Flow Case
To illustrate the idea, let us look at the example of a single ﬂow network as in
Figure 5.1. There are 4 nodes in the network: the source node S, destination
node D, attacker R, and the watchdog node W . The thick (directed) lines
denote a link from the tail node to the head node, a dashed line denotes the
overhearing and a blue line denotes a secure asymptotically negligible rate
channel between the two nodes. We assume that all links (except for the
blue one) have the same transmission rate of 1 packet per unit time. We
also assume an optimal centralized schedule is enforced and the watchdog W
knows what to compare. Moreover, we assume all transmissions along the
path S → R → D are reliable while W can only overhear both transmission
of a packet with probability q 1.
The source node S encodes every k data packets into a block of n coded
packets with an (n, k) MDS (maximum distance separable) code. We assume
the packet size is large enough so that an MDS code always exists for the
desired value of n and k. With an (n, k) MDS code, an attack will always be
detected at the decoder as long as no more than n − k packets are altered.
As a result, R has to alter at least n − k + 1 packets in a block in order to
1Transmissions along the data path are usually protected by channel coding or/and
retransmission mechanisms, while the watchdog can only overhear packets opportunisti-
cally.
101



































(a) Miss detection probability v.s. observe probability


































(b) Miss detection probability with k = n+ 1− β lnnq
Figure 5.2: Miss detection probability in the single ﬂow example.
avoid being detected by the decoder. Since the more packets node R tampers
with, the more likely it will be caught by node W , it is in R’s interest to just
attack the minimum number of packets per block: n− k + 1. In this case, it
is easy to show that the probability of node R not being caught is
Pmiss(n, k, q) = (1− q)n−k+1. (5.1)
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If we construct a (n, k) encoder such that
k = n+ 1− f(n, q)
q
, (5.2)
then from Equation 5.1 we have
Pmiss(n, k, q) ≤ e−q(n−k+1) = e−f(n,q). (5.3)
We can then choose the function f(n, q) appropriately so that we can make
Pmiss arbitrarily small while the coding rate k/n approaches arbitrarily close
to optimal (1). For example, by making f(n, q) = β lnn for any positive
constant β, we have
Pmiss(n, k, q) ≤ e−β lnn
= n−β → 0 as n → ∞, (5.4)














→ 1 as n → ∞. (5.5)
So we can reduce the incentive for R to attack by making n large and choosing
β appropriately.
Since the delay to verify a block equals the time it takes to transmit n
packets in the block, the trade-oﬀ between probability of miss-detection and
n is of interest. Figure 5.2(a) and Figure 5.2(b) show the probability of miss-
detection with the observe probability q and with the number of packets n
respectively. We can see that by integrating a watchdog and error detection
coding, we can reduce the incentive for the attacker to attack by allowing
longer delay.
Notice that by making n large, the coding/decoding complexity increases.
In the case complexity is a concern, the source can scramble coded packets
of multiple (n, k) encoded blocks and transmit these packets in a random
order. By doing so, the attacker will have to corrupt more packets in order





Figure 5.3: A two ﬂow network.
watchdog.
5.3 Two Flows Case
In Section 5.2.1, we have illustrated the eﬀectiveness of source coding on top
of watchdog mechanisms by a single ﬂow example with a centralized optimal
scheduler. In this section, we will study the trade-oﬀ between throughput
and security in a more practical setting: there are multiple data ﬂows in
the network and a distributed random access MAC protocol is used. In the
following example, we show that the proposed scheme achieves a high level
of security while maintaining a reasonably good throughput.
Consider the network shown in Figure 5.3 with two ﬂows: S1 → R1 → D1
and S2 → R2 → D2. Suppose the ﬂows are far enough away from each other
so there is no inter-ﬂow interference, but the watchdog W is sitting between
the ﬂows and can overhear transmissions on all the four links. So even though
a transmission is successful along its path, it may collide with packets from
the other ﬂow received atW . We assume a slotted aloha access protocol with
access probability α. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that a node
will access the channel by transmitting dummy packets when it has no data
packet to send. Under these assumptions, we can compute the throughput
of each ﬂow and the probability W can compare a particular packet as
T = α(1− α), (5.6)
q = (1− α)5. (5.7)
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(a) Miss detection probability v.s. channel access probabil-
ity






























(b) Eﬀective throughput v.s. channel access probability
Figure 5.4: Miss detection probability and eﬀective throughput in the two
ﬂows example with k = n+ 1− β lnn
(1−α)5 . Where the curves stop means no
code is available.
The exponent in Equation 5.7 is 5 because given that the transmission from
S1 to R1 is successful, W can overhear it if neither S2 nor R2 transmits, which
occurs with probability (1−α)2. To compare this packet, W should overhear
the transmission from R1 to D1 too, which happens with probability (1−α)3
for S1, S2 and R2 to remain silent.
Similar to the single-ﬂow example, we can make Pmiss arbitrarily small by
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choosing
k = n+ 1− β lnn
(1− α)5 , (5.8)
and the eﬀective throughput is
TE = T × k
n




In Figure 5.4(a) and Figure 5.4(b), we plot the miss-detection probability
and eﬀective throughput when the error detection code is chosen according
to Equation 5.8. We only plot the result for α ≤ 0.5 because further in-
creasing α will only reduce the throughput. We can see from Figure 5.4(a)
the probability of miss-detection increases as α increases and converges to
roughly n−β. Since the higher the α is, the fewer packets the watchdog can
observe, the source has to sacriﬁce coding rate in order to maintain a certain
probability of missing an attack as α increases.
As shown in Figure 5.4(b), as α increases, the eﬀective throughput in-
creases up to a certain level then drops to zero as α gets larger. We can also
see the optimal access probability changes according to the value of n and β:
the larger n, the higher α should be; the larger β, the smaller α should be.
For instance, if the source does not perform any coding (which is not plotted
here), it is well known that the optimal α = 0.5 and the per-ﬂow throughput
is 0.25 packet per slot. In the case n = 255 and β = 1, the optimal α is
about 0.35 and the throughput is about 0.19 packets per slot. Although the
throughput is higher without source coding, it comes with the cost of not
being able to provide any security guarantee. On the contrary, our scheme
guarantees by upper-bounding Pmiss by n
−β . Our scheme provides a method
to optimize the balance among throughput, delay, and security.
5.4 Identifying the Misbehaving Node
In the previous section, we have studied the detection of misbehavior in the
network. While misbehavior detection is essential in some applications, it is
also important to identify the node that is misbehaving in order to avoid that
node in future transmissions. The scheme discussed in the previous section
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cannot determine which node is misbehaving.
In this section, we present a simple protocol that identiﬁes the misbehav-
ing node with two watchdogs. This includes the cases when a watchdog node
is misbehaving. However, we show that for the proposed protocol, the adver-
sary has no incentive to attack the watchdog. In particular, if the adversary
attacks the watchdog, our protocol locates the adversarial node determin-
istically (with probability equal to one). However, if the adversary attacks
the relay node, our scheme is guaranteed to locate the attacker with a prob-
ability that quickly approaches to unity with increasing number of packets
transmitted.
The protocol in the following subsection can be viewed as several nodes
making a decision on the correctness of the message transmitted by the relay
node. The protocol can be visualized as the maximum likelihood decision
scheme, and as we show in the following subsection, gives an optimal decision
based on the decisions of the watchdogs.
5.4.1 The Protocol
Consider a relay node R that is observed by two watchdogs W1 and W2 and
relays the information from a source node S to destination node D. Assume
that the source node employs an (n, k)-MDS code. Assume that each source
packet contains a unique generation number that identiﬁes the generation to
which a particular packet belongs. Each watchdog in the network decides
whether or not the relay node is misbehaving based on all the overheard
packets that belong to the current generation. If R is misbehaving (one of
the n packets transmitted by R does not match the corresponding packet
transmitted by S), it transmits a “decision bit” 1 to the judge node2, else it
transmits a decision bit 0 to the judge node. We assume that if the watchdog
is misbehaving, it may transmit a 0 or a 1 for any particular relay node (same
watchdog may transmit diﬀerent decisions for diﬀerent relay nodes). Denote
the bits received from W1 and W2 by w1 and w2. The judge node collects
the decision bits and makes a decision as follows:
2A judge node may be a destination node or the source node or both the nodes. In case
of the destination node, it may decide to treat the information as authentic if it infers the
relay node of not misbehaving. In case of the source node, it may decide to consider the
path S → R→ D secure if it infers the relay node to be not misbehaving.
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• w1w2 = 11: R is misbehaving;
• w1w2 = 10: W1 is misbehaving;
• w1w2 = 01: W2 is misbehaving;
• w1w2 = 00: none of the nodes is under attack.
We remark that our scheme gives a decision based on maximum likelihood
probability of a particular node misbehaving. To see the protocol as a max-
imum likelihood decision making scheme, ﬁrst consider the two simple cases
of the decision bits being 11 and 00: in the former, the relay node must be
misbehaving, else W1 and W2 cannot both detect a misbehavior at R (note
that one of them can; if that particular watchdog is misbehaving, it could
pretend that the relay node is actually misbehaving). And in the latter,
there is no way to detect which node is misbehaving; indeed there may be
no misbehaving node in such a case. For the case of 01 (10), note that if
the attacker is at W1(W2), W2(W1) will never send a 1. Hence, assuming
each node can be misbehaving with equal probability and the miss-detection
probability for W1 and W2 are both Pmiss, it is easy to compute probability
of each node misbehaves given w1w2 = 01 as:
PW1|01 = 0
PR|01 =
Pmiss × (1− Pmiss)
1 + (Pmiss × (1− Pmiss))
PW2|01 =
1
1 + (Pmiss × (1− Pmiss))
The protocol in such a scenario decides that the watchdog sending a 1 is
under attack, which is precisely the maximum likelihood decision given such
a conﬁguration (note that PW2|01 > PR|01).
We show in the following subsections that the misbehaving node can be
located with a very high probability using just two watchdogs. We ﬁnally
comment on how to bring the probability of correct location detection arbi-
trarily close to unity.
Let PL|N denote the probability of correctly locating the misbehaving node
in the network given the adversary is at node N (where N may be R, W1,





Figure 5.5: Single ﬂow network of Figure 5.1 with an extra watchdogs.
to be misbehaving while in fact N is the adversary; and PU |N denote the
probability when the adversary at node N operates undetected.
5.4.2 Performance – Single Flow Case
For the single ﬂow case, only one extra watchdog is required to locate the
adversary in the network (see Figure 5.5). We employ the protocol discussed
above at destination D. Given this scheme, we have the following lemmas
characterizing the performance of the protocol:
Lemma 5.1 In single ﬂow case of Figure 5.5, if any of the watchdogs is
misbehaving, it will be located, i.e.,
PL|W1 = PL|W2 = 1
PF |W1 = PU |W1 = PF |W2 = PU |W2 = 0
Proof: Let us assume, without loss of the generality, that W1 is misbehav-
ing. In such a scenario, W2 will always send a decision bit 0 to D since it will
never overhear any incorrect packet being transmitted by R. A misbehaving
W1, on the other hand, will accuse the relay node of misbehaving. Then,
the received decision bits at node D are 10. Given our protocol, D will de-
cide that R is a reliable node and hence, the node W1 sending a 1 must be
misbehaving. Hence, D will always be able to locate the misbehaving node.

The above lemma implies that the adversary has no incentive to attack
either of the watchdogs in the network. Using the results of previous sections,
this further restricts the capabilities of the attacker: it is not only restricted
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(a) False detection probability v.s. channel access probabil-
ity



































(b) Miss-detection probability v.s. channel access probabil-
ity
Figure 5.6: False location probability and undetected probability in the
single ﬂow example with k = n+ 1− β lnn
(1−α)5 . The curves stop where no code
is available.
to attack the relay node but also needs to corrupt a large number of packets.
The following lemma characterizes the performance of the protocol when the
relay node misbehaves (corrupts more than (n−k) packets out of n packets):
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Lemma 5.2 In single ﬂow network of Figure 5.5, if R is misbehaving, then:
PL|R = (1− Pmiss)2
PF |R = 2× Pmiss × (1− Pmiss)
PU |R = P 2miss.
Proof: Let R be misbehaving and the decision bits sent by W1 and W2 be
w1 and w2 respectively. Then, R goes undetected if and only if w1w2 = 00,
i.e., when both the watchdogs miss all the packets corrupted by the attacker.
Hence, the probability of R operating undetected is PU |R = Pmiss × Pmiss.
On the other hand, R will be detected if and only if none of the watchdogs
miss any of the packets corrupted by R, i.e., w1w2 = 11, leading to the fact
that PL|R = (1− Pmiss)× (1− Pmiss).
Finally, the case of false detection is when exactly one of the watchdogs
misses all the packets corrupted by R, i.e., when w1w2 is either 10 or 01; in
this case W1 or W2 is detected as bad (not R). This gives PF |R = Pmiss ×
(1− Pmiss) + Pmiss × (1− Pmiss). Notice that PF |R = 1− (PL|R + PU |R).

The probabilities PF |R and PU |R are plotted in Figure 5.6(a) and Figure
5.6(b) as a function of channel access probability for k = n + 1− β lnn
(1−α)5 .
In Lemma 5.2, we have assumed that both the watchdogs have the same
probability Pmiss. This might not be the case since diﬀerent nodes might
observe diﬀerent channel conditions due to being at diﬀerent locations. We
consider this case in the following subsection but the results of Lemma 5.2
can be modiﬁed easily to incorporate such a diﬀerence in probability of W1
and W2 missing the detection of packet modiﬁcation by the relay node.
5.4.3 Performance – Two Flows Case
In this section, we study the location detection of the misbehaving node for
the two ﬂow case of Section 5.3. We ﬁrst consider the case when the desti-
nation nodes may collaborate among themselves to locate the misbehaving
node and show that such a collaboration does not necessarily reduce the con-
nectivity requirement and/or improve the detection probability as long as the








Figure 5.7: Corresponding netowrk for the two ﬂow network of Figure 5.3
with extra watchdogs, when the judge nodes collaborate among themselves.
The illustration also captures the multipath routing case when S relays the
information to D via multiple relay nodes.
then show that the case of two ﬂow network reduces to the case of multiple
single ﬂows with appropriate modiﬁcations to the probabilities of missing an
attack at the watchdog nodes.
Assume that the two destinations D1 andD2 collaborate among themselves
(share a few bits in order to locate the misbehaving node) and that the
misbehaving node is oblivious to any attack detection mechanism in the
network. This means that if the watchdog W2 is the misbehaving node, it
will send decision bits 1 to both D1 and D2. However, since there is a single
adversary in the network, R1 and R2 cannot be both misbehaving. If D1 and
D2 both receive 1 from W2, they will (collaboratively) decide that W2 is the
misbehaving node. On the other hand, if R1 or R2 is misbehaving, W2 sends
a 1 to the corresponding destination node and a 0 to the other destination
node, which will certainly imply that the corresponding relay node is under
attack (assuming that W2 is oblivious to the attack detection mechanism).
Notice that in the above case, we do not need W1 and W3 for locating the
misbehaving node. The problem arises when the misbehaving node knows
that an attack detection scheme is being employed in the network. In such
a case, the misbehaving node (at W2) may send a decision bit 1 to one
destination node (say D1) and a 0 to the other destination node, making







Figure 5.8: Two ﬂow network of Figure 5.3 with extra watchdogs.
need W1 and W3 to be able to correctly decide the location of the adversary.
Note that the above discussion implies that even if several judge nodes start
collaborating, at least two watchdogs are required to correctly locate the
misbehaving node. Hence, collaboration of judge nodes does not help in
reducing connectivity requirements and/or devising a better attack detection
scheme.
Notice that the above discussion of collaborating judge nodes also captures
the multipath transmission mechanism where a source node might relay the
information to the same destination via multiple relay nodes (see Figure
5.7). Hence, to (correctly) locate the misbehaving node, the connectivity
requirements for the network is every relay node being monitored by at least
two watchdogs. We derive the results for the two ﬂow case when the judge
nodes do not collaborate but as discussed above, these results hold even if
the judge nodes collaborate among themselves.
If the destination nodes do not collaborate, then the decision made by any
of the destination nodes, say D1, is dependent only on the decision bits of
the watchdogs observing the corresponding relay node, i.e., W1 and W2 for
D1 (similar remarks hold for D2). This in turn means that each destination
node individually behaves as if it is participating in a single ﬂow network.
However, as discussed earlier, it might be the case that the watchdogsW1 and
W3 have probabilities of detection diﬀerent from that of W2. The following
lemmas hold for the case of two ﬂow network of Figure 5.8, where we denote
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the probabilities of missing an attack at the relay node for watchdogs W1
and W3 are Pmiss,1 and that of W2 is Pmiss,2.
Lemma 5.3 In the two ﬂow case of Figure 5.8 with our protocol, if the
attacker attacks at any of the watchdogs, it will be located, i.e.,
PL|W1 = PL|W2 = 1
PF |W1 = PU |W1 = PF |W2 = PU |W2 = 0
Proof: Similar to Lemma 5.1, collaboration of destination nodes does not
play a role.

Lemma 5.4 In the two ﬂow case with our protocol, if the adversary attacks
R1 or R2, then:
PL|R1 = PL|R2 = (1− Pmiss,1)× (1− Pmiss,2)
PF |R1 = PF |R2 = Pmiss,1 + Pmiss,2 − 2× Pmiss,1Pmiss,2
PU |R1 = PU |R2 = Pmiss,1 × Pmiss,2




In this work, we have studied the problem of misbehavior detection in wireless
networks. We propose a lightweight misbehavior detection scheme which
integrates the idea of watchdogs and error detection coding. We show in a
single ﬂow example that even if the watchdog can only observe a fraction of
packets, by choosing the encoder properly, an attacker will be detected with
high probability while achieving throughput arbitrarily close to optimal. The
trade-oﬀ between throughput and security in a more practical setting – there
are multiple data ﬂows in the network and a distributed random access MAC
protocol is used – is also studied. This technique can also be used to locate




In this chapter, we summarize the future goals of our research.
6.1 Fast Oblivious Byzantine Agreement Algorithms
In the Byzantine broadcast algorithms we present in Chapter 3, every time
a failure is detected, the dispute control (or fault diagnosis) broadcast stage
is performed in addition to the normal operations. Moreover, the order
according to which the nodes transmit will change after a mode transition,
depending on the location of the failure. In practice, the diagnostic process is
preferred to be avoided since it introduces excessive delay before agreement
is achieved for the current instance. It is also desirable that the algorithm is
oblivious, by which we mean the schedule of transmissions does not change
over time. Fast oblivious algorithms that have these properties is one possible
topic for future work.
6.2 Byzantine Agreement with Capacity Constraints in
Wired Networks
In Chapter 3, we have presented the NAB algorithm that achieves at least 1/3
of the capacity of Byzantine broadcast for general point-to-point networks.
For future work, providing better performance guarantee in the following two
aspects are of interests:
1. Provide tighter upper bounds on the capacity of Byzantine broadcast
or consensus in general point-to-point networks.
2. Develop Byzantine broadcast or consensus algorithm that achieves bet-
ter throughput than NAB. One possible approach for achieving this
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goal is to combine the unreliable broadcast in Phase 1 and fault detec-
tion in Phase 2 of NAB. The two capacity-achieving Byzantine broad-
cast algorithms for four-node networks and symmetric networks suggest
good potential of this approach.
6.3 Byzantine Agreement in Wireless Networks
In Chapter 5, we have explored the broadcast property of the wireless medium
for misbehavior detection in unicast communication. In fact, Byzantine
agreement algorithms may also beneﬁt from the broadcast communication
model when wireless medium is considered. Therefore, investigating the
Byzantine agreement problem in the broadcast communication model setting
is part of the future work. A potential strategy would be try to integrate the
watchdog mechanism into a Byzantine agreement algorithm.
6.4 Multiparty Equality Function Computation with
Capacity Constraints
As we have seen in the previous chapters on Byzantine agreement, the main
procedure of our agreement algorithms is to check whether all n−f fault-free
nodes decide on the same value, which is in fact solving the MEQ problem
for every subset of n − f nodes in the network. In Chapter 4, preliminary
results of the MEQ problem with no capacity constraint have been discussed.
However, even the smallest non-trivial instance of the problem – MEQ(3, K)
– is still unsolved for general K. Part of the future work would be to con-
tinue investigating the MEQ(3, K) problem. The ﬁrst step would be to study
the MEQ(3, K) problem under point-to-point capacity constraints, which we
believe would provide useful insight for the unconstrained problem. Mean-
while, better understanding of the MEQ problem in the constrained setting




In this dissertation, we have discussed various algorithms for tolerating fail-
ures in distributed systems. More speciﬁcally, in Chapter 2, we propose
CBC, a linear-complexity Byzantine consensus algorithm; and CBB, a linear-
complexity Byzantine broadcast algorithm. In design of both CBC and CBB,
we incorporate techniques such as error-detection coding and system level
diagnosis to improve the communication complexity of Byzantine consensus
and broadcast, without relying on any cryptographic assumption.
In Chapter 3, we study the design of network-aware Byzantine agreement
algorithms. In particular, we focus on optimizing the throughput of Byzan-
tine broadcast in point-to-point networks, in which each link has a link ca-
pacity constraint. We derive an upper bound on the achievable through-
puts of Byzantine broadcast for general point-to-point networks. A network-
aware Byzantine broadcast algorithm NAB is proposed and proved to achieve
throughput at least 1/3 fraction of the optimal in general point-to-point
networks. In two particular families of point-to-point networks, capacity-
achieving Byzantine broadcast algorithms are developed.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the problem of multiparty equality (MEQ)
function computation, under the point-to-point communication model. The
point-to-point communication model changes the problem signiﬁcantly com-
pared with previously used broadcast communication models. We focus on
static protocols in which the schedule of transmissions is independent of the
inputs. We then introduce techniques to signiﬁcantly reduce the space of
protocols to be studied. We then study the MEQ-AD(3,6) problem and
introduce an optimal static protocol that achieves the minimum communi-
cation cost among all static protocols that solve the problem. This protocol
is then used as a building block for construction of eﬃcient protocols for
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more general MEQ-AD problems. The problem of ﬁnding the communica-
tion complexity of the MEQ problem for arbitrary values of n and K is still
open.
In Chapter 5, we study the problem of misbehavior detection in wireless
networks. We propose a lightweight misbehavior detection scheme which
integrates the idea of watchdogs and error-detection coding. We show in a
single ﬂow example that even if the watchdog can only observe a fraction of
packets, by choosing the encoder properly, an attacker will be detected with
high probability while achieving throughput arbitrarily close to optimal. The
trade-oﬀ between throughput and security in a more practical setting – there
are multiple data ﬂows in the network and a distributed random access MAC
protocol is used – is also studied. This technique can also be used to locate
the misbehaving node, by using just one extra watchdog per relay node.
The design principle of the fault-tolerant algorithms in this dissertation
is based on the observation that if the locations of the faulty component(s)
in the system do not change frequently, error-detection suﬃces, in contrast
to the commonly adopted error-correction approach. Error-detection guar-
antees safety, i.e., no erroneous outcome can be arrived. When error (or
failure) is detected, diagnostic operations can be performed to learn infor-
mation of the locations of the faulty components and reduce their capability
in interfering with the normal operation of the algorithm in the future. It is
our belief that this methodology could be applied to other open challenging






A.1 Improving Computational Complexity of CBC
To make the algorithm computationally more eﬃcient, we need to modify
Algorithm 1 slightly, as elaborated later in this appendix. With this change,
the algorithm only looks for a set Pmatch of size n− f such that all the fault-
free processors in Pmatch ∩ Pgood have the same input in generation g. The
algorithm’s response when such a Pmatch is not found is now somewhat diﬀer-
ent, as sketched below. A complete description and the proof of correctness
of the modiﬁed algorithm is omitted for brevity.
Pmatch is found as follows. We maintain a set Q that contains the largest
set of processors that appear to have identical input up to the previous
generation. Initially, Q is the set of all n processors. The matching stage is
performed as it is in Algorithm 1, up to Line 3(d). The subsequent steps of
the matching stage are diﬀerent.
(i) Determine the largest set Q′ ⊆ Q such that all the processors in set Q′
haveM vectors that contain at least n−f TRUE entries. If |Q′| < n−f , then
the fault-free processors must have diﬀerent L-bit inputs, and the algorithm
terminates with the decision being a default value. If |Q′| ≥ n − f , the
proceed to the following steps.
(ii) For every pair of nodes i, j ∈ Q′ that trusts each other, if there are
more than t distinct processors not trusted by node i or j, then one of nodes
i and j must be faulty. Remove edge (i, j) in the diagnosis graph, set Mi[j] =
FALSE and Mj [i] = FALSE, and go back to step (i) above.
(iii) For every pair of nodes i, j ∈ Q′ (that now trust the same set of at
least n− f processors), check whether Mi[k] = Mj [k] for each node k that is
trusted by both nodes i and j. If this check fails, then either vi(g) and vj(g)
are diﬀerent (or, pretending to be diﬀerent, in case one of these processors is
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faulty), or node k has sent diﬀerent symbols to nodes i and j. In this case,
go to step (iv); otherwise it can be proved that vi(g) = vj(g) if nodes i and j
are both fault-free. If all these checks pass, then Pmatch can be chosen as any
subset of Q′ of size n − f , and it always contains a clique of at least n − 2t
fault-free processors that have the same input for the current generation.
Then proceed to the Checking stage as in Algorithm 1.
(iv) If misbehavior, or diﬀerence in processor inputs, is detected in step
(iii) above, some additional steps are needed: All processors in Q′ broadcast
their inputs for generation g. Q is then updated as the largest subset of Q′
that broadcast the same value. If |Q| < n − f , then terminate and decide
on a default output. If |Q| ≥ n − f , then decide on the value broadcast by
processors in Q. Additionally, diagnosis is also performed to remove an edge
from the diagnosis graph, if misbehavior has indeed occurred.
A.2 Proof of Correctness of Improved-CBC
In this section, we prove the correctness of Algorithm 2.6.2. Similar to the
proof of CBC, in the proofs of the following lemmas, we assume that the
fault-free nodes always trust each other.
Lemma A.1 If Detectedj =FALSE for every node j in Line 2(d), every
fault-free node i ∈ Pgood decides on the identical output value y(g) such that
y(g) = xj(g) for every node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pmatch.
Proof: According to the algorithm, every fault-free node i ∈ Pgood has
sent Si[i] (computed from xi(g) directly if node i ∈ Pmatch, or computed
using symbols received in Lines 1(a) and 1(b) if node i /∈ Pmatch) to all the
other fault-free nodes. As a result, Ri|Pgood = Rj |Pgood is true for every
pair of fault-free nodes i, j ∈ Pgood. Since |Pgood| ≥ n − f and Cn−f is
a distance-(f + 1) code, it follows that either all fault-free nodes in Pgood
decide on the same output, or at least one fault-free node i ∈ Pgood sets
Detectedi ←TRUE in Line 2(a). In the case all Detectedj=FALSE, all
fault-free nodes decide on an identical y(g). Moreover, according to Line
2(b), every fault-free node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pmatch ﬁnds Rj = Sj. It then follows





Lemma A.2 If a Pnew such that |Pnew| ≥ n−f is found in Line 3(g), every
fault-free node i ∈ Pgood decides on an identical output value y(g) such that
y(g) = xj(g) for every node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pnew.
Proof: Since |Pnew| ≥ n − f and since at most f nodes are faulty, there
must be at least n−2f fault-free nodes in Pgood∩Pnew, which have broadcast
the same S#’s in Line 3(b). So at Line 3(h), all fault-free nodes decide on
the identical output y(g) = xj(g) for node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pnew.

Lemma A.3 If a Pnew such that |Pnew| ≥ n − f can not be found in Line
3(g), then there must be two fault-free nodes i, j ∈ Pgood such that xi = xj.
Proof: It is easy to see that if all fault-free nodes in Pgood are given the
same input, then a Pnew such that |Pnew| ≥ n − f can always be found in
Line 3(g). Then the lemma follows.

The correctness of the way Diag Graph is updated is proved in the same
way as in CBC. Now we can conclude the correctness of Algorithm Improved-
CBC as the following theorem:
Theorem A.1 Given n nodes with at most f < n/3 being faulty, each given
an input value of L bits, Algorithm 2.6.2 achieves consensus correctly in L/D
generations, with the diagnosis stage performed for at most f+f(f+1) times.
Proof: According to Lemmas A.1 and A.2, the decided output y(g) always
equals to xj(g) for some node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pmatch, unless |Pnew| < n − f in
Line 3(h). So consistency and validity properties are satisﬁed until |Pnew|
becomes < n−f . In the case |Pnew| < n−f , according to Lemma A.3, there
must be two fault-free nodes that are given diﬀerent inputs. Then it is safe
to decide on a default output and terminate. So the L-bit output satisﬁes
the consistency and validity properties.
Every time the diagnosis stage is performed, either at least one edge in
Diag Graph associated with a faulty node is removed, or at least one node is
removed from Pmatch. So it takes at most f(f +1) instances of the diagnosis
stage before all faulty nodes are identiﬁed. In addition, it will take at most
f instances to remove fault-free nodes from Pmatch until two fault-free nodes
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are identiﬁed as having diﬀerent inputs, and the algorithm terminates with
a default output. 
A.3 Proof of Correctness of VCBC
Lemma A.4 If there are a set of at least v fault-free nodes Q ⊆ Pgood such
that for each node i ∈ Q, xi(g) = x(g) for some x(g), then a set Pmatch of
size v necessarily exists.
Proof: Since all the fault-free nodes in Q have identical input x(g), Si =
Cv(x(g)) for every node i ∈ Q. Since these nodes are fault-free and always
trust each other, they send each other correct messages in the matching stage.
Thus, Ri[j] = Sj [j] = Si[j] for every pair of nodes i, j ∈ Q. This fact implies
that Mi[j] = Mj[i] =TRUE for all pairs i, j ∈ Q. Since there are |Q| ≥ v
fault-free nodes in Q, it follows that a set Pmatch of size v must exist. 
Lemma A.5 If Detectedj =FALSE for every node j in Line 2(d), every
fault-free node i ∈ Pgood decides on the identical output value y(g) such that
y(g) = xj(g) for every node j ∈ Pmatch ∩ Pgood.
Proof: Observe that size of set Pmatch ∩Pgood is at least v− f ≥ 1, so there
must be at least one fault-free node in Pmatch.
According to the algorithm, every fault-free node i ∈ Pgood has sent Si[i]
(computed from xi(g) directly if node i ∈ Pmatch, or computed using the v
symbols received from Pmatch in Lines 1(a) and 1(f) if node i /∈ Pmatch) to all
the other fault-free nodes. As a result, Ri|Pgood = Rj |Pgood is true for every
pair of fault-free nodes i, j ∈ Pgood. Since |Pgood| ≥ n − f ≥ v and Cv has
dimension v, it follows that either all fault-free nodes Pgood decide on the same
output, or at least one fault-free node i ∈ Pgood sets Detectedi ←TRUE
in Line 2(a). In the case Detectedj=FALSE for every node j, all fault-
free nodes decide on an identical y(g). Moreover, according to Line 2(b),
every fault-free node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pmatch ﬁnds Rj = Sj . It then follows that
y(g) = C−1v (Rj) = C
−1
v (Sj) = xj(g) where node j ∈ Pgood ∩ Pmatch.

Then we can have the following theorem about the correctness of Algorithm
2.6.3.
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Theorem A.2 Given n nodes with at most f < n/3 being faulty, each given
an input value of L bits, Algorithm 2.6.3 achieves v-validity for each one of
the L/D generations, with the diagnosis stage performed for at most f(f+1)
times.
Proof: Similar to Theorem A.1. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof: First consider the case when source node n is faulty. In this case,
every fault-free peer i < n sends Ri[i] to all peers that it trusts. Also, as
we have discussed in Section 2.7.2, fault-free node always trust each other.
These two facts together imply that among coded symbols received by the
fault-free peers, at least n − f of them are shared identically. According to
the property of the (2(n − 1), n − f) Reed-Solomon code Cn−f , either all
fault-free peers succeed in decoding the received symbols to some identical
output, or at least one of them cannot decode and detects the failure.
In the case that source node n is fault-free, each fault-free peer i receives
at least n − f coded symbols either directly from node n or through other
fault-free peers. So these symbols must be the same as the corresponding





B.1 Unreliable Broadcast in Phase 1
According to [76], in a given graph Gk with γk = minj∈Vk MINCUT (Gk, 1, j),
there always exist a set of γk unit-capacity spanning trees of Gk such that
the total usage on each edge e ∈ Ek by all the γk spanning trees combined
is no more than its link capacity ze. Each spanning tree is “unit-capacity”
in the sense that 1 unit capacity of each link on that tree is allocated for
transmissions on that tree. For example, Figure 3.2(c) shows 2 unit-capacity
spanning trees that can be embedded in the directed graph in Figure 3.2(a):
one spanning tree is shown with solid edges and the other spanning tree is
shown in dotted edges. Observe that link (1,2) is used by both spanning
trees, each tree using a unit capacity on link (1,2), for a total usage of 2
units, which is the capacity of link (1,2).
To broadcast an L-bit value from source node 1, we represent the L-bit
value as γk symbols, each symbol being represented using L/γk bits. One
symbol (L/γk bits) is then transmitted along each of the γk unit-capacity
spanning trees.
B.2 Dispute Control
The dispute control algorithm is performed in the k-th instance of NAB only
if at least one node misbehaves during Phases 1 or 2. The goal of dispute
control is to learn some information about the identity of at least one faulty
node. In particular, the dispute control algorithm will identify a new node as
being faulty, or/and identify a new node pair in dispute (at least one of the
nodes in the pair is guaranteed to be faulty). The steps in dispute control in
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the k-th instance of NAB are as follows:
• (DC1) Each node i in Vk uses a previously proposed Byzantine broad-
cast algorithm, such as [35], to broadcast to all other nodes in Vk all
the messages that this node i claims to have received from other nodes,
and sent to the other nodes, during Phases 1 and 2 of the k-th instance.
Source node 1 also uses an existing Byzantine broadcast algorithm [35]
to broadcast its L-bit input for the k-th instance to all the other nodes.
Thus, at the end of this step, all the fault-free nodes will reach correct
agreement for the output for the k-th instance.
• (DC2) If for some node pair a, b ∈ Vk, a message that node a claims
above to have sent to node b mismatches with the claim of received
messages made by node b, then node pair a, b is found in dispute. In
step DC1, since a Byzantine broadcast algorithm is used to disseminate
the claims, all the fault-free nodes will identify identical node pairs in
dispute.
It should be clear that a pair of fault-free nodes will never be found in
dispute with each other in this step.
• (DC3) The NAB algorithm is deterministic in nature. Therefore, the
messages that should be sent by each node in Phases 1 and 2 can be
completely determined by the messages that the node receives, and, in
case of node 1, its initial input. Thus, if the claims of the messages
sent by some node i are inconsistent with the message it claims to have
received, and its initial input (in case of node 1), then that node i
must be faulty. Again, all fault-free nodes identify these faulty nodes
identically. Any nodes thus identiﬁed as faulty until now (including
all previous instances of NAB) are deemed to be “in dispute” with all
their neighbors (to whom the faulty nodes have incoming or outgoing
links).
It should be clear that a fault-free node will never be found to be faulty
in this step.
• (DC4) Consider the node pairs that have been identiﬁed as being in
dispute in DC2 and DC3 of at least one instances of NAB so far.
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We will say that a set of nodes Fi, where |Fi| ≤ f , “explains” all the
disputes so far, if for each pair a, b found in dispute so far, at least one
of a and b is in Fi. It should be easy to see that for any set of disputes
that may be observed, there must be at least one such set that explains
the disputes. It is easy to argue that the nodes in the set below must
be necessarily faulty (in fact, the nodes in the set intersection below




Then, Vk+1 is obtained as Vk −
⋂Δ
δ=1 Fδ. Ek+1 is obtained by removing
from Ek edges incident on nodes in
⋂Δ
δ=1 Fδ, and also excluding edges
between node pairs that have been found in dispute so far.
As noted earlier, the above dispute control phase may be executed in at
most f(f + 1) instances of NAB.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove Theorem 3.1, we ﬁrst prove that when the coding matrices are
generated at random as described, for a particular subgraph H ∈ Ωk, with
non-zero probability, the coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Gk} deﬁne a matrix CH
(as elaborated later) such that DHCH = 0 if and only if DH = 0. Then we
prove that this is also simultaneously true for all subgraphs H ∈ Ωk.
B.3.1 For a Given Subgraph H ∈ Ωk
Consider any subgraph H ∈ Ωk. For each edge e = (i, j) in H , we “expand”
the corresponding coding matrix Ce (of size ρk × ze) to a (n− f − 1)ρk × ze
matrix Be as follows: Be consists n − f − 1 blocks, each block is a ρk × ze
matrix:
• If i = n − f and j = n − f , then the i-th and j-th block equal to Ce
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• If i = n − f , then the j-th block equals to −Ce, and the other blocks














• If j = n− f , then the i-th block equals to Ce, and the other blocks are
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LetDi(β) = Xi(β)−Xn−f (β) for i < n−f as the diﬀerence between Xi and
Xn−f in the β-th element. Recall thatDi = Xi−Xn−f =
(




D1 · · · Dn−f−1
)
. So DH is a row vector of (n− f − 1)ρk el-
ements from GF (2L/ρk) that captures the diﬀerences between Xi and Xn−f
for all i < n− f . It should be easy to see that, for edge e = (i, j)
(Xi −Xj)Ce = 0⇔ DHBe = 0.
So for edge e, steps 1-2 of Algorithm 3.4.5 have the eﬀect of checking whether
or not DHBe = 0.
If we label the set of edges in H as e1, e2, · · · , and let m be the sum of the
capacities of all edges in H , then we construct a (n − f − 1)ρk ×m matrix
CH by concatenating all expanded coding matrices:
CH =
(
Be1 Be2 · · ·
)
where each column of CH represents the equality checking of one coded
symbol sent in H over the corresponding edge. Note that the sum of the
capacities of all edges in H equals to m. Then steps 1-2 of Algorithm 3.4.5
for all edges inH have the same eﬀect of checking whether or notDHCH = 0.
So to prove Theorem 3.1, we need to show that there exists at least one CH
such that
DHCH = 0 ⇔ DH = 0.
It is obvious that if DH = 0, then DHCH = 0 for any CH. So all left to
show is that there exists at least one CH such that DHCH = 0⇒ DH = 0.
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It is then suﬃcient to show that CH contains a (n− f − 1)ρk× (n− f − 1)ρk
submatrixMH that is invertible, because when such an invertible submatrix
exists,
DHCH = 0 ⇒ DHMH = 0 ⇒ DH = 0.
Now we describe how one such submatrixMH can be obtained. Notice that
each column of CH represents one coded symbol sent on the corresponding
edge. A (n−f−1)ρk×(n−f−1) submatrix S ofCH is said to be a “spanning
matrix” ofH if the edges corresponding to the columns of S form a undirected
spanning tree of H; recall that H is the undirected representation of H . In
Figure 3.2(d), an undirected spanning tree of the undirected graph in Figure
3.2(b) is shown in dotted edges. It is worth pointing out that an undirected
spanning tree in an undirected graph H does not necessarily correspond to a
directed spanning tree in the corresponding directed graph H . For example,
the directed edges in Figure 3.2(a) corresponding to the dotted undirected
edges in Figure 3.2(d) do not form a spanning tree in the directed graph in
Figure 3.2(a).
It is known that in an undirected graph whose MINCUT equals to U , at
least U/2 undirected unit-capacity spanning trees can be embedded [76].1
This implies that the sum of link capacities m ≥ (n − f − 1)Uk/2, and CH
contains a set of Uk/2 spanning matrices such that no two spanning matrices
in the set covers the same column in CH. Let {S1, · · · ,Sρk} be one set of
ρk ≤ Uk/2 such spanning matrices of H . Each of these spanning matrices
has dimension (n− f − 1)ρk× (n− f − 1). Then the union of these spanning
matrices forms an (n− f − 1)ρk × (n− f − 1)ρk submatrix of CH:
MH =
(
S1 · · · Sρk
)
.
Next, we will show that when the set of coding matrices are generated as
described in Theorem 3.1, with non-zero probability we obtain an invertible
square matrix MH. When MH is invertible,
DHMH = 0 ⇔ DH = 0 ⇔ X1 = · · · = Xn−f .
1The deﬁnition of embedding undirected unit-capacity spanning trees in undirected
graphs is similar to embedding directed unit-capacity spanning trees in directed graphs
(by dropping the direction of edges).
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so that the (β − 1)(n− f − 1) + 1-th through the β(n− f − 1) elements of
D˜H represent the diﬀerence between Xi (i = 1, · · · , n− f − 1) and Xn−f in
the β-th element.
We also reorder the rows of each spanning matrix Sq (q = 1, · · · , ρk)
accordingly to match with the order of elements in D˜H . After reordering, Sq










Here Aq is a (n− f − 1)× (n− f − 1) square matrix, and it is called the
adjacency matrix of the spanning tree corresponding to Sq. Aq is formed as
follows. Suppose that the r-th column of Sq corresponds to a coded symbol
sent over a directed edge (i, j) in H , then
1. If i = n − f and j = n − f , then the r-th column of Aq has the i-th
element as 1 and the j-th element as −1, the remaining entries in that
column are all 0;
2. If i = n − f , then the j-th element of the r-th column of Aq is set to
−1, the remaining elements of that column are all 0;
3. If j = n − f , then the i-th element of the r-th column of Aq is set to
1, the remaining elements of that column are all 0.
For example, suppose H is the graph shown in Figure 3.2(b), and Sq cor-
responds to a spanning tree of H consisting of the dotted edges in Figure
3.2(d). Suppose that we index the corresponding directed edges in the graph
shown in Figure 3.2(a) in the following order: (2,3), (1,4), (4,3). The result-
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On the other hand, each Sq,p is a (n− f −1)× (n− f −1) square diagonal
matrix. The r-th diagonal element of Sq,p equals to the p-th coeﬃcient
used to compute the coded symbol corresponding to the r-th column of Sq.
For example, suppose the ﬁrst column of Sq corresponds to a coded symbol
3X1(1)+ 4X1(2) being sent on link (1, 2). Then the ﬁrst diagonal element of
Sq,1 is 3 and the ﬁrst diagonal element of Sq,2 is 4.





A1S1,1 A2S2,1 · · · AρkCρk,1




A1S1,ρk A2S2,ρk · · · AρkSρk,ρk
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (B.2)
Notice that M˜H is obtained by permuting the rows of MH. So showing that








A1S1,q · · · AqSq,q
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ for 1 ≤ q ≤ ρk. Note that Mq1 is
a sub-matrix ofMq2 when q1 < q2, andMρk = M˜H. We prove the following
lemma:






matrix M˜H is invertible. Hence MH is also invertible with the same proba-
bility.




for all q ≤ ρk. The proof is done by induction, with q = 1
being the base case.
Base Case: q = 1
M1 = A1S1,1. (B.3)
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As shown later in Appendix B.3.3,Aq is always invertible and det(Aq) = ±1.
Since S1,1 is a (n − f − 1)-by-(n − f − 1) diagonal matrix, it is invert-
ible provided that all its (n − f − 1) diagonal elements are non-zero. Re-
member that the diagonal elements of S1,1 are chosen uniformly and inde-







Induction Step: q to q + 1 when 1 ≤ q < ρk
Recall that Mq is a (n − f − 1)q × (n − f − 1)q square matrix. The

















is an (n− f − 1)q × (n− f − 1) matrix, and
Fq =
(
A1S1,q+1 · · · AqSq,q+1
)
(B.6)
is an (n− f − 1)× (n− f − 1)q matrix.



































A−1q+1Fq Sq+1,q+1 −A−1q+1FqM−1q Pq
)
.
Here I(n−f−1)q and I(n−f−1), respectively, denote (n−f −1)q× (n−f −1)q
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and a (n− f − 1)× (n− f − 1) identity matrices. For this proof, we need to
show thatMq+1 is invertible, i.e., det(Mq+1) = 0. Note that | det(M′q+1)| =
| det(Mq+1)|, since the matrix multiplied at the left has determinant ±1, and
the matrix multiplied at the right has determinant 1. So it suﬃces to show
that M′q+1 is invertible.
Observe that the diagonal elements of the (n−f−1)×(n−f −1) diagonal




q Pq. Then as
shown later in Appendix B.3.4, Sq+1,q+1−A−1q+1FqM−1q Pq is invertible with
probability at least 1−n−f−1
2L/ρk






according to the induction assumption. So
we have
Pr{Mq+1 is invertible} = Pr{M′q+1 is invertible}
≥
(
1− n− f − 1
2L/ρk
)q (


















≥ 1− (n− f − 1)ρk
2L/ρk
(B.10)
→ 1, as L → ∞. (B.11)

Now we have proved that there exists a set of coding matrices {Ce|e ∈ Ek}
such that the resulting CH satisﬁes the condition that DHCH = 0 if and
only if DH = 0.
B.3.2 For All Subgraphs in Ωk
In this section, we are going to show that, for Gk, if the coding matrices
{Ce|e ∈ Ek} are generated as described in Theorem 3.1, then with non-
zero probability the set of square matrices {MH|H ∈ Ωk} are all invertible
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simultaneously. When this is true, there exists a set of coding matrices
that is correct.
To show that MH’s for all H ∈ Ωk are simultaneously invertible with




According to Lemma B.1, each MH (H ∈ Ωk) is invertible with non-zero
probability. It implies that det(MH) is a non-identically-zero polynomial of
the random coding coeﬃcients of degree at most (n − f − 1)ρk (recall that










is a non-identically-zero polynomial of the random coeﬃcients of degree at
most |Ωk|(n− f − 1)ρk. Notice that each coded symbol is used once in each
subgraph H . So each random coeﬃcient appears in at most one column in





is at most |Ωk|.





non-zero is at least
(
1− 2−L/ρk |Ωk|
)(n−f−1)ρk ≥ 1− 2−L/ρk [|Ωk|(n− f − 1)ρk] .
According to the way Gk is constructed and the deﬁnition of Ωk, it should











and Theorem 3.1 follows.
B.3.3 Proof that Aq is Invertible
Given an adjacency matrix Aq, let us call the corresponding spanning tree of
H as Tq. For edges in Tq incident on node n− f , the corresponding columns
in Aq have exactly one non-zero entry. Also, the column corresponding to an
edge that is incident on node i has a non-zero entry in row i. Since there must
be at least one edge in Tq that is incident on node n − f , there must be at
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least one column of Aq that has only one non-zero element. Also, since every
node is incident on at least one edge in Tq, every row of Aq has at least one
non-zero element(s). Since there is at most one edge between every pair of
nodes in Tq, no two columns in Aq are non-zero in identical rows. Therefore,
by column manipulation, we can transform matrix Aq into another matrix in
which every row and every column has exactly one non-zero element. Hence
det(Aq) equals to either 1 or −1, and Aq is invertible.
B.3.4 Proof that Sq+1,q+1 −A−1q+1FqM−1q Pq is Invertible
ConsiderW to be an arbitrary ﬁxed w×w matrix. Consider a random w×w




s1 0 · · · 0




0 · · · 0 sw
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (B.12)
The diagonal elements of S are selected independently and uniformly ran-
domly from GF (2ρk). Then we have:
Lemma B.2 The probability that the w × w matrix S −W is invertible is
lower-bounded by:
Pr{(S−W) is invertible} ≥ 1− w
2ρk
. (B.13)




(s1 −W1,1) −R1,2 · · · −W1,w




−Rw,1 · · · −Ww,w−1 (sr −Rw,w)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= (s1 −W1,1)(s2 −W2,2) · · · (sw −Ww,w) + other terms
= Πwi=1si + Ww−1 (B.14)
The ﬁrst term above, Πwi=1si, is a degree-w polynomial of s1, · · · , sw. Ww−1
is a polynomial of degree at most w − 1 of s1, · · · , sw, and it represents the
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remaining terms in det(S−W). Notice that det(S−W) cannot be identically
zero since it contains only one degree-w term. Then by the Schwartz-Zippel
Theorem, the probability that det(S −R) = 0 is ≤ w/2ρk . Since S −W is
invertible if and only if det(S−W) = 0, we conclude that
Pr{(S−W) is invertible} ≥ 1− w
2ρk
. (B.15)




q Pq, and w = n − f − 1, we





B.4 Throughput of NAB
First consider the time cost of each operation in instance k of NAB :
• Phase 1: It takes L/γk ≤ L/γ∗ time units, since unreliable broadcast
from the source node 1 at rate γk is achievable and γk ≥ γ∗, as discussed
in Appendix B.1.
• Phase 2 – Equality check: As discussed previously, it takes L/ρk ≤
L/ρ∗ time units.
• Phase 2 – Broadcasting outcomes of equality check: To reliably
broadcast the 1-bit ﬂags from the equality check algorithm, a previ-
ously proposed Byzantine broadcast algorithm, such as [35], is used.
The algorithm from [35], denoted as Broadcast Binary hereafter, re-
liably broadcasts 1 bit by communicating no more than P (n) bits in
a complete graph, where P (n) is a polynomial of n. In our setting,
G might not be complete. However, the connectivity of G is at least
2f + 1. It is well-known that, in a graph with connectivity at least
2f + 1 and at most f faulty nodes, reliable end-to-end communication
from any node i to any other node j can be achieved by sending the
same copy of data along a set of 2f + 1 node-disjoint paths from node
i to node j and taking the majority at node j. By doing this, we can
emulate a complete graph in an incomplete graph G. Since every simple
path in G is at most n−1 hops long, and each edge in E has capacity at
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least 1 bit/time unit, it takes at most n− 1 time units to emulate in G
the transmission of 1 bit in the complete graph. Then we can conclude
that, by running Broadcast Binary on top of the emulated complete
graph, reliably broadcasting the 1-bit ﬂags can be completed in O(nα)
time units, for some constant α > 0.
• Phase 3: If Phase 3 is performed in instance k, every node i in Vk uses
Broadcast Binary to reliably broadcast all the messages that it claims
to have received from other nodes, and sent to the other nodes, during
Phase 1 and 2 of the k-th instance. Denote the total capacity of edges
in E as m. Since Phases 1 and 2 takes at most L/γ∗+L/ρ∗ time units,
at most mL(1/γ∗ + 1/ρ∗) bits have been communicated in G during
Phases 1 and 2. Similar to the discussion above about broadcasting
the outcomes of equality check, the time it takes to complete Phase 3
is O(mL(1/γ∗ + 1/ρ∗)nα).
Now consider a sequence of Q > 0 instances of NAB. As discussed pre-
viously, Phase 3 will be performed at most f(f + 1) times throughout the
execution of the algorithm. So we have the following upper bound of the
execution time of Q instances of NAB:




















Then the throughput of NAB can be lower-bounded by






































The last inequality is due to f < n/3.
Notice that for a given graph G, {n, γ∗, ρ∗, α,m} are all constants inde-
pendent of L and Q. So for suﬃciently large values of L and Q, speciﬁcally





, the last two terms in the last
inequality becomes negligible compared to the ﬁrst term, and the through-
put of NAB approaches to a value that is at least as large as TNAB, which is
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In the above discussion, we implicitly assumed that transmissions during
the unreliable broadcast in Phase 1 accomplish all at the same time, by
assuming no propagation delay. However, when propagation delay is consid-
ered, a node cannot forward a message/symbol until it ﬁnishes receiving it. So
for the k-th instance of NAB, the information broadcast by the source prop-
agates only one hop every L/γk time units. So for a large network, the “time
span” of Phase 1 can be much larger than L/γk. This problem can be solved








time units. For each instance of NAB, the L-bit input from the source node
1 propagates one hop per round, using the ﬁrst L/γ∗ time units, until Phase






time units of the last round
is used to perform Phase 2. An example in which the broadcast in Phase
1 takes 3 hops is shown in Figure B.1. In a particular round q, ﬁrst hop
transmissions of the unreliable broadcast in Phase 1 of the q-th instance,
the second hop transmissions of the Phase 1 of the (q − 1)-th instance , and
the third hop transmissions of the phase 1 of the (q − 2)-th instance are
performed simultaneously during the ﬁrst L/γ∗ time units. Phase 1 of the
(q − 2)-th instance completes by then. Then failure detection of Phase 2
of the (q − 2)-th instance is performed using the remaining L/ρ∗ + O(nα)
unit time, illustrated as the gray area. During the gray area, all links in the
network are used.
By pipelining, we achieve the lower bound from Equation 3.6.
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B.5 Construction of Γ
A subgraph of G belonging to Γ is obtained as follows: We will say that
edges in W ⊂ E are “explainable” if there exists a set F ⊂ V such that (i)
F contains at most f nodes, and (ii) each edge in W is incident on at least
one node in F . Set F is then said to “explain set W”.
Consider each explainable set of edges W ⊂ E . Suppose that F1, · · · , FΔ
are all the subsets of V of size ≤ f that explain edge set W . A subgraph ΨW
of G is obtained by removing edges in W from E , and nodes in ⋂Δδ=1 Fδ from
V.2 In general, ΨW above may or may not contain the source node 1. Only
those ΨW ’s that do contain node 1 belong to Γ.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 3.2
In arbitrary point-to-point network G(V, E), the capacity of the BB problem
with node 1 being the source and up to f < n/3 faults satisﬁes the upper
bounds proved in Sections B.6.1 and B.6.2.
B.6.1 CBB(G) ≤ γ∗
Proof: Consider any ΨW ∈ Γ and let W be the set of edges in G but not
in ΨW . By the construction of Γ, there must be at least one set F ⊂ V that
explains W and does not contain the source node 1. We are going to show
that CBB(G) ≤ MINCUT (ΨW , 1, i) for every node i = 1 that is in ΨW .
Notice that there must exist a set of nodes that explains W and does not
contain node 1; otherwise node 1 is not in ΨW . Without loss of generality,
assume that F1 is one such set of nodes. So F1 does not contain source node
1.
First consider any node i = 1 in ΨW such that i /∈ F1. Let all the nodes
in F1 be faulty such that they refuse to communicate over edges in W , but
otherwise behave correctly. In this case, since the source is fault-free, node
i must be able to receive the L-bit input that node 1 is trying to broadcast.
So CBB(G) ≤ MINCUT (ΨW , 1, i).
2It is possible that ΨW for diﬀerent W may be identical. This does not aﬀect the
correctness of our algorithm.
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Next we consider a node i = 1 in ΨW such that i ∈ F1, if it exists. Notice
that node i cannot be contained in all sets of nodes that explainW ; otherwise,
node i is not in ΨW . Then there are only two possibilities:
1. There exists another set F that explains W and contains neither node
1 nor node i. In this case, CBB(G) ≤ MINCUT (ΨW , 1, i) according
to the above argument by replacing F1 with F .
2. Otherwise, there must exist a set F2 = F1 that explains W such that
i /∈ F2 and 1 ∈ F2.
Deﬁne V − = V−F1−F2. V − is not empty since F1 and F2 both contain
at most f nodes and there are n ≥ 3f + 1 nodes in V. Consider two
scenarios with the same input value x: (1) Nodes in F1 (which does not
contain node 1) are faulty and refuse to communicate over edges in W ,
but otherwise behave correctly; and (2) Nodes in F2 (which contains
node 1) are faulty and refuse to communicate over edges in W , but
otherwise behave correctly. In both cases, nodes in V − are fault-free.
Observe that among edges connecting nodes in V − to/from nodes in
F1 ∪ F2, only edges connecting nodes in V − to/from nodes F1 ∩ F2
could have been removed, because otherwise W cannot be explained
by both F1 and F2. So nodes in V
− cannot distinguish between the
two scenarios above. In scenario (1), the source node 1 is not faulty.
Hence nodes in V − must agree with the value x that node 1 is trying
to broadcast, according to the validity condition. Since nodes in V −
cannot distinguish between the two scenarios, they must also set their
outputs to x in scenario (2), even though in this case the source node
1 is faulty. Then according to the agreement condition, node i must
agree with nodes in V − in scenario (2), which means that node i also
has to learn x. So CBB(G) ≤ MINCUT (ΨW , 1, i).
This completes the proof. 
B.6.2 CBB(G) ≤ 2ρ∗
Proof: For a subgraph H ∈ Ω1 (and accordingly H ∈ Ω1), denote
UH = min
nodes i,j in H
MINCUT (H, i, j).
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(a) Scenario 1. Source is in F1, and
the input value is u.
(b) Scenario 2. Source is in F2, and
input value is v.
(c) Scenario 3
Figure B.2: Three scenarios for the proof of CBB(G) ≤ 2ρ∗.
We will prove the upper bound by showing that CBB(G) ≤ UH for every
H ∈ Ω1.
Suppose on the contrary that Byzantine broadcast can be done at a rate
R > UH + 	 for some constant 	 > 0. So there exists a BB algorithm, named
A, that can broadcast t(UH + 	) bits in using t time units, for some t > 0.
Let E be a set of edges in H that corresponds to one of the minimum-cuts
in H. In other words,
∑
e∈E ze = UH , and the nodes in H can be partitioned
into two non-empty sets L and R such that L and R are disconnected from
each other if edges in E are removed. Also denote F as the set of nodes that
are in G but not in H . Since H contains (n− f) nodes, F contains f nodes.
Notice that in t time units, at most tUH < t(UH + 	) bits of information
can be sent over edges in E. According to the pigeonhole principle, there
must exist two diﬀerent input values of t(UH + 	) bits, denoted as u and v,
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such that in the absence of misbehavior, broadcasting u and v with algorithm
A results in the same communication pattern over edges in E.
There are two possible cases: (1) F contains the source node 1; and (2) F
does not contain the source node 1.
First case: F contains the source node 1 Consider the three scenarios
using algorithm A:
1. Node 1 broadcasts u, and none of the nodes misbehaves. So all nodes
should set their outputs to u.
2. Node 1 broadcasts v, and none of the nodes misbehaves. So all nodes
should set their outputs to v.
3. Nodes in F are faulty (includes the source node 1). The faulty nodes
in F behave to nodes in L as in scenario 1, and behave to nodes in R
as in scenario 2.
Next, we will show that nodes in L cannot distinguish scenario 1 from
scenario 3, and nodes in R cannot distinguish scenario 2 from scenario 3.
For this purpose, we construct 3 state machines, one for each of the above
scenarios in Figure B.2. The state machine for scenario 1 is shown in Figure
B.2(a): it is a copy of G, and the circles F1, L1 and R1, respectively, represent
copies of the nodes in F , L and R. The bidirectional edge E1 between L1
and R1 represents copies of the edges connecting nodes in L to/from nodes in
R, i.e., edges in E. Similarly, the other two bidirectional edges represent the
edges connecting nodes in F to/from nodes in L, and the edges connecting
nodes in F to/from nodes in R, respectively. Edges connecting nodes within
each set are not shown in the ﬁgure. The copy of source node 1 in F1 is
given input value u. The information being communicated between L1 and
R1 over edges in E1 is denoted as LR(u). Similarly, Figure B.2(b) is the state
machine for scenario 2, with the input value to the copy of the source node
being v, and the corresponding information communicated between L2 and
R2 over edges in E2 is denoted as LR(v).
The state machine in Figure B.2(c) is constructed as follows: (1) detach E1
from R1 and attach it to R2 as L and R are connected by E; (2) similarly,
detach E2 from R2 and attach it to R1 as L and R are connected by E.
Recall that LR(u) = LR(v). It follows that the behaviors of the nodes in
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F1, L1, R1, F2, L2, R2 are not aﬀected by above modiﬁcation of switching edges
in E1 and E2. In particular, L1 behave identically in both state machines
from Figure B.2(a) and Figure B.2(c); and R2 behave identically in both
state machines from Figure B.2(b) and Figure B.2(c). For scenario 3, we let
L = L1, R = R2, and the faulty nodes in F behave to L as F1 and behave
to R as F2 in Figure B.2(c).
Now we have showed that nodes in L cannot distinguish scenario 1 from
scenario 3, and nodes in R cannot distinguish scenario 2 from scenario 3.
So in scenario 3, nodes in L set their outputs to u and nodes in R set their
outputs to v. This violates the agreement condition and contradicts with the
assumption that A solves BB at rate UH + 	. Hence CBB(G) ≤ UH .
Second case: F does not contain the source node 1 Without loss
of generality, suppose that node 1 is in L. Consider the following three
scenarios:
1. Node 1 broadcasts u, and none of the nodes misbehave. So all nodes
should set their outputs to u.
2. Node 1 broadcasts v, and none of the nodes misbehave. So all nodes
should set their outputs to v.
3. Node 1 broadcasts u, and nodes in F are faulty. The faulty nodes in
F behave to nodes in L as in scenario 1, and behave to nodes in R as
in scenario 2.
For this part, we construct 3 state machines, one for each of the above sce-
narios, that are almost the same as those in Figure B.2 for the ﬁrst case,
with the modiﬁcation that now the source node is in L1 and L2 in Figures
B.2(a) and B.2(b), respectively. Similar to the ﬁrst case, nodes in L cannot
distinguish scenario 1 from scenario 3, and nodes in R cannot distinguish
scenario 2 from scenario 3. So in scenario 3, nodes in L set their outputs to u
and nodes in R set their outputs to v. This violates the agreement condition
and contradicts with the assumption that A solves BB at rate UH+ 	. Hence
CBB(G) ≤ UH , and this completes the proof. 
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B.7 Correctness of Algorithm 3.7.6
As in network coding [46], for suﬃciently large value of L and R no greater
than the upper bound from Corollary 3.1, as discussed later, there exist sets
of coeﬃcients that make every subset of R coded symbols computed in Algo-
rithm 3.7.6 correspond to a set of R linearly independent linear combinations
of the R data symbols of X. We assume in the following discussion that one
set of such coeﬃcients is chosen. A set of coded symbols are said to be linearly
independent if the corresponding linear combinations of the data symbols are
linearly independent. From basic linear algebra, we know that there exists
a unique vector Y that satisﬁes all the linear combinations represented by
any subset of R linearly independent coded symbols. We call vector Y the
unique solution to the set of R linearly independent coded symbols.
Notice that the source node 1 can be in dispute with at most one peer,
otherwise it must have been identiﬁed as faulty and the fault-free peers should
have terminated the algorithm with a default output. So there are three
cases: the source is fault-free, the source is faulty and not in dispute with
any peer, and the source is faulty and in dispute with one peer. We consider
these three cases separately.
For the following discussion, denote zi,j as the capacity of edge e = (i, j).
With this notation, Corollary 3.1 can be expressed as follows:
zj,i + zk,i ≥ CBB4, i ∈ {2, 3, 4}; j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; i = j, i = k, j = k;
z1,i + z1,j ≥ CBB4, i = 1, j = 1, i = j.
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 3.7.6, consider any R that is no
greater than the upper bound from Corollary 3.1, i.e.,
zj,i + zk,i ≥ R, i = 2, 3, 4; i = j, i = k, j =; (B.17)
z1,i + z1,j ≥ R, i = 1, j = 1, i = j. (B.18)
Source is fault-free: Consider any two fault-free peer nodes i and j. Ac-
cording to the manner in which coded symbols are transmitted in Algorithm
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3.7.6, it is easy to see that node i receives at least
z1,i +min(z1,j , zj,i) = min(z1,i + z1,j , z1,i + zj,i)
≥ R
untampered linearly independent coded symbols, either directly from source
or via the other fault-free peer node j. Since X is the unique solution to any
set of untampered linearly independent coded symbols, either node i ﬁnds
the unique solution to the coded symbols it has received as Yi = X, or there
does not exist a unique solution, in which case failure is detected. So when
the source is fault-free, either all fault-free peers decide on the correct output
X, or at least one node detects a failure.
Source is faulty and not in dispute with any peer: In this case, all
peer nodes are fault-free; they are never in dispute with each other. Accord-
ing to Equation B.17, we have
(z2,3 + z3,2) + (z2,4 + z4,2) + (z3,4 + z4,3)
= (z3,2 + z4,2) + (z2,3 + z4,3) + (z2,4 + z3,4) ≥ 3R.
This implies at least one of the terms (z2,3+z3,2), (z2,4+z4,2) and (z3,4+z4,3)
must exceed R. Without loss of generality, suppose that z2,3 + z3,2 ≥ R.
Now, let us consider the number of coded symbols nodes 2 and 3 ex-
change in step 2 on links (2,3) and (3,2) together. Observe that node 2
sends min{z1,2, z2,3} coded symbols to node 3 on (2,3), and node 3 sends
min{z1,3, z3,2} to node 2 on link (3,2). So the number of coded symbols they
exchange on links (2,3) and (3,2) together is
min{z1,2, z2,3}+min{z1,3, z3,2} (B.19)
= min{z1,2 + z1,3, z1,2 + z3,2, z2,3 + z1,3, z2,3 + z3,2} (B.20)
≥ min{R, z2,3 + z3,2} (B.21)
The reason for the ≥ in Equation B.21 is that each of the ﬁrst three terms on
the right-hand side of Equation B.20, namely z1,2+ z1,3, z1,2+ z3,2, z2,3+ z1,3,
is ≥ R, as per Equations B.17 and B.18. z2,3 + z1,3 ≥ R and Equation B.21
together imply that after step 2, nodes 2 and 3 share at least R coded symbols.
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That is, among the symbols nodes 2 and 3 have received, there are R identical
symbols. Thus, nodes 2 and 3 will not agree on diﬀerent data symbols (since
the agreed data must satisfy linear combinations corresponding to all received
coded symbols).
Thus, either at least one of nodes 2 and 3 will detect misbehavior by node
1, or all the symbols they have received will be consistent with an identical
vector Y (of R symbols). In the former case, the misbehavior by node 1 is
detected. In the latter case, neither node 2 nor 3 detects the misbehavior. In
this case, we will now consider what happens at node 4. In particular, there
are three possibilities:
• z2,4 + z4,2 ≥ R: Similar to the above argument for nodes 2 and 3,
we can argue that nodes 2 and 4 will have at least R coded symbols
in common, and therefore, they will not agree on two diﬀerent data
vectors. This, combined with the fact that nodes 2 and 3 will also not
agree on two diﬀerent vectors, implies that if none of the three fault-
free peers detects a misbehavior, then they will agree on an identical
vector Y.
• z3,4 + z4,3 ≥ R: This case is similar to the previous case.
• z2,4+z4,2 < R and z3,4+z4,3 < R: In this case, similar to Equation B.21,
we can show that:
min{z1,2, z2,4}+min{z1,4, z4,2} ≥ min{R, z2,4 + z4,2}
min{z1,3, z3,4}+min{z1,4, z4,3} ≥ min{R, z3,4 + z4,3}.
This implies that these four links are all “saturated” (that is, the num-
ber of coded symbols sent on each of these links in round 2 is equal
to the link capacity). It follows that node 4 receives z2,4 + z3,4 ≥ R
coded symbols from nodes 2 and 3 together, and node 4 has at least R
coded symbols in common with the union of symbols available to nodes
2 and 3. Since nodes 2 and 3 have not detected a misbehavior, these R
symbols must all be consistent with the solution obtained at nodes 2
and 3 both. Thus, node 4 cannot possibly decide on an output that is
diﬀerent from that agreed upon by nodes 2 and 3. Thus, it follows that
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either at least one of the peers will detect the misbehavior by node 1,
or they will all agree.
Source is faulty and in dispute with one peer: Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that the faulty source node 1 is in dispute with the fault-free
peer node 4. By the end of step 2, node 2 has received z1,2+min(z1,3, z3,2) ≥ R
coded symbols from source node 1 and node 3 together. Similarly, node 3
has received z1,3 +min(z1,2, z2,3) ≥ R coded symbols. So the coded symbols
nodes 2 and 3 compute and send to node 4 in step 3 satisfy the linearly inde-
pendent requirement. Then in steps 2-3, node 4 receives z2,4+z3,4 ≥ R coded
symbol from nodes 2 and 3 together. As before, the coded symbols node 4
computes and sends in step 3 satisfy the linearly independent requirement.
Then, in step 3, node 4 sends min(z4,2, z4,3) identical coded symbols to
both nodes 2 and 3. It then follows that nodes 2 and 3 share
min(z1,2, z2,3) + min(z1,3, z3,2) + min(z4,2, z4,3)
= min(z1,2 + z1,3 + z4,2, z1,2 + z1,3 + z4,3,
z1,2 + z3,2 + z4,2, z1,2 + z3,2 + z4,3,
z2,3 + z1,3 + z4,2, z2,3 + z1,3 + z4,3,
z2,3 + z3,2 + z4,2, z2,3 + z3,2 + z4,3)
linearly independent coded symbols identically. Following directly from Equa-
tion B.17 and Equation B.18, all 8 summations in the min function above
are ≥ R. It follows that nodes 2 and 3 have at least R coded symbols in
common, and hence they cannot possibly agree on diﬀerent outputs. Similar
to the previous case, it follows that either at least one of the peers will detect





C.1 Edge Coloring Representation of MEQ-AD(3,K)
From Sections 4.5 and 4.6, we have shown that it is suﬃcient to study 3-
node systems where information is transmitted only on links AB, AC and
BC. Let us denote |sAB|, |sAC| and |sBC | as the number of diﬀerent symbols
being transmitted on links AB, AC and BC, respectively. Now consider the
following simple bipartite graph G(U, V, E), where U and V are the two
disjoint sets of vertices and E is the set of edges:
• |U | = |sAB|, each vertex is labeled as UsAB(x) for all K values of x;
• |V | = |sAC|, each vertex is labeled as VsAC(x) for all K values of x;
• eij = (Ui, Vj) ∈ E if and only if i = sAB(x) and j = sAC(x) for some x.
In essence, each vertex Ui (or Vi) represents the set of value x’s that produce
the same value sAB(x) = i (or sAC(x) = i); and each edge eij = (Ui, Vj)
represents the set of value x’s that produces the same pair of channel symbols
sAB(x) = i and sAC(x) = j. Figure 4.2 on page 93 shows the bipartite graph
corresponding to the MEQ-AD(3,6) protocol we introduced in Section 4.6.
Near the nodes Ui and Vi we show the set of value x’s such that sAB(x) = i and
sAC(x) = i, respectively. The number near each edges is the corresponding
value of that edge.
Let |eij | be the size of the set of value x’s corresponding to edge eij. We
ﬁrst argue that
Lemma C.1 |eij| = 1 for all eij ∈ E. Hence |E| = M and |U | × |V | ≥ M .
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Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there exists some eij ∈ E with |eij | ≥
2. Then there must be two values x, x′ such that x = x′, sAB(x) = sAB(x′)
and sAC(x) = sAC(x
′). Similar to the “fooling set” argument in [17], it is
impossible for nodes B and C to tell the diﬀerence between the two input
vectors (x, x, x) and (x′, x, x); hence they will not be able to solve the MEQ-
AD(3,M) problem, which leads to a contradiction. Then the ﬁrst part of the
lemma follows.
Since every edge represents one x, and there are M possible values of x,
it follows that |E| = K. Also, in a simple bipartite graph, we always have
|U | × |V | ≥ |E|. Thus |U | × |V | ≥ K. 
Since there is a one-to-one mapping from the set of input values {1, · · · , K}
to the edges E, we will use the terms input value (x) and edge (eij) inter-
changeably. Now we prove the following theorem on the constraint of sBC :
Lemma C.2 sBC(x) = sBC(x′) if edges x and x′ are adjacent or there is
some other edge that is adjacent to both of them, in the bipartite graph
G(U, V, E).
Proof: Consider any pairs x, x′ such that x = x′ and (UsAB(x), VsAC(x′)) ∈ E.
Let x∗ (maybe equal to x or x′) be the input value that edge (UsAB(x), VsAC(x′))
corresponds to. So we have sAB(x
∗) = sAB(x) and sAC(x∗) = sAC(x′). Now
consider the input vector (x∗, x, x′) at node A, B and C. Since sAB(x∗) =
sAB(x), node B cannot diﬀerentiate (x
∗, x, x′) from (x, x, x). So node B
cannot detect the mismatch. Meanwhile, since sAC(x
∗) = sAC(x′), node C
can not diﬀerentiate (x∗, x, x′) from (x′, x′, x′) by just looking into the receives
sAC . So sBC(x) must be diﬀerent from sBC(x
′); otherwise, the MEQ-AD
problem is not solved. Then the lemma follows. 
Now we can conclude that the problem of designing sBC , given functions
sAB(·) and sAC(·), is equivalent to ﬁnding a distance-2 edge coloring for the
corresponding bipartite graph G(U, V, E). Furthermore, it should not be
hard to see that any protocol P that solves MEQ-AD(3,M) is equivalent to
a bipartite graph G(U, V, E) together with a distance-2 coloring scheme W
such that |U | = |sAB|, |V | = |sAC|, |E| = M , and |W | = |sBC |, where |W |
denotes the number of colors in scheme W . Notice that
C(P ) = log2 |sAB|+log2 |sAC |+log2 |sBC | = log2(|sAB|×|sAC|×|sBC |). (C.1)
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Then Theorem 4.2 follows.
According to Theorem 4.2, we can conclude that the problem of ﬁnding
CAD(3, K) is equivalent to the problem of ﬁnding the minimum of |U |×|V |×
|W | for the bipartite graphs and distance-2 coloring schemes that satisfy the
above constrains.
Using Theorem 4.2, to show that CAD(3, 4) = 4, we only need to show
that for every combination of |U | × |V | × |W | < 24 = 16 there exists no
bipartite graph G(U, V, E) and distance-2 coloring scheme W that satisfy the
conditions as described in Theorem 4.2. In other words, if the conditions are
all satisﬁed, then the bipartite graph G(U, V, E) cannot be distance-2 colored
with |W | colors. It is not hard to see that there are only two combinations
(up to permutation) that satisfy all conditions and have product less than
16: (2, 2, 2) and (2, 2, 3). Notice that in both cases, |E| = |U | × |V |,
where every pair of edges are within distance of 2 of each other, which means
graph G can only be distance-2 colored with at least |E| colors, which in this
case is 4. Together with the upper bound from Section 4.4, this proves that
CAD(3, 4) = CCD(3, 4) = 4.
Similarly, it can be shown that CAD(3, 6) = log2 27. There are only two
combinations that satisfy all conditions in Theorem 4.2 and have product
less than 27: (2, 3, 3) and (2, 3, 4). Again, |E| = |U | × |V |, so at least
|E| = 6 colors are needed, which proves that CAD(3, 6) = log2 27.
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